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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FISCHER, Trustees of the William and 
Ann Fischer Revocable Trust, 
 
 Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
v. 
 
JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE 
C. CROSTON, husband and wife, and 
ALL UNKNOWN OWNERS AND/OR 
OTHER PERSONS OR ENTITIES 
CLAIMING ANY INTEREST IN THE 
FOLLOWING DESCRIBED REAL 
PROPERTY, (see file for property 
description), 
 
 Defendants/ Appellants. 
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 Appeal from the District Court of the 
 Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
 in and for the County of Bonneville 
 
 HONORABLE JOEL E. TINGEY, District Judge. 
 
 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
 
Karl R. Decker 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Attorney for  Respondents 
Robin D. Dunn 
477 Pleasant County Ln . 
P.O Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
Attorney for  Appellants 
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Seventh Judicial District Court - Bonneville County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2016-0002894-OC Current Judge: Joel E. Tingey 
William Fischer, etal. vs. James Croston, etal. 
User: ABIRCH 
William Fischer, Margaret Ann Fischer vs. James Croston, Majorie C. Croston, Unknown Owners 
Date 
5/31/2016 
6/6/2016 
6/27/2016 
6/28/2016 
7/1 /2016 
7/13/2016 
7/14/2016 
7/20/2016 
8/23/2016 
Code 
SMIS 
NCOC 
NOAP 
NOAP 
COMP 
MOTN 
AFFD 
ORDR 
SMIS 
NOAP 
NOAP 
ASRV 
NTTD 
ANSW 
PPUB 
ROST 
ANSW 
ORDR 
HRSC 
HRHD 
ORDR 
User 
BJENNINGS 
BJENNINGS 
BJENNINGS 
BJENNINGS 
BJENNINGS 
BJENNINGS 
BJENNINGS 
BJENNINGS 
SOUTHWIC 
SOUTHWIC 
TCORONA 
TCORONA 
TCORONA 
TCORONA 
TCORONA 
CPETERSON 
TCORONA 
JNICHOLS 
JNICHOLS 
SOUTHWIC 
SOUTHWIC 
SOUTHWIC 
SOUTHWIC 
Judge 
Summons Issued Joel E. Tingey 
New Case Filed-Other Claims Joel E. Tingey 
Plaintiff: Fischer, William Notice Of Appearance Joel E. Tingey 
Karl R. Decker 
Plaintiff: Fischer, Margaret Ann Notice Of Joel E. Tingey 
Appearance Karl R. Decker 
Filing: AA- All initial civil case filings in District Joel E. Tingey 
Court of any type not listed in categories E, F and 
H(1) Paid by: Decker, Karl R. (attorney for 
Fischer, William) Receipt number: 0023387 
Dated: 6/3/2016 Amount $221 .00 {Check) For: 
Fischer, William (plaintiff) 
Verified Complaint to Quiet Title Joel E. Tingey 
Motion to Effect Service by Publication Joel E. Tingey 
Affidavit in Support of Motion to Effect Service by Joel E. Tingey 
Publication 
Order Granting Motion to Effect Service by Joel E. Tingey 
Publication 
Summons Issued Joel E. Tingey 
Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other Joel E. Tingey 
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Croston, 
James (defendant) Receipt number: 0027598 
Dated: 6/28/2016 Amount: $136.00 (Check) For: 
Croston, James (defendant) 
Defendant: Croston, James Notice Of 
Appearance Robin D. Dunn 
Defendant: Croston, Majorie C. Notice Of 
Appearance Robin D. Dunn 
Affidavit of Service - 06/11 /16 James and 
Marjorie Croston 
Notice Of Intent To Take Default 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Defendant's Answer to Complaint Counterclaim Joel E. Tingey 
Of The Defendants 
Proof Of Publication June 16, 23, 30 and July 7, Joel E. Tingey 
2016 
Plaintiffs Request For Trial Setting Joel E. Tingey 
Plaintiffs Answers To Counterclaims Joel E. Tingey 
Order for Telephonic Status conference Joel E. Tingey 
Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference Joel E. Tingey 
08/23/2016 08:30 AM) 
Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled Joel E. Tingey 
on 08/23/2016 08:30 AM: Hearing Held in 
chambers off the record 
Order and Notice Setting Court Trial Joel E. Tingey 
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Page 2 of 4 Case: CV-2016-0002894-OC Current Judge: Joel E. Tingey 
William Fischer, etal. vs. James Croston, etal. 
William Fischer, Margaret Ann Fischer vs. James Croston, Majorie C. Croston, Unknown Owners 
Date Code User Judge 
8/23/2016 HRSC SOUTHWIC Hearing Scheduled (Trial 03/21/2016 10:00 AM) Joel E. Tingey 
2 - 3 days 
HRSC SOUTHWIC Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Joel E. Tingey 
02/22/2017 08:45 AM) 
9/8/2016 NTOS TCORONA Notice Of Service Plaintiffs Forst Set Of Joel E. Tingey 
Interrogatories, Requests For Production , And 
Requests For Admiss ion 
10/11/2016 NTOS BJENNINGS Notice Of Service - Response to Plaintiffs First Joel E. Tingey 
Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Production, 
and Requests for Admission 
11/29/2016 HRSC SOUTHWIC Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/18/2017 09:00 Joel E. Tingey 
AM) Decker - Mo SJ 
12/20/2016 MOTN JNICHOLS Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment Joel E. Tingey 
MEMO JNICHOLS Memorandum In Support oF Plaintiffs' Motion For Joel E. Tingey 
Summary Judgment 
JNICHOLS Declaration Of W. Forest Fischer In Support OF Joel E. Tingey 
Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment 
JNICHOLS Declaration Of M. Ann Fischer Joel E. Tingey 
JNICHOLS Declaration Of Sharon Anderson Joel E. Tingey 
JNICHOLS Declaration Of Larry Kennedy Joel E. Tingey 
NOTH JNICHOLS Notice Of Hearing RE: Motion For Summary Joel E. Tingey 
Judgment 01/18/2017 9:00AM 
12/30/2016 MOTN BJENNINGS Defendant's Motion to Continue Trial Joel E. Tingey 
AFFD BJENNINGS Affidavit of Robin D. Dunn in Support of Motion to Joel E. Tingey 
Continue Trial 
1/4/2017 TCORONA Verification Joel E. Tingey 
MEMO TCORONA Memorandum Of the Defendants In Opposition Joel E. Tingey 
To Pla intiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment 
AFFD TCORONA Affidavit Of Linda D. Penning In Opposition Of Joel E. Tingey 
Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment 
1/10/2017 RESP TCORONA Plaintiffs Response To Motion To Continue Trial Joel E. Tingey 
1/11 /2017 MEMO BJENNINGS Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Joel E. Tingey 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment 
MOTN BJENNINGS Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Affidavit of Linda D. Joel E. Tingey 
Penning 
MEMO BJENNINGS Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Joel E. Tingey 
Motion to Strike Affidavit of Linda D. Penning 
BJENNINGS Declaration of W. Forrest Fischer in Support of Joel E. Tingey 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike 
NOTH BJENNINGS Notice Of Hearing - Plaintiffs ' Motion to Strike Joel E. Tingey 
Affidavit of Linda D. Penning - 01/18/2017 at 9:00 
AM 
MOTN BJENNINGS Plaintiffs' Motion to Shorten Time to Hear Motion Joel E. Tingey 
to Strike Affidavit of Linda D. Penning 
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Seventh Judicial District Court - Bonneville County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2016-0002894-OC Current Judge: Joel E. Tingey 
William Fischer, etal. vs. James Croston, etal. 
User: ABIRCH 
William Fischer, Margaret Ann Fischer vs. James Croston, Majorie C. Croston, Unknown Owners 
Date 
1/11/2017 
1/18/2017 
1/19/2017 
1/24/201 7 
1/31/201 7 
2/2/2017 
2/6/201 7 
2/23/201 7 
Code 
NOTH 
DCHH 
MINE 
ORDR 
JDMT 
CDIS 
HRVC 
HRVC 
STATUS 
AFFD 
MEMO 
BNDC 
User 
BJENNINGS 
SOUTHWIC 
SOUTHWIC 
SOUTHWIC 
SOUTHWIC 
SOUTHWlC 
SOUTHWIC 
SOUTHWIC 
SOUTHWIC 
TCORONA 
TCORONA 
BJENNINGS 
BJENNINGS 
TCORONA 
BJENNINGS 
TCORONA 
Notice Of Hearing - Plaintiffs' Motion to Shorten 
Time to Hear Motion to Strike Affidavit of Linda 
Penning - 01/18/2017 at 9:00 AM 
Judge 
Joel E. Tingey 
Hearing resu lt for Motion scheduled on Joel E. Tingey 
01/18/2017 09:00 AM : District Court Hearing Hel1 
Court Reporter: Jack fuller 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Decker - Mo SJ -- under 100 
Minute Entry Joel E. Tingey 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 1/18/2017 
Time: 9:01 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Jack Fuller 
Minutes Clerk: Marlene Southwick 
Tape Number: 5 
Memorandum Decision and ORDER Joel E. Tingey 
Judgment -- title in property is quieted and vested Joel E. Tingey 
in Fischer//Defs' counterclaim is dismissed with 
prejudice 
Civil Disposition entered for: Croston, James, Joel E. Tingey 
Defendant; Croston, Majorie C., Defendant; 
Unknown Owners,, Defendant; Fischer, Margaret 
Ann , Plaintiff; Fischer, William, Plaintiff. Filing 
date: 1/19/2017 
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled Joel E. Tingey 
on 02/22/2017 08:45 AM: Hearing Vacated 
Hearing result for Trial scheduled on 03/2 1/2016 Joel E. Tingey 
10:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 2 - 3 days 
Case Status Changed: closed Joel E. Tingey 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any Joel E. Tingey 
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by: 
Fischer, William Receipt number: 0005814 
Dated: 1/24/2017 Amount: $1 .00 (Check) 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Joel E. T ingey 
Additional Fee For Certificate And Seal Paid by: 
Fischer, William Receipt number: 0005814 
Dated: 1/24/2017 Amoun t: $1.00 (Check) 
Affidavit of W . Forrest Fischer in Support of 
Memorandum of Attorneys' Fees and Costs 
Joel E. Tingey 
Memorandum of Attorneys' Fees and Costs Joel E. T ingey 
Objection to the Pla intiffs Requests For Fees And Joel E. T ingey 
Costs 
Reply in Support of Memorandum of Attorneys' Joel E. Tingey 
Fees and Costs 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 10221 Dated Joel E. Tingey 
2/23/2017 for 100.00) 
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Seventh Judicial District Court - Bonneville County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2016-0002894-OC Current Judge: Joel E. Tingey 
William Fischer, etal. vs. James Croston, etal. 
User: ABIRCH 
William Fischer, Margaret Ann Fischer vs. James Croston , Majorie C. Croston , Unknown Owners 
Date 
2/23/2017 
2/24/201 7 
3/2/2017 
3/8/201 7 
3/30/2017 
Code 
STATUS 
NOTC 
APSC 
ORDR 
CDIS 
APSC 
CERTAP 
RQST 
User 
TCORONA 
TCORONA 
TCORONA 
TCORONA 
SOUTHWIC 
SOUTHWIC 
SOUTHWIC 
ABIRCH 
ABIRCH 
JNICHOLS 
TCORONA 
Case Status Changed: Closed pend ing clerk 
action 
Judge 
Joel E. Tingey 
Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Joel E. Tingey 
Supreme Court Paid by: Dunn, Robin D. 
(attorney for Croston, James) Receipt number: 
001 0222 Dated: 2/23/2017 Amount: $129.00 
(Check) For: Croston, James (defendant) 
Notice Of Appeal 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
Order 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Judgment of Costs and Attorney Fees -- Pis are Joel E. Tingey 
awarded a total jdmt of $2936.50 plus interest 
Civil Disposition entered for: Croston, James, Joel E. Tingey 
Defendant; Croston, Majorie C., Defendant; 
Unknown Owners., Defendant; Fischer, Margaret 
Ann, Plaintiff; Fischer, William, Plaintiff. Filing 
date: 2/24/2017 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
Clerk's Certificate of Appeal 
Plaintiffs Request For Add itional Record 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Joel E. Tingey 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any Joel E. Tingey 
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by: 
holden Receipt number: 0015641 Dated: 
3/30/2017 Amount: $2.00 (Check) 
6Karl R. Decker, ISB #3390 
W. Forrest Fischer, ISB # 10009 
kd ck r@holdenlegal.com 
wfischer@holdenlegal.com 
CASE ASSIGNED TOCJUNE VILLE COUNTY. IDAHO 
HON. JOEL E. TINGEl'U1B HAY 31 PH ~= 39 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P .L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone 208-523-0620 
Facsimile 208-523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVE TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN FISCHER, 
Trustees of the William and Ann Fischer Revocable 
Trust, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAMES F. CROSTON and MAJORIE C. 
CROSTON, husband and wife; 
AND ALL UNKOWN OWNERS AND/OR 
OTHER PERSONS OR ENTITIES CLAMINING 
ANY INTEREST IN THE FOLLOWING 
DESCRIBED REAL PROPERTY: 
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 4, Block 12, 
of the Original Ammon Townsite, Bonneville 
County, Idaho; running thence N. 88°33 '58" W. 
330.00 feet to the N011hwest corner of said Lot 4; 
then S. 00°00'21"W. along the West line of said Lot 
4 a distance of 8.99 feet to an existing fence line; 
thence S. 89°41 '36" E . along said existing fence line 
329.90 feet to a point on the East line of said Lot 4; 
thence N. 00°00 '21" E. along said East line 2.50 feet 
to the POINT OF BEGINNING 
Defendants. 
VERJFI D COMPLAINT TO QUIET TlTLE- l 
Case No. CV-2016-~Jm.._,. ..___...__L!..__ _ 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT To QUIET 
TITLE 
Fee Category: A.A. 
Fee: $221.00 
7COME NOW Plaintiffs William R. Fischer and M. Ann Fischer, Trustees of the William 
and Ann Fischer Revocable Trust ("Plaintiffs"), by and through their attorneys of record, Karl R. 
Decker and W. Forrest Fischer of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., and for cause of 
action against the above-captioned Defendants, allege as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiffs own real property in Bonneville County, Idaho located at 3000 S. 
Western Avenue, Ammon, Idaho. 
2. Defendants James F. Croston and Ma1jorie C. Croston ("Defendants") are residents 
of Spokane County, Washington and own real property located at 3020 S. Western Avenue, 
Ammon, Idaho. 
3. Defendants "all unknown owners and/or other persons or entities claiming any 
interest in the property" are unknown individuals or entities who have an interest in, or who may 
claim an interest in, the Croston Property as defined below. 
J URISDCCTIO AND VENUE 
4. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action, pursuant to Idaho Code 
§§ 1-705 and 10-1201, because the controversy centers on real property located in Bonneville 
Cow1ty, Idaho. · 
5. This Court has jurisdiction over the Defendants pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-5 14( c ), 
because they own the real property that is subject to this lawsuit which is located within the State 
ofldaho. 
6. Venue in this action properly lies in this Court, pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-401 , 
because this action seeks to quiet title to real property located in Bonnevi lie CoLmty, Idaho. 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT TO QUI ET TITLE- 2 
8STATEMENT OFF ACTS 
7. Plaintiffs own real property in Bo1meville County, Idaho located at 3000 S. 
Western Avenue, Ammon, Idaho ("Fischer Property") which is legall y described as: 
Lot 3, and the South 59 feet of Lot 2, Block 12, Ammon 
Townsite, Bonneville County, State of Idaho, according to 
the recorded plat thereof. 
8. Plaintiffs acquired the Fischer property in their fiduciary capacity on November 2, 
2001, via Warranty Deed from themselves, William R. Fischer and M. Ann Fischer, in their 
individual capacity (the "Fischers"). 
9. Defendants' own real property located at 3020 S. Western Avenue, Ammon, Idaho 
("Croston Property") which is legally described as: 
Lot number fo ur (4), Block number twelve (12) of the 
Ammon Townsite, Bo1meville County, State of Idaho as per 
recorded plat thereof. 
10. The No11h boundary of the Croston Prope11y is the South boundary of the Fischer 
Property. Since at least 199 1, when the Fischers built a home on the Fischer Prope1ty, the 
structures on the Croston Property have been vacant and in a constant state of disrepair. 
11. When the Fischers acquired the Fischer Property in 1991 , there was an existing 
post-and-wire fence ("Old Fence") mnning along the Fischer Property' s southern boundary, 
dividing the Fischer Property and Croston Property. Since that time, the Fischers and Plaint iffs 
have always recognized the Old Fence as the southern prope1ty boundary of the Fischer Property. 
12. When the Fischers acquired the Fischer Prope1ty in 1991, there existed an access 
road ("Access Road") located immediately north of the Old Fence, running paral lel to the Old 
Fence for approximately 230 feet until ending at an old tin shed with a concrete foundation 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT TO QUIET TITLE- 3 
9("Shed"). This Access R oad existed prior to the Fischers' purchase of the Fischer Property and 
has existed since that time. 
13. From 199 1 to 1996, the F ischers used the Access Road to access the western part of 
the Fischer Property and the Shed. 
14. In approximately 1996, the Fischers constructed a large garage ("Garage") 
approximately 140 feet to the west of the easternmost boundary, and approximately 15 feet north 
of the Old Fence. 
15. Collectively, the Fischers and Plaintiffs have exclusively used the Access Road for 
access to the western portion of the Fischer Property and the Garage for over 24 years. 
16. In or about 1996, the Fischers removed the Shed in order to utilize the space it 
occupied, but left the Shed's concrete foundation intact. 
17. Until 2015, neither the Fischers nor Plaintiffs have ever witnessed Defendants or 
anyone else, maintaining the Old Fence. As a result, the Old Fence decayed to a point that certain 
portions of it had failed and fallen onto the Fischer Property. 
18. During or about August 201 5, the Plaintiffs decided to replace the dilapidated Old 
Fence with a new fence. While in the midst replacing the Old Fence, Defendants sent the Fischers 
a letter dated September 4, 2015, wherein they threatened to sue the Fischers for trespass and 
malicious injury to the Croston Prope1ty ("Demand Letter") for their work on the Old Fence. 
This Demand Letter also required that the Fischers " restore [the] prope1ty to [Defendants'] 
satisfaction." 
19. Upon receiving the Demand Letter, Plaintiffs immediately ceased replacing the Old 
Fence in order to investigate the veracity of Defendants' claims. 
VERfflED COMPLAINT TO QULET T ITLE- 4 
10
20. Following receipt of the Demand Letter, Plaintiffs commissioned Ellswo11h & 
Associates, PLLC to conduct a survey of the boundary line between the Fischer Property and 
Croston Property. During this survey, the surveyor made several survey marks on the Fischer 
Property to mark E llsworth' s understanding of the location of the lot boundaries according to the 
recorded plat of the Ammon Townsite. ("Plat") 
2 1. Upon visual review of the survey markers, it appeared that the location of the Old 
Fence did not fo llow the lot line shown on the Plat. Instead, the easternmost post of the Old Fence 
appeared to begin approximately two feet and a half south of the north lot line of the Croston 
Prope11y shown on the Plat, with the Old Fence rwming in a straight line to a westernmost point 
approximately 8 feet south the lot line of the Croston Property shown on the Plat. 
22. The area located between the Old Fence and the platted boundary, as shown by the 
Ellsworth survey, consists of 1,896 square feet and is legally described as follows: 
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 4, Block 12, of the Original 
Ammon Townsite, Bonneville County, Idaho; running thence N . 
88°33' 58" W. 330.00 feet to the No1 hwest corner of said Lot 4; 
then S. 00°00'21 "W. along the West line of said Lot 4 a distance of 
8.99 feet to an existing fence line; thence S. 89°4 1 ' 36" E. along said 
existing fence line 329.90 feet to a point on the East line of said Lot 
4; thence N. 00°00'21" E. along said East line 2.50 feet to the 
POINT OF BEGINNING 
(hereinafter referred to as "Tract l "). Tract I is illustrated as follows: 
VER.I Fl ED COMPLAfNT TO QUIET TITLE- 5 
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AMMO TOWNSITE 
LOT 3 
BLOCK 12 
New fence Line 
0 rl I, N. tl',o!f"JJ'.So • w. (P) 
0.044 AC. 
Old Fence LOT 4 
Fischer 
Property 
Croston 
Prope1ty 
0 
0 
,; 
~ 
'l:: 
!<i ~ . l?i 
~ i.. 
<:) <l p ½ 
<:) (;j Cl 
i ~ 
Cl) 
23 . After reviewing the survey and identifying the Tract Plaintiffs ent their own 
demand letter to Defendants on September 24, 2015, notifying them of the fence line discrepancy, 
asserting their legal right to Tract 1, and offering settlement of any potential issues between the 
Parties. 
24. Additionally Plaintiffs posted two "No Trespassing'' signs along the Old Fence. 
25. On September 27 2015 Linda Penning ("Penning ') allegedly acting on behalf of 
Defendants, constructed a new wired fence along what they assumed to be the boundary line 
( ew Fence"). As Penning prepared to construct the fence, Plaintiffs provided her with a copy 
of Plaintiffs' September 24, 2015, demand letter and requested that she cease building the New 
Fence. Penning refused and proceeded to complete the New Fence by the end of the day. 
26. When the Plaintiffs inspected the New Fence the following day, they discovered 
that their" o Trespassing" signs on the Old Fence had been removed. 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT TO QUTET TlTLE- 6 
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FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Declaratory Judgment - I.C. §10-1201) 
27. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 26 of this Complaint as if 
set forth in full at this point. 
28. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 10-120 I , this Com1 has j m·isdiction to detem1ine the 
rights, status, and legal relations of Plaintiffs and Defendants with respect to (I) the ownership of 
Tract 1; (2) the boundary between the Fischer Property and Croston Property; and (3) the location 
of the fences which have been constructed along said boundary. 
29. Pursuant to Idaho Code §10-1202 and Idaho Code §10-1213, Plaintiffs have 
standing to bring this petition for a declaration of their rights. 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Boundary by Agreement or Acquiescence) 
30. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 tlu·ough 26 of this Complaint as if 
set forth in full at thi s point. 
31. The boundary line between the Fischer Property and the Croston Property was 
established to be the location of the Old Fence by construction of the Old Fence at a time when the 
legal boundary line between the properties was either not surveyed and/or was either unknown, 
uncertain, or in dispute. 
32. By agreement between Plaintiffs' predecessors in interest and Defendants' 
predecessors in interest, the Old Fence was placed on the boundary line between the Fischer 
Property and Croston Property. 
33. The Old Fence has been historically treated as the true boundary line between the 
Fischer Property and Croston Prope1 y fo r more than two decades and all the owners of the 
VER fFIED COM PLAINT TO QU IET TITLE- 7 
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respecti ve properties have either agreed or acquiesced to this boundary until the events of the fall 
of 2015. 
34. On information and belief, at the time that the Old Fence was constructed, the legal 
boundary line between the Fischer Propetty and the Croston Property was uncertain, not surveyed, 
unknown, or in dispute. 
35. All prior owners of the Fischer Property and Croston Prope1ty have, from the time 
that the Old Fence was erected, believed and treated the Old Fence as the true boundary line 
between the Fischer Property and Croston Propetty. 
36. The Old Fence was constructed pursuant to an agreement fixing the boundary line 
between the Fischer Property and the Coston Property. 
37. Pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 6-401 , el seq., Plaintiffs are entitled to have legal title to 
Tract I quieted in their favor, and are entitled to a judgment determining that Plaintiffs ' right, tit le, 
claim and interest in Tract 1 is superior to any right, t itle, claim, or interest of Defendants in Tract 
1. 
38. The Old Fence has existed fo r well over 24 years, since before the Fischers fi rst 
purchased the Fischer Propetty 
TlllRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Quiet Title - I.C. §6-401) 
39. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs l through 26 and 30 through 38 of 
this Complaint as if set fo11h in fu ll at this point. 
40. Tract l has been usually cultivated or improved by Plaintiffs and their predecessors 
m confornlity with the requirements of Idaho Code § 5-208(1)(a); and/or Tract 1 has been 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT TO QUIET TITLE- 8 
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protected by a substantial enclosure in conformity with the requirements of Idaho Code § 
5-208(1)(b); and/or although not enclosed, Tract I has been used fo r the ordinary use of the 
occupant in conformity with the requirements ofldaho Code§ 5-208(I)(c); and/or Tract 1 is part 
of a known farm or single lot, which has been partially improved in conformity wi th the 
requirements ofldaho Code§ 5-208( l)(d). 
41. Plaintiffs' possession of Tract 1 is and was open, notorious, continuous, and hostile 
to the rights of all others. 
42. Plaintiffs have managed and used Tract I in the usual manner together with the rest 
of the Fischer Property. 
43. Plaintiffs' and Plaintiffs' predecessor's use and possession of Tract l has been for 
more than twenty-five (25) years prior to amendment ofldaho Code § 5-207 or 206. 
44. Title to Tract 1 should be quieted in Plaintiffs on the basis of adverse possession, 
free of all claim s of Defendants and any one claiming tlu·ough or after Defendants. 
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Waste & Trespass - I.C. §6-202) 
45. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 tlu·ough 26 of this Complaint as if 
set forth in ful I at this point. 
46. At the tin1e that Defendants constructed the New Fence, Plaintiffs were the legal 
owners of Tract 1. 
47. Prior to constructing the New Fence, Defendants were notified of Plaintiffs' claim 
to Tract 1. 
VERIFJED COMPLAINT TO QUIET T ITLE- 9 
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48. Prior to construction of the New Fence, Plaintiffs erected "No Trespassing" signs 
along the Old Fence. 
49. Defendants wi llfully and intentionally removed Plaintiffs' "No Trespassing" signs 
and constructed the New Fence within Tract 1, causing damages to Plaintiffs and the Fischer 
Property. 
50. Defendants' actions constitute waste and willful trespass on real property and the 
presence of the New Fence constitutes a continuing trespass on real property. 
51. Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of treble damages and their reasonable attorney's 
fees in bringing this action pmsuant to J.C. §6-202, awarded against Defendants. 
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
(Easement by Prescription) 
52. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 26 of this Complaint as if 
set forth in full at this point. 
53. Plaintiffs have used Tract 1 to access the Garage and the western part of the Fischer 
Property for more than 5 years. 
54. Plaintiffs' use of Tract 1 has been open and notorious, continuous and 
uninterrupted, and adverse to the legal owner of Tract 1. 
55. Defendants knew, or should have known, of Plaintiffs' exclusive and continuous 
use of Tract l. 
56. Plaintiffs are entitled to a prescriptive easement over Tract 1. 
VERIFIED COMPLATNT TO QUIET TITLE- 10 
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CLAJM FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
57. Plaintiffs were required to retain the services of an attorney to prosecute their 
claims in this action. 
58. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover from Defendants their reasonable attorney's fees 
and costs incurred in this action pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-202, Idaho Code § 12-121, and Idaho 
Rule of C ivil P rocedure 54(d) and 54(e), and other relevant provisions ofldaho law. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs prays the judgment of the court as follows: 
A. That the Court order and decree that Tract I belongs to Plaintiffs, and that all right, 
title and interest to such real property cun-ently belongs to and is owned by Plaintiffs free and 
clear of any right, title and interest of all Defendants; 
B. That title to Tract 1 be quieted in fee simple in favor of Plaintiffs against the claims 
of all Defendants and all unknown claimants and/or owners thereof; 
C. That Plaintiffs receive judgment against any defendant(s) who contest(s) this action 
to quiet title in Plaintiffs to Tract 1 for any and all reasonable costs and attorney fees; and 
D. For such other costs and disbursements as may be authorized by law or Court rule, 
including any advances by Plaintiffs for the preservation, protection, maintenance, or operation of 
Tract 1 and for any and all other authorized Court costs. 
E. In the alternative, for a grant of a prescriptive easement in favor of Plaintiffs for the 
continued use of the Tract I . 
F. For such other relief as this Court deems just and equitable. 
VERIFIED COMPLAfNT TO QUIET TITLE- 11 
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DATED this i l day of May, 2016. 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT TO QUIET TITLE- 12 
Karl R. Decker 
W. Fonest Fischer 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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VERIFICATION OF COMPLAINT 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
WILLIAM R FISCHER and M. ANN FISCHER Trustees of the William and Ann 
Fischer Revocable Trust, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say that they are the 
Plaintiffs hereto; that they have read the above Verified Complaint to Quiet Title and 
believe that the facts stated therein are true; and that they are authorized to make this 
verification. 
,,,,, .... ,,,,, 
~,,'\>s.t.!:!!.cf ,,,, 
(seal) ~ ~ •••• •· •·•• .. ~>~ 
... wri:..,;. • • ..-"\, 
: -.:- I ..-,,_QTA~J,- •. ,:. 
- : ' ~ : 
= : --·-- i = 
,:. \ Pus•\V : : 
.. . ~ : ... 
""' .. . 0 ... 
, ... n •• •• """ ~ v~ •• ••• ~ , 
.,, -1.,:;·•· ...... Q~ ,$ 
,,,, f: OF\ , ' 
,,,,,, .. ,,,,, 
1am and Ann 
M. Ann Fischer, trustee of William and Ann 
Fischer Revocable Trust 
No a Public for Idaho 
Residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho 
My C01mnission Expires: tJ/ - ~ - .?(}c)-/ 
G:\WPDATA\WFF\18611 (Fischer Property)\Pleadings\Verified Complaint to Quiel Tille.docx 
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DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC. 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box277 
Rigby ID 83442 
Telephone; (208) 745-9202 
Fac9imile: (208) 745-8160 
rgunn@dunnlawoffices.com 
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Attorney for Defendants James F. and Matjode C. Croston 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN FISCHER, ) 
Trustees of the William and .Ann Fischer ) 
Revocable Trust, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. 
CROSTON, husband and wife; 
AND ALL UNKNOWN OWNERS AND/OR 
OTHER PERSONS OR ENTITIES CLAIMING 
ANY INTEREST IN THE POI.LOWING 
DESCRIBED REAL PROPER1Y: 
Beginning at the No,:theast comer of Lot 4, Block 
12, of the Original Ammon Townsite, Bonneville 
County, Idaho; running thence N. 88°33'58" W. 
330.00 feet to the Northwest cornet of said Lot 4; 
thence S 00°00'21"W. along the West line of said Lot 
4 a distance of 8.99 feet to an existing fence line; 
thence S. 89°4tt36,, E. along said existing fence line 
329.90 feet to a point on the East line of said Lot 4; 
thence N. 00°00,21" E. along said East line 2.50 feet 
to the POINT OF BEGINNING. 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-16-2894 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 
COUNTERCLAIM OF THE 
DEFENDANTS 
COME NOW, the defendants, JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. 
CROSTON, husband and wife, by and thtough the undersigned counsel, and ANSWER that 
complaint on file herein as follows: 
20
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I. 
The complaint herein fails to set forth a cause of action for which relief may be granted 
because the elements for a quiet title action are lacking. IRCP 12 (b)(6). 
II. 
These answering defendants deny each and every allegation in the complaint not 
specifically admitted hereafter. 
III. 
As to each individual paragraph of the complaint, these answering defendants respond as 
follows: 
1. Admit. 
2. Admit. 
3. Lack information to form a belief and, therefore, deny. 
4. Admit. 
5. Deny. 
6. Admit that this is a quiet title action with such allegations but deny it is a proper 
use of the quiet title theory. However, venue is admitted, 
7. U pon information and belief admit subject to verification of the legal description, 
8. No person al knowledge and, therefore, deny. 
9. Admit. 
10. Admit that the properties abut and deny the balance. 
11. An old fence existed but circumstances changed between the parties. Thus, 
partially admit and deny the balance. 
12. D eny. 
13. The plaintiff had rurned his large truck on the defendant property which was 
objectionable to the defendants. 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM .2. 
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14. Deny the measurements. A garage was built. 
15. Deny. 
16. Unknown to these answering defendants and, therefore, deny. 
17. Admit that the old fence became unusable and it is alleged the plaintiffs removed 
the old fence. 
18, Admit a letter was sent to establish the correct location of the fence. 
19, Unknown what the plaintiffs thought or investigated and, therefore, deny. 
20. Admit a survey was completed. 
21. Admit that the survey did not match the old fence line. 
22. Unknown to these answering defendants other than the survey markers we(e 
placed in the appropriate location according to the surveyor. 
23. A letter was sent to the defendants indicating the proper survey markings, The 
balance of the lette( was self-serving and irrelevant. 
24. Admit. 
25. The plaintiffs had previously desired that the new fence be placed on the survey 
markings, The defendants complied, On the day that the fence was being placed, 
the plaintiffs then desired to suspend the fencing. The defendants needed a fence for 
livestock and completed the fence. 
26. Allegation is confusing as to which party is being discussed. Denied. 
27. Defendants re-allege answers to paragraphs 1-26. 
28. Admit. 
29. Admit if there exist proper allegations. 
30. Defendants re-allege paragraphs 1-26. 
31. Deny. 
32. Deny. 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM -3-
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33. Deny. 
34. Unknown, Deny. 
35. Deny. 
36. Deny. 
37. Deny. 
38. The old fence existed for some rime but it i5 unknown, at this time, as to when 
the old fence was erected. The balance is denied. 
39, Defendants re-allege prior answers of paragraphs 1-26; 30-38. 
40. Deny. 
41. Deny. 
42. Deny. 
43. Deny. 
44. Deny, 
45. Defendants re-allege answers to par. 1-26. 
46. Deny. 
47. Deny. 
48. The old fence did not exist in total and had bei:n removed. No trespassing signs 
were in some location. 
49. Deny. 
50. Deny. 
51. Deny. 
52. Defendants re-allege answers to par. 1~26. 
53. Deny. 
54. Deny. 
55. Deny. 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM + 
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56. Deny. 
57. Plaintiffs retained an attorney but were not required to do so. 
58. Deny. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The plaintiffs have failed to allege proper elements for quiet ride, boundary disputes and 
trespass. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The plaintiffs recognized that the "old fence" was in disrepair or removed. The plaintiffs 
removed most of the remaining portions of the fence. The plaintiffs requested a survey and 
indicated to the defendants that the survey would control. The plaintiffs indicated that the new 
fence should be placed on the survey and would pay one-half (1/2) of the cost. Defendants 
complied. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The parties have entered into an accord and satisfaction on the location of the new fence 
which would divide the properties appropriately between the two parcels. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The parries have never agreed upon a boundary based upon the old fence or the 
placement of the old fence. The parties specifically agreed to the survey to be controlling. Only 
after the plaintiffs discovered the survey was moved southward was any objection brought forth 
from plaintiffs to the defendants. 
REQUEST FOR FEES AND COSTS 
The defendants request their fees and costs for defending the complaint filed by the 
plaintiffs in this matter. The fees and costs are requested pursuant to statutes, rule and case law 
established in the State of Idaho. 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM -5-
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COUNTERCLAIM 
A. The defendants o'Virn real property in Bonneville County, Idaho. 
B. The plaintiffs own real property south and abutting the real property of the 
defendants. 
P. 007/008 
C. The plaintiffs and these answeting defendants are described in the complaint. 
D. The defendants are elderly and act though thdr agent and daughter, Linda 
Penning. 
E. The parties entered into an agreement that the survey that was being performed 
would control the boundary between the two parcels. 
F . The survey was completed and marked. 
G. The defendants constructed a fence upon the sunrey markings consistent with the 
survey. 
H. The plaintiffs previously had agreed to pay one-half the cost of the fence. 
I. The fence was a necessary item as plans were being made to have livestock to 
keep the grass and weeds eaten. 
J. The plaintiffs refused to honor their agreement as to the boundary after the survey 
and fence were completed. 
K. The plaintiffs owe the defendants for the one-half cost of the fence. 
L. The defendants request fees and costs pursuant to statutes, rules and case law in 
the State of Idaho. 
WHEREFORE, the defendants pray for the following relief: 
1. That the complaint on file be dismissed with prejudice; 
2. That fees and costs be awarded to the defendants for defending the complaint; 
3. That the defendants be awarded the relief requested in the counterclaim; 
4. That the defendants be awarded fees and costs on the counterclaim; and, 
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM -6-
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5. For any and other just relief that is appropriate. 
Dated this 1•t day of Ju]y, 2016. 
ac:JC51 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1°1 day of July, 2016, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was delivered to the following person(s) by: 
__ Hand Delivery 
_ Postage-prepaid mail 
~Facsimile T.ansmission 208 5~ 
Dunn Law Offices, PLLC 
Karl R. Deckec, Esq. 
W. Forrest Fischer, Esq. 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Fa1ls, ID 83405 
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Karl R. Decker, ISB #3 390 
W. Forrest Fischer, ISB # 10009 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls ID 83405 
Telephone 208-523-0620 
Facsimile 208-523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN FISCHER, 
Trustees of the WiJliam and Ann Fischer Revocable 
Trust, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAMES F. CROSTON and MAJORIE C. 
CROSTON, husband and wife; 
AND ALL UNKOWN OWNERS AND/OR 
OTHER PERSONS ORE TITIES CLAMINING 
ANY INT REST IN THE FOLLOWING 
DESCRIBED REAL PROPERTY: 
Beginning at the Northeast comer of Lot 4, Block 12, 
of the Original Ammon Townsite Bonneville 
County, Idaho; running thence . 88°33'58" W. 
330.00 feet to the orthwest comer of said Lot 4; 
thence S. 00°00'21 "W. along the West line of said 
Lot 4 a distance of 8. 99 feet to an existing fence line; 
thence S. 89°41 '36" E. along said existing fence line 
329.90 feet to a point on the East line of said Lot 4; 
thence N. 00°00'21" E. along said East line 2.50 feet 
to the POINT OF BEGINNING 
Defendants. 
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Case No. CV-2016-2894 
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JAMES F. CROSTON and MAJORJE C. 
CROSTON, husband and wife· 
Co unterclaimants 
s. 
\VILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN FISCHER, 
Trustees of the William and Ann Fischer Revocable 
Trust, 
Counter Defendant . 
COME now Plaintiffs/Counter Defendants William R. Fischer and M. Ann Fischer, 
Trustees of the William and Ann Fischer Revocable Trust ("Plaintiffs"), and answer 
Defendants'/Counterclaimants James F. Croston and Majorie C. Croston ("Defendants') 
Counterclaim of the Defendants ("Counterclaim' ) as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs deny each and every allegation in the Counterclaim not specifically admitted 
hereafter. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs Defendants' Counterclaim as follows: 
1. Answering the allegations in paragraph A of the Counterclaim Plaintiffs admit the 
allegations thereof. 
2. Answering the allegations m paragraph B of the Counterclaim, Plaintiffs d ny the 
allegations thereof. Plaintiffs own real property to the north and abutting the real property 
of Defendants. 
3. Answering the allegations in paragraph C of the Counterclaim, Plaintiffs admit the 
al legations thereof. 
PLAINTIFF ., ANSWER TO COUNTERCLA IM - 2 
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4. Answering the allegations in Paragraph D of the Counterclaim, Plaintiffs state that they 
lack sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations and therefore 
deny the allegations thereof. Plaintiffs admit that Linda Penning has represented herself 
to Plaintiffs that she is the agent of Defendants. 
5. Answering the all egations in paragraph E of the Counterclaim, Plaintiffs deny the 
allegations thereof. 
6. Answering the allegations of Paragraph F of the Counterclaim, Plaintiffs admit that a 
survey was conducted and that survey pins were placed. 
7. Answering the allegations of Paragraph G of the Counterclaim, Plaintiffs admit that 
Defendants constructed a fence over the objections of Plaintiffs, but deny that the fence 
was constructed consistent with the survey. At the time that Defendants constructed the 
fence, no survey had been recorded. 
8. Answering the allegations of Paragraph H, Plaintiffs denies the allegations thereof. 
9. Answering the allegations of Paragraph I of the Counterclaim, Plaintiffs lack sufficient 
infom1ation to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations and therefore deny the 
allegations thereof. As of the date of this Answer, no livestock are on Defendants 
property and the grass and weeds have become overgrown. 
10. Answering the allegations of Paragraph J of the Counterclaim, Plaintiffs deny the existence 
of an agreement and therefore deny the allegations thereof. 
11. Answering the allegations of Paragraph K of the Counterclaim, Plaintiffs deny the 
allegations thereof. 
12. Paragraph L contains no allegation against Plaintiffs. However, inasmuch as paragraph L 
alleges that Plaintiffs are liable to pay Defendants fees and costs, that allegation is denied. 
PLA IN TIFFS' A NSWER TO COUNTERCLAIMS - 3 
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THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
D fondants fai l to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate the claimed or alleged damage. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants' claim fails by reason of lack of consideration. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Inasmuch as Defendants seek equitable relief, such relief is barred under the doctrine of 
unclean hands. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants ' allegation of the existence of an oral agreement or contract between the patties 
is barred by Idaho's Statute of Frauds. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for the following judgment: 
l. For an Order dismissing Defendants Counterclaim with prejudic and fl.irther 
ordering that Defendants take nothing th reby. 
2. For an Order awarding Plaintiff it reasonable attorneys' fees and costs as allowed 
under Idaho Code §12-120 andl.R.C.P. 54(d) and (e). 
3. For all such other and further relief as may be just and equitable. 
Ill 
Ill 
Ill 
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DATED this Jj_th day of July 2016 . 
P LA INTIFFS' A NSWER TO COUNTERCLAIMS - 5 
. Forrest Fischer 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in 
-\{\ 
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the \:) day of July, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the con-ect postage 
thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with IRCP 5(b ). 
Persons Served: 
Robin D. Dunn 
Dmm Law Offices, PLLC 
4 77 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby ID 83422 
Fax: (208) 745-8160 
G:\WPDATA\WFF\18611 (Fischer Property)\Pleadings\Fischers Answer to Counterclaims.docx 
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Karl R. Decker, ISB #3390 
W. Forrest Fischer, ISB #10009 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FISCHER, Trustees of the William and Ann 
Fischer Revocable Trust, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. 
CROSTON, husband and wife; 
AND ALL UNKNOWN OWNERS AND/OR 
OTHER PERSONS OR ENTITIES 
CLAIMING ANY INTEREST IN THE 
FOLLOWING DESCRIBED REAL 
PROPERTY: 
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 4, 
Block 12, of the Original Ammon Townsite, 
Bonneville County, Idaho; running thence N. 
88°33'58" W. 330.00 feet to the Northwest 
comer of said Lot 4; thence S. 00°00'21"W. 
along the West line of said Lot 4 a distance of 
8.99 feet to an existing fence line; thence S. 
89°41 '36" E. along said existing fence line 
329.90 feet to a point on the East line of said 
Lot 4; thence N. 00°00'21" E. along said East 
line 2.50 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING 
Defendants. 
JAMES F. CROSTO and MARJORIE C. 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY nJDGMENT - l 
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CROSTON, husband and wife; 
Counter Claimants, 
vs. 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FISCHER, Trustees of the William and Ann 
Fischer Revocable Trust, 
Counter Defendants. 
COMES NOW Plaintiffs/Counter Claimants, William R. Fischer And M. Ann Fischer, 
Trustees of the William and Ann Fischer Revocable Trust ("Plaintiffs"), by and through their 
counsel ofrecord, Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., and pursuant to Rule 56 of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure, respectfully move that the Court enter summary judgment in favor of 
Plaintiffs against Defendants/Counter Claimants. There are no genuine issues of material fact that 
would preclude this Court from rendering summary judgment in Plaintiffs' favor. Furthermore, 
Plaintiffs request that the Court award them their damages as well as their costs and attorneys' fees 
incurred in this action. 
This Motion is supported by Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint and following docun1ents 
which are filed concurrently herewith: 
• Declaration of W. Forrest Fischer; 
• Declaration of LruTy Kennedy; 
• Declaration of Sharon Anderson; 
• Declaration of M. Ann Fischer; and 
• Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. 
""~ DATED this _I>'_ day of December, 2016 . 
.ForrestFischer 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in 
\"' 
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the f'LO day of December, 2016, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct postage 
thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with IRCP 5(b ). 
Persons Served: 
Robin D. Dunn 
Dunn Law Offices, PLLC 
4 77 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby ID 83422 
Fax: (208) 745-8160 
Method of Service: 
"-. • Mail 
\fJ Fax 
• Hand Delivery 
• Other: 
-------
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Karl R. Decker, ISB #3390 
W. Forrest Fischer, ISB #10009 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAH & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH TTJDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FISCHER, Trustees of the William and Ann 
Fischer Revocable Trust, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. 
CROSTON, husband and wife; 
AND ALL UNKNOWN OWNERS AND/OR 
OTHER PERSONS OR E TITIES 
CLAIM G ANY INTEREST IN THE 
FOLLOWING DESCRIBED REAL 
PROPERTY: 
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 4, 
Block 12, of the Original Ammon Townsite, 
Bonneville County, Idaho; running thence N. 
88°33'58" W. 330.00 feet to the Northwest 
corner of said Lot 4; thence S. 00°00'2l"W. 
along the West line of said Lot 4 a distance of 
8.99 feet to an existing fence line; thence S. 
89°41 '36" E. along said existing fence line 
329.90 feet to a point on the East line of said 
Lot 4; thence N. 00°00'21" E. along said East 
line 2.50 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
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JAMES F. CROSTO and MARJORIE C. 
CRO TON husband and wife· 
Counter Claimants, 
vs. 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FISCHER, Trustees of the William and Ann 
Fischer Revocable Trust, 
Counter Defendants. 
Plaintiffs/Counter Defendants William R. Fischer and M. Ann Fischer, Trustees of the 
William and Ann Fischer Revocable Trust ("Plaintiffs"), by and through their counsel of record, 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. hereby submit this Memorandum in Support of their 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For at least the past six decades, an old post and wire fence between the parties respective 
properties existed and served as the parties' mutually accepted boundary line. Moreover the 
parties' predecessors in interest also considered and regarded the fence as the boundary between 
their properties. Under Idaho law, these facts create the presumption that the location of the 
decades-old fence is the true boundary between the paities' prope1ties. This law - boundary by 
agreement or acquiescence - is filmly established in Idaho jurisprudence. One corollary of this 
doctrine is that long acquiescence between neighbors concerning the location of the boundary line 
between their prope1iies ought to preclude a controversy that will involve rights that have been 
unquestioned for a generation.' Dreher v. Powell, 120 Idaho 715, 717- 18 819 P.2d 569 571-72 
(Ct. App. 1991) ( citation omitted) . The facts presented in this case satisfy all of the requisite 
MEMORAND M IN UP PORT OF 
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elements for a boundary line by agreement. Despite this fact, Defendants engaged in self-help by 
forcibly claiming almost 1,900 square feet of Plaintiffs' property as their own. Accordingly the 
Court should grant summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and award them their reasonable 
attorneys' fees and costs based on this doctrine. Furthermore, the Court should grant summary 
judgment on Defendants' counterclaim as a matter oflaw. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs own real property in Bonneville County, Idaho, located at 3000 S. Western 
Avenue, Ammon, Idaho ("Fischer Property"), which is legally described as: 
Lot 3, and the South 59 feet of Lot 2, Block 12, Ammon Townsite, 
Bonneville County, State of Idaho, according to the recorded plat 
thereof. 
F. Fischer Decl. 1, at 1 1 (Ex. A), Verified Complaint, at 11 7-8. Plaintiffs acquired the Fischer 
Property in their individual capacity in 1992 and later transferred it into a trust on November 2, 
2001. Id In order to avoid confusion, Plaintiffs shall hereinafter be referred to as the "Fischers," 
with the understanding that all actions perfom1ed by the Fischers prior to November 2, 2001, were 
done in their individual capacity, and all subsequent actions performed in the Fischers' capacity 
as Trustees of the William and Ann Fischer Revocable Trust. 
The Fischers originally purchased the Fischer Property from Douglas M. Ackerman and 
Cheryl A. Ackerman in January 1992. F. Fischer Deel. at 1 1 (Ex. A); M Fischer Deel. 2 at 12. 
The Ackermans obtained the Fischer Prope1ty from Lan-y J. Kennedy and Sharon Kennedy less 
than a year earlier, in June 199 1. F. Fischer Deel. , at 1 1 (Ex. A). The Kennedys acquired the 
Fischer Property in 1982 from Sharon Kennedy's parents, Levi D. Barzee and Inza E. Barzee, who 
l Declaration of W . Forrest Fischer in support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. 
2 Declaration ofM. Allil Fischer. 
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had owned the property since 1943. Id. 
Immediately adjacent to the south of the Fischer property is real prope1ty owned by 
D fi ndants James F. Croston and Mrujori.e C. roston ("Crostons"), commonly known as 3020 
S. Western A venue, Ammon, Idaho ("Croston Property"). Id. at ,r 2, (Ex. B); Verified Complaint, 
at ,r 9. The Croston Property is legally described as : 
Lot number four (4), Block number twelve (12) of the Ammon 
Townsite, Bonneville County State of Idaho as per recorded plat 
thereof. 
Id. The orth boundary of the Croston Property is the South boundary of the Fi cher Prope1ty. 
Verified Complaint, at ,r 10. The Crostons acquired the Croston Prope1ty in March 1959 from 
Denzel W. Rowbury and Viola H. Rowbury.3 F Fischer Deel. , at ,r 2 (Ex. B). At the time the 
Crostons purchased the Croston Property, there was an existing post-and-wire fence running along 
the Fischer Property' s southern boundary dividing the Fischer Property and Croston Property 
("Old Fence"). F Fischer Deel. , at ,r 4 (Ex. C at p. 9); Anderson Deel. 4 at ,r 7. The Fischers do 
not know when the Old Fence was first constructed. M Fischer Deel. , at ,r 3. However the Old 
Fence predated the Crostons' acquisition of the Croston Property5 such that the date and purpose 
for construction of the Old Fence is beyond the personal knowledge of the Crostons. F. Fischer 
Deel. , at ,r 4 (Ex. C at pp. 3, 4, and 9). The best evidence cunently available reflects that the Old 
Fence existed since at least 1951. Anderson Deel. at ,r 7. 
Located upon the eastern portion of Croston Property is an old building that was once a log 
cabin ("Log Cabin"). Anderson Deel. at ,r 2. Sharon Anderson nee Rowbury moved into the 
3 The Rowbury 's obtained the Croston Property from Alv in and Bl anche lssacs in 195 I. F. Fischer Deel., at 2 
(Ex. B). 
4 Declaration of Sharon Anderson. 
5 Anderson Deel. at ,r 7. 
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Log Cabin with her family in 1951. Anderson Deel., at 12; F. Fischer Deel., at ii 2 (Ex . B). At 
the time Mrs. Anderson moved into the Log Cabin, the Fischer Prope1ty was merely pasture. 
Ander on Deel. , at 1 6. According to Mrs. Anderson, the Old Fence existed prior to her parents 
moving into the Log Cabin. Id. at 17. Furthermore, Mrs. Anderson and her family always treated 
the Old Fence as the true boundary between what is now the Croston Property and Fischer 
Property. Id. at 118-9. After graduating from high school in 1958, Mrs. Anderson moved out of 
the Log Cabin and a year later, her parents sold it to the Crostons. Id. at 11 3-4. 
Around 1973, Larry Kennedy became acquainted with the Fischer Prope1ty as part of 
helping his friend Ron Barzee. Kennedy Deel. 6 at 11 3-4. At that time, Ron Barzee s parents 
owned the Fischer Property, which was only pasture, as well as a home located directly north of 
the Fischer Property. Id. at 15 . Because Ron 's parents were elderly, he and Mr. Kennedy regularly 
helped around the house and maintained the Fischer Property. Id. at 1 4. Mr. Kennedy recalls 
fix ing po1tions of the Old Fence, sometimes replacing rotted posts or other times stretching and 
stapling new hog wire. Id. at 11 6-7 (Ex. A). According to Mr. Kennedy the Old Fence was in 
rough condition when he first saw it and thought that it was likely decades old. Id. at 6. 
In addition to the Old Fenc there was a shed on a concrete foundation located on the 
south-west side of the Fischer Property(' Shed"). Id. at 115, 8 (Ex. B). It is unknown when this 
Shed was built or who built it. Nevertheless, Ron Barzee's parents primarily used the Shed to 
store tools and animal feed. Id. at 1 5. To access the Shed, Mr. Kennedy and others would drive 
on an existing, two-track dirt road that ran west from Western A venue along the southern boundary 
of the Fischer Property until it met up with the Shed (the "Access Road ). Id. 
6 Declaration of Larry Kennedy . 
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Mr. Kennedy married Ron Barzee's sister in about 1974 or 1975. Id. at 8. Beginning in 
1981, Mr. Kennedy and his wife wanted to build a house for themselves in Ammon and pm-chased 
what is now the Fischer Property from Levi Barzee. Id. While Mr. Kennedy and his wife owned 
the Fischer Property, he rebuilt the Shed with tin. Id. However, Mr. Kennedy and his wife 
divorced before they could build a home on the Fischer Property, and subsequently sold it in 1991. 
Jd.at19. 
At all times during his work upon, and ownership of the Fischer Property Mr. Kennedy 
regarded the Old Fence to be the true boundary line between the Fischer Property and the Croston 
Property. Id. at 1 10. Mr. Kennedy's knowledge is based on his prior ownership of the Fischer 
Property, his maintenance of the Fischer Property up to the Old Fence, and his repairs of sections 
of the Old Fence. Id. 
In 1992, the Fischers built a single family home on the Fischer Property. M Fischer Deel. 
at 12. When they purchased the Fischer Property, the Fischers regarded and understood the Old 
Fence to be the southern boundary of their prope1iy. Verified Complaint, at 11. Fmthermore, 
from 1992 to 1996, the Fischers used th.e entire length and breadth of the Access Road to access 
the western part of the Fischer Prope1iy and the Shed. Id. at 1 12. 
In or about 1996, the Fischers constructed a large garage ("Garage") approximately 140 
feet to the west of the easternmost boundary, and approximately 15 feet north of the Old Fence. 
Id. at ir 14. Around the same time, the Fischers removed the Shed in order to utili ze the space it 
occupied but left the Shed 's concrete foundation intact. Id. at 1 16. The Fischers continued to 
use the Access Road in order to access the Garage and used the gap between the Garage and the 
Old ence to access the westernmost part of the Fi cher Property. 1\11. Fischer Deel. at 4· Verified 
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Complaint, at 1 15. Altogether, the Fischers exclusively used the Access Road to access the 
western portion of the Fischer Property and the Garage for over 24 years. Verified Complaint, at 
1 15. 
Since purchasing and building a home on the Fischer Property, the Fischers have regarded 
and treated the Old Fence as their southern boundary line. Verified Complaint, at 1 11. The 
Fischers have maintained the Fischer Property up to the Old Fence for over two decades by 
mowing and controlling the large grasses that grow on the property, especially along the Old 
Fence. M Fischer Deel. , at 15. 
Until 2015, the Fischers never witnessed the Crostons, or anyone else, maintaining the Old 
Fence. Verified Complaint, at 1 17. As a result, the Old Fence decayed to a point that certain 
portions had failed and fallen onto the Fischer Property. Id. Due to the dilapidated condition of 
the Old Fence, the Fischers decided to replace it with a new, more aesthetically p leasing fence in 
August 2015. Id. at 1 18. 
While the Fischers were in the midst of replacing the Old Fence, the Crostons sent the 
Fischers a letter dated September 4, 2015, wherein they threatened to sue the Fischers for trespass 
and malicious injury to the Croston Property ("Demand Letter") for their work on the Old Fence. 
Verified Complaint, at 1 17; F. Fischer Deel. at 1 5 (Ex. D). This Demand Letter also required 
that the Fischers "restore [the] property to [the Crostons'] satisfaction." Id. At the bottom of the 
Demand Letter, it appeared that the Crostons sent additional copies of the letter to the City of 
Ammon' s P lanning Depatiment and Code Enforcement Depatiment, the Bonneville County 
Sheriff, and the Progressive Irrigation District. F. Fischer Deel. at 1 5 (Ex. D). Given the tone 
and tenor of the Demand Letter at1d the inclusion of third party agencies, the Fischers immediately 
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ceased replacing the Old Fence and consulted with their attorney regarding what they could do to 
avoid being sued. Verified Complaint, at ,r 19; M Fischer Deel., at ,r 6. 
Wanting to avoid litigation with the Crostons, the Fischers commissioned Ellsworth & 
Associates, PLLC, ("Ellsworth") to conduct a survey of the existing boundary line between the 
Fischer Property and Croston Property. Ver(fied Complaint, at ,r 20; M Fischer Deel. , at ,r 7. The 
Fischers wanted a survey to ensure that the replacement fence would be located exactly where the 
Old Fence had been. M Fischer Deel., at ,r 7. 
Prior to the survey, Mrs. Fischer encountered and spoke with Jim Croston ("Jim"), on or 
about August 30, 2015. Id. at ,r 8. At the time of their conversation, Mrs. Fischer did not know 
that Jim was the son of the Crostons. Id. Jim was in the process of marking and measuring those 
portions where the Old Fence had been, using spray paint to draw a line approximating the Old 
Fence's location on those portions where it had been removed. Id. During their conversation, 
Mrs. Fischer indicated to Jim that the Fischers would be replacing the Old Fence with a better one. 
Id. Mrs. Fischer informed Jim that the Fischers had hired a sw-vey company to mark the line of 
the Old Fence so there would be no disputes when they constructed the new fence. M Fischer 
Deel., at ,r 8; F. Fischer Deel. , at ,r 7 (Ex. F). Mrs. Fischer denies that she ever entered into an oral 
agreement changing the properties' boundary during any p01t ion of her conversation with Jim. M 
Fischer Deel., at ,r 10. Rather, Mrs. Fischer merely informed Jim of the steps the Fischers were 
planning on taking to replace the fence on the boundary between the properties. Id. At the time 
of this conversation, the Fischers had no reason to believe that the Old Fence was not on the deeded 
boundary line. Id. 
In September 2015, Ellswo1th surveyed the boundary line between the Fischer and Croston 
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prope1ties, placing survey markers. Verified Complaint, at~ 20. During this survey, the surveyor 
made several marks on the Fischer property to correspond with Ellsworth's understanding of the 
location of the lot boundaries according to the recorded plat of the Ammon Townsite ( 'Plat"). Id 
Upon visual review of the survey markers, it appeared that the location of the Old Fence did not 
follow the 1.ot line shown on the Plat. Id. at~ 21. Instead, the easternmost post of the Old Fence 
appeared to be approximately two and a half feet south of the north lot line, with the Old Fence 
ruru1ing in a straight line to a westernmost point approximately 8 feet south of the lot li.ne of the 
Croston Property shown on the Plat. Id. 
The area located between the Old Fence and the platted boundary as shown by the 
Ellsworth survey, consists of 1,896 square feet and is legally described as follows: 
Beginning at the Northeast comer of Lot 4, Block 12, of the Original 
Ammon Townsite, Bom1eville County, Idaho; running thence N. 88°3 3 '5 8'' 
W. 330.00 feet to the Northwest corner of said Lot 4; then S. 00°00'21 "W. 
along the West line of said ot 4 a distance of 8.99 feet to an existing fence 
line; thence S. 89°4 1 '36" E. along said existing fence line 329.90 feet to a 
point on the East line of said Lot 4; thence N. 00°00'21 E. along said East 
line 2.50 feet to the PO T OF BEGINNING 
(hereinafter referred to as "Tract 1"). Verified omplaint at~ 22; F. Fischer Deel. at~ 8 (Ex. 
G). Tract l is illustrated as follows: 
Ill 
Ill 
Ill 
Ill 
Ill 
Ill 
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After reviewing the survey and identifying Tract 1, the Fischers overnighted a letter to the 
Crostons dated September 24, 2015, notifying them of the fence line discrepancy, asse1iing the 
Fischers legal right to Tract 1, and offering settlement of any potential issues between the Parties. 
Verified Complaint, at 123 · M: Fischer Deel. at 1 11. At the same time the Fischer's posted two 
o Trespassing' signs along the Old Fence. Verified Complaint, at ~ 24. 
On or about September 25 2015 counsel for the Fischers called the Crostons and spoke 
with Marjorie Croston. F. Fischer Deel. at 1 9, (Ex. H). According to Maijorie, the Fischers' 
attorney notified her of the Fischer's legal claim to Tract 1, instructed her not to construct a new 
fence until the paities came to an agreement and told her to expect a letter in the mail outlining 
the Fischers claims. Id. Marjorie informed the Fischers' attorney that her daughter, Linda 
Penning ('Penning'), had the Crostons Power of Attorney to act on their behalf in this matter. 
Id Following this phone call Marjorie called Penning and informed her of her conversation with 
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the Fischers' attorney. Id. at~ 10 (Ex. 1). Contrary to the Fischers' reasonable requests, Penning 
told Maijorie that she "would put the fence up now instead of waiting" as they wanted "to run 
some livestock anyway." Id. However, the Crostons could not put livestock on the Croston 
Property due to prohibitions within the Ammon City Code. F. Fischer Deel. , at~ 10 (Ex. I). 
On September 27, 2015, Penning began construction of a new wire fence along what she 
assumed to be the boundary line ("New Fence"). Verified Complaint, at~ 25. Upon seeing the 
fencing crews on their property, the Fischers provided Penning with a copy of their letter dated 
September 24, 2015, and requested that she cease building the fence. Id. When Penning refused 
to comply with the Fischers' request, the Fischers' attorney immediately called Maijorie Croston. 
F. Fischer Deel., at~ 11 (Ex. J). When Maijorie did not ai1swer the phone, the Fischers' attorney 
left her a detailed voice message wherein he strongly advised that she instruct Pe1ming to stop 
constructing the New Fence lest the Fischers file a lawsuit against her. Id. Unfortunately, despite 
the Fischers' numerous demands, the Crostons proceeded to complete the New Fence by the end 
of the day. Verified Complaint , at~ 25. 
Currently, the New Fence blocks the Fischers from access to the western portion of their 
property over the Access Road running next to the Garage. M Fischer Deel. , at~ 4. The New 
Fence runs at such an angle that it encroaches almost 9 feet into the Fischers' Property at the 
western end of the property, crossing the old concrete foundation of the Shed. F. Fischer Deel., 
at i i 8 and 12 (Exs. G and K). Finally, in the course of a year since this dispute arose, the Crostons 
have neither inhabited the Log Cabin, nor util ized the Croston Property to graze animals. M 
Fischer Deel. , at i 12. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 11 
46
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Swnmary judgment is proper if "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(a). The moving party carries the 
bmden of proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Losee v. Idaho Co., 148 Idaho 
219, 222, P.3d 575, 578 (2009). 
In this matter, neither party demanded a trial by jury. Furthermore, none of the causes of 
action at issue in this case warrant a jury trial. Accordingly, " [w]hen an action will be tried before 
the court without a jury, the trial court as the trier of fact is entitled to arrive at the most probable 
inferences based upon the undisputed evidence properly before it and grant the summary judgment 
despite the possibility of conflicting inferences." Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, L.L.C. , 140 
Idaho 354, 360- 61 , 93 P.3d 685, 692 (2004) (citation omitted). Furthermore, the Court "freely 
reviews the entire record to ascertain if either party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
and determines whether the record reasonably supports the inferences drawn by the district judge." 
Flying Elk Inv., LLC v. Cornwall, 149 Idaho 9, 13,232 P.3d 330,334 (2010) (citation omitted). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The Court should declare that the Old Fence is the true boundary line between the 
Fischer Property and Croston Property under the doctrine of boundary line by 
agreement or acquiescence. 
The Old Fence marked and served as the boundary between the Fischer Property and 
Croston Property for over six decades before this dispute arose. Fences that have been in place for 
a long time are presumed to be the true boundary under Idaho Law. See Luce v. Marble, 142 Idaho 
264, 271, 127 P.3d 167, 174 (2005). Furthermore, the conduct of prior property owners 
demonstrate that the Old Fence was regarded as the true boundary between tbe properties. These 
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facts coupled with lack of any evidence from those who were alive at the time the fenc was built, 
create the presumption that the Old Fence is the true boundary between the prope11ies. 
Accordingly the Court should grant summary judgment in favor of the Fischers and declare that 
the Old Fence is the true boundary between the Fischer Prope11y and Croston Property. 
The doctrine of boundary by agreement or acquiescence 7 is well established in Idaho law. 
The doctrine is based upon the premise that long acquiescence between neighbors concerning the 
boundary Jine between their properties ought to preclude "a controversy that will involve rights 
that have been unquestioned for a generation: Dreher v. Powell, 120 Idaho 715 718 819 P.2d 
569 572 (Ct. App. 1991) (citation omitted). "Where the boundary is uncertain or disputed, 
coterminous owners 'may orally agree upon a boundary line' and such an agr ement can become 
binding on successors if the parties to the oral agreement take possession under it." Flying Elk 
Inv. , 149 Idaho at 13,232 P.3d at 334 (citing Downing v. Boehringer, 82 Idaho 52, 56, 349 P.2d 
306, 308 (1960)). 
As di.stilled by the Idaho Supreme Court, "[b ]oundary by agreement or acquiescence has 
two elements: (1) there must be an uncertain or disputed boundary and (2) a subsequent agreement 
fixing the boundary." Luce 142 Idaho at 27 1 127 P.3d at 174. Concerning the first element, 
' [t]here is no requirement that there be a dispute over the boundary. Rather there must be either 
uncertainty or a dispute as to the location of the true boundary." Johnson v. Newport, 131 Idaho 
521 , 523 960 P.2d 742, 744 (1998). Moreover, "if the location of the true boundary is unknown 
to either of the parties, and is w1ce1tain or in dispute such coterminous owners may agree upon a 
7 "Though [.I daho] cases often use the phrase 'bounda ry by acqu iescence' interchangeab ly witb 'boundary by 
agreement ... the latter phrase more accurately descri bes the doctrine. Wells v. Williamson, 118 Idaho 37, 40, 794 
P.2d 626, 629 (1990). 
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boundary line." Trappett v. Davis, 102 Idaho 527, 531 , 633 P.2d 592, 596 (1981). Finally, 
" [i]gnorance of the true boundary creates the uncertainty necessary to satisfy the first element." 
Flying Elk Inv. , 149 Idaho at 13, 232 P.3d at 334 ( citing Morrissey v. Haley, 124 [daho 870, 873, 
(1993)). 
Concerning the second element, " [t]he agreement may be either express or implied by the 
landowners ' conduct." Id. (citing Teton Peaks Investment Co. v. Ohme, 146 Idaho 394, 397, 195 
P.3d 1207, 1210 (2008)). Since there must be an agreement, acquiescence "is merely regarded as 
competent evidence of the agreement," and alone is not enough to establish a boundary by 
agreement. Flying Elk Inv. , 149 Idaho at 13, 232 P.3d at 334 (citation omitted). However, 
" [a]llowing an adjoining landowner to improve the disputed land is evidence of an agreement." 
Id. ( citation omitted). 
If the elements of boundary by agreement are satisfied, "the pm1ies to the agreement are 
no longer entitled to the an1ount of property provided for in their deeds and must absorb the effect 
of any increase or decrease in the amount of their property as a result of the new boundary." 
Stafford v. Weaver, 136 Idaho 223, 225, 31 P.3d 245, 247 (2001). "The new bOlmdary then is 
binding on successors in interest who purchase with notice of the agreement." Anderson v. Rex 
Hayes Family Trust, 145 Idaho 741 , 744, 185 P.3d 253,256 (2008) (citation omitted). 
In evaluating the existence of an implied agreement regarding a boundary line fence, Idaho 
courts m·e guided by two related presumptions: 
First, when a fence line has been erected, and then coterminous 
lm1downers have treated that fence line as fixing the boundary 
between their properties for such a length of time that neither ought 
to be allowed to deny the correctness of its location the law 
presumes an agreement fixing that fence line as the boundary 
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Second, coupled with the long existence and recognition of a fence 
as a boundary, the want of any evidence as to the manner or 
circumstances of its original location, the law presumes that it was 
originally located as a boundary by agreement because of 
uncertainty or dispute as to the true line. 
Luce, 142 Idaho at 271-72, 127 P.3d at 174 (citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis and 
internal spacing added). Based on these presumptions, Idaho comts have "repeatedly found a 
boundary by agreement where a fence is treated as the property line for a number of years, there 
is no information about why the fence was built, and no evidence to disprove that the fence was 
intended to be a boundary." Flying Elk, 149 Idaho at 14, 232 P.3d at 335. Ultimately, "[t]he 
doctrine of boundary by agreement or acquiescence is based on a reasonable assumption implied 
from the surrounding circumstances." Luce, 142 Idaho at 272, 127 P.3d at 174. 
In Flying Elk, for example, the parties disputed ownership of a njneteen-acre sliver of land 
and the legal effect of a historic boundary fence. 149 Idaho at 12,232 P.3d at 333. Prior to fi ling 
suit, Flying Elk had its lot surveyed, reveal ing that the fence dividing its property fo r the adjoining 
property cut into Flying Elk's property by at least 300 feet in some places. 149 Idaho at 13, 232 
P.3d at 334. When Flying Elk sued, the adjoining property owner counterclaimed under the theory 
of boundary by agreement argujng that because the fence had been present for roughly seventy 
years, the disputed land was now legally his. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district 
court's grant of summary judgment in favo r of the adjoining property owner, finding that the 
evidence suppotted the conclusion that the fence had long been recognized as boundary between 
the properties . 149 Idaho at 14, 232 P.3d at 335. Some of the facts and evidence which supported 
this conclusion included (1) successive owners using the land up to the fence line; (2) the 
installation of a pond by the adjoining land owner within the disputed tract without objection from 
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Flying Elk s predecessor; (3) testimony that the fence was essentially unchanged for at least 50 
years, but for minor repairs· and (4) no evidence regarding the pmpose of the original fence. Id. 
Ultimately, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that these factors demonstrated and supported a 
boundary line by agreement. id. 
Flying Elk is directly on point here. First, like the fence in Flying Elk, the Old Fence is 
decades old. Specifically, the Old Fence existed since at least 1951 8 - at least 64 years before this 
current dispute arose. While the Fischers have not found anyone that can testify about the Old 
Fence s construction, prior owners of both the Fischer Prope1ty and Croston Property always 
regarded the Old Fence as the true boundary line between the prope11ies. See generally, Anderson 
Deel. and Kennedy Deel. 
Second, just like the prior owners in Flying Elk, the prior owners of both the Fischer 
Property and Croston Property have used the land up to the Old Fence. Mrs. Anderson, Mr. 
Kennedy, and the Fischers have all testified regarding their use of the Fischer Property up to the 
Old Fence line, including use as an animal pasture mowing grass in conjunction with ownership 
of a single family home, and use of the Access Road to access the western po11ion of the Fischer 
Property. Anderson Deel. , at ,r 7; Kennedy Deel., at ,r,r 5,8· M Fischer Deel. at ,r 5. Concernirtg 
the Croston Prope1ty, Mrs. Anderson testified of her parents using their property up to the Old 
Fence line for grazing of animals and a garden t.mtil 1959, when they sold to the Crostons. 
Anderson Deel. , at ,r 7. 
Third, like irtstallation of the pond within the disputed area in Flying Elk the construction 
of the Shed on the Fischer Property, complete with a concrete foundation furth r supports a 
8 Anderson Deel., at 7. 
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boundary by agreement. As it stands now, the Shed's concrete foundation is located several feet 
into Tract 1 - south of the New Fence. F. Fischer Deel., at ,r 12 (Ex. K). Given that the process 
of excavating, pouring a concrete foundation, and constructing a substantial outbuilding does not 
happen overnight, the Shed was no doubt built within full view of the Crostons or their 
predecessors. Although it is unknown exactly when the Shed was first constructed, Mr. Kennedy 
testifies of its existence since at least 1973 - at least 14 years after the Crostons acquired their 
prope11y. Kennedy Decl.,at ,r 5. Moreover, Mr. Kennedy testified to increasing the size of the 
Shed and replacing the exterior with tin during his ownership of the Fischer Property, all within 
full view of the Crostons, who never objected. Id. at ,r 8. The Shed itself shows that the prior 
owners of the Fischer Prope11y and Croston Property believed the Old Fence to be the true 
boundary 1 ine. 
Fourth and finally, the Old Fence remained essentially unchanged for at least 64 years, 
with only minor repairs. Again, it is unknown exactly when the Old Fence was constructed, as 
was the case in Flying Elk. Nevertheless, Mrs. Anderson has testified that it existed when she 
lived on the Croston Property beginning in 195 1. Anderson Deel., at ,r 7. This fact is supported 
by the Crostons' admission that the Old Fence existed when they bought the Croston Property in 
1959. F. Fischer Deel. , at ,r 4 (Ex. C at p. 9). Finally, Mr. Kennedy' s testimony reinforces the 
existence and location of the Old Fence, given his maintenance and repairs of it. Kennedy Deel., 
at ,r,r 6-7, 10. 
Based on these facts, the Court should follow the dfrection of the Idaho Supreme Court in 
Flying Elk and s imilarly hold that the Old Fence is the true boundary between the Fischer Property 
and Croston Property under the doctrine of boundary by agreement. The facts presented in this 
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case clearly give rise to the two presumptions articulated in Luce: namely, that (1) there was an 
agreement between prior owners fixing the Old Fence Line as the true boundary between the 
Fischer Property and Croston Property; and (2) that the true boundary between the Fischer Prope1iy 
and Croston Property is the location of the Old Fence. See Luce, 142 ldaho at 271 - 72, 127 P.3d 
at 174-175. Although these prestunptions are rebuttable, the Crostons cannot rely on their own 
unexpressed intentions regarding the purpose of the Old Fence because "[t]he Court can only 
evaluate the parties' conduct, not their ' mental operations."' Flying Elk, 149 Idaho at 14,232 P.3d 
at 335 (citation omitted). 
Ultimately, there is no evidence to indicate the fence was built for any purpose other than 
the presumed purposed of establishing a boundary between the Fischer Property and Croston 
Property. Accordingly, the Court should grant summary judgment in favor of the Fischers as a 
matter of law. 
B. The Fischers are entitled to summary judgment as to the Crostons' Counterclaim. 
While the Crostons appear to assert a counterclaim against the Fischers, the nature of this 
counterclaim is not exactly clear. See Answer to Complaint and Counterclaim of the Defendants 
("Answer & Counterclaim"), p. 6. Although the Crostons make several allegations that could 
support a counterclaim, no specific cause of action is identified. Id. Furthermore, the Crostons 
request an award of attorney's fees and costs, but fai l to c ite any statutory authority supporting 
such a claim. Id. at ~ L. Failing to provide such authority renders the claim ineffective and 
inapplicable. See PHH Mortg. Servs. Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 63 1, 641, 200 P.3d 1180, 1190 
(2009). Accordingly, the Fischers contend that the Crostons' counterclaim defective on its face. 
See Gillespie v. Mountain Park Estates L.L.C. , 138 ldaho 27, 29, 56 P.3d 1277, 1279 (2002) ("The 
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Key issue in determining the validity of a complaint is whether the adverse patty is put on notice 
of the claims brought against it. '). As a result of being defective, the Court should dismiss it, or, 
at the very least, not consider it on summary judgm nt. See Maroun v. Wyreless Sys. , Inc. 141 
Idaho 604, 613 114 P.3d 974, 983 (2005) ("'A cause of action not raised in a party's pleadings 
may not be considered on summary judgment nor may it be considered for the first time on 
appeal. "') ( citation omitted). 
Assuming for the sake of argument that the Crostons did adequately plead a counterclaim, 
the first step is to identify what it is. The Crostons allege that the "pa1ties entered into an agreement 
that the survey that was being performed would control the boundary between the [Croston 
Prope1iy and the Fischer Prope1iy] and that the Fischers ' previously had agreed to pay one-half 
the cost of the fence." Answer & Counterclaim, p. 6, ,i,i E, H. This, along with a subsidiary claim 
for fees and costs,9 appears to form the Crostons ' counterclaim. However the facts, even when 
construed in favor of the Crostons, do not supp01t this counterclaim. Accordingly, for the r asons 
that follow there are no genuine issues of material fact and the Fischers are entitled to judgment 
as a matter oflaw as to the Crostons' counterclaim. I.R.C.P. 56(a) . 
1. The Crostons' counterclaim is prohibited by Idaho's statute of frauds. 
It is tmdisputed that no written agreement exists between the Fischers and the Crostons. 
See Exs. C, F to Fischer Deel. Instead, the only evidence for an agreement comes from a written 
statement signed by the Crostons son, Jim. Fischer Deel., at ,i 7 (Ex. F). Jim Croston claims that 
while he was marking the location of the Old Fenc Ann Fischer allegedly said to him: 
We will be replacing the fence with a much better fence . We are 
going to get a survey to find out where the line is at. We are using 
9 Answer & Counterclaim p. 6, L. 
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the same stu-veyors as the City uses so [there] shouldn't be any 
disputes. 
Id. Jim Croston states that he "said OK." Id. Based upon this statement the Crostons claim that 
the parties entered into an oral agreement regarding the boundary between their two properties. 
However what the Crostons fail to realize is that regardless of the content of Jim Crostons' 
statement oral agreements are invalid and unenforceable under Idaho 's statute of frauds. 
Idaho ' s statute of frauds is codified within Idaho Code§ 9-505. The pertinent parts of thi s 
statute reads as follows: 
9-505. CERTAIN AGREEMENTS TO BE IN WRITING. In the 
following cases the agreement is invalid, unless the same or some 
note or memorandum thereof, be in writing and subscribed by the 
party charged or by his agent. Evidence therefore, of the agreement 
cam1ot be received without the writing or secondary evidence of its 
contents: 
4. An agreement for the leasing, for a longer period than one 
( 1) year, or fo r the sale of real prope1ty, or of an interest therein 
and such agreement, if made by an agent of the party sought to be 
charged, is invalid, unless the authority of the agent be in writing, 
subscribed by the party sought to be charged. 
LC. § 9-505. As interpreted by Idaho courts,"[ a]n agreement for the sale ofreal property is invalid 
unless the agreement or some note or memorandum thereof be in writing and subscrib d by the 
paity chai·ged or his agent. ' Hoffinan 1. S V Co. 102 Idaho 187, 190 628 P .2d 218 221 (1981) 
(citation omitted). "Failure to comply with the statute of frauds renders an oral agreement 
unenforceable both in an action at law for damages and in a suit in equity for specific 
performance. Id. 
Here ownership of Tract 1 passed to the Fischers long before they fi led their Verified 
Complaint. ee Stafford, 136 Idaho, at 225, 31 P.3d at 247 ("[i]f a botmdary by agreement is 
MEMORA D M Ir PPORT OF 
PLAJ1 TffFS ' MOT IO FOR SUMMARY .I DGM ENT - 20 
55
established, the parties to the agreement are no longer entitled to the amount of property provided 
for in their deeds and must absorb the effect of any increase or decrease in the amount of their 
property as a result of the new boundary."). Thus, any change in the Fischers' interest in the 
Fischer Property, including Tract 1, would require a written agreement signed by the Fischers. See 
I.C. § 9-505(4). Again, it is undisputed that no written agreement exists regarding the ownership 
or disposition of Tract 1. See Fischer Deel., (Ex. C at pp. 6, and 9) (Ex. F). This fact alone 
completely undermines the Crostons' counterclaim. 
Absent the existence of a written agreement, the Crostons' counterclaim fails as a matter 
oflaw pursuant to Idaho's statute of frauds. Any agreement purpo1iing to transfer interest in Tract 
1 or otherwise setting mutual boundary lines, is required to be in writing and signed by the pa1iies 
who are to be bound. LC. § 9-505(4). Because no such written agreement exists, the Fischers are 
entitled to summary judgment disposing of the Crostons' counterclaim. 
2. The Crostons are precluded from arguing boundary line by agreement or 
acquiescence because they do not satisfy the requisite elements for such a claim. 
Given that Idaho's statute of frauds significantly undercuts their counterclaim, the Crostons 
may be tempted to argue boundary by agreement or acquiescence as an exception to this rnle. 
However, this argument would fa il because the available evidence does not satisfy the required 
elements of this doctrine. 
Idaho case law has determined that boundary line by agreement or acquiescence does not 
fall under the purview Idaho's Statute of Frauds: "[t]he general rule of case law is that an 
agreement which arises from uncertainty or dispute over the location of a bow1dary is valid, and 
does not constitute an oral conveyance of land." Norwood v. Stevens, I 04 Idaho 44, 45, 655 P.2d 
938, 939 (Ct. App. 1982) (emphasis in original). As stated above, boundary by agreement or 
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acqui scence has two elements: (1) there mu t be an uncertain or disputed boundary and (2) a 
subsequent agreement fix ing the boundary. Luce 142 Idaho at 271, 127 P.3d at 174. Iowever, 
[ w ]here the location of the true boundary line between coterminous owners is known to either of 
the pat.ties or is not uncertain, and is not in dispute, an oral agreement between them purporting 
to establish another line as the boundary between their prope1ties constitutes an attempt to convey 
real property in violation of the statute of frauds ... and is invalid. ' Downing v. Boehringer, 
82 Idaho 52, 56, 349 P.2d 306, 308 (1960) (emphasis added). 
Here the Crostons cannot satisfy the first element of boundary line by agreement or 
acquiescence. Specifically, at the time of the purported agreement between Mrs. Fischer and Jim 
Croston, the Fischers knew the location of the true boundary line between the properties to be the 
Old Fence line. 10 As argued above the true boundary line was fixed decades before the Fischers 
purchased the Fischer Property. See Stafford, 136 Idaho, at 225, 31 P.3d at 247 . Because of this, 
it is immaterial that the deeded boundary line shown on the Ellsworth survey differs from the Old 
Fence line. Rather, it is presumed that, at the tin1e that the Old Fence was built, the predecessors 
in interest to the Fischer Property and Croston Property agreed that the Old Fence would serve as 
the true boirndary between them. Id. Whereupon the law recognizes that the deeds were modified 
to reflect this agreement. Id. 
Ultimately, because the Fischers knew the location of the trne boundary at the time of the 
purported agreement, the Crostons cannot satisfy the first element of boundary line by agreement 
or acquiescence. Failure to satisfy both elements of boundary line by agreement or acquiescence 
10 Indeed Jim Croston's act of spray painting the Old Fence line seems to imply that the Croston believed the Old 
Fence to be the true boundary as we ll. See M Fischer Deel., at 16 (Ex. D). 
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is fatal to such a claim. See Luce, 142 Idaho at 271 , 127 P.3d at 174; see also Downing, 82 Idaho 
at 56, 349 P.2d at 308. 
3. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the true boundary line was not known, 
the Crostons' counterclaim still fails because there was not an agreement between 
coterminous owners. 
Assuming that the Crostons satisfy the first element of boundary line by agreement or 
acquiescence, their counterclaim nevertheless fails to satisfy the doctrine's second element -
namely, evidence of an agreement between the Fischers and the Crostons fix ing the boundary. See 
Luce, 142 Idaho at 271, 127 P.3d at 174. Although the Crostons might attempt to point to the 
alleged oral agreement between Mrs. Fischer and Jim Croston as satisfying this element, this 
argument is flawed. Specifically, Jim Croston is neither an owner of the Croston property nor 
designated as the Crostons' attorney in fact. As a result, he cannot enter into contracts or 
agreements affecting the Crostons' real property interests. 
As stated above, it is undisputed that no written agreement between the paiiies exists. See 
Exs. C, F to Fischer Deel. Instead, the only evidence for an agreement comes from a Jim Crostons' 
statement regarding his conversation with Mrs. Fischer. Fischer Deel. , at 17 (Ex. F). However, 
Jim Croston lacked the authority to enter into any agreement on his parent's behalf. Huyett v. 
Idaho State Univ. , I 40 Idaho 904, 908, 104 P.3d 946, 950 (2004) ("For an agent to bind a principal 
to a third pai·ty in contract the agent must have actual or apparent authority."). First, Jim Croston 
does not have any ownership interest in the Crostons Property. Fischer Deel., at 14 (Ex.Cat p. 
8). And second, at no time did the Crostons, or Jim himself, represent that Jim Croston was 
authorized to bind the Crostons in contract. M Fischer Deel. , at 1 8. Instead, the Crostons have 
only asserted that Penning is their attorney in fact. F. Fischer Deel., at 1 9 (Ex. H). For these 
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reasons, it was impossible for Jim Croston to enter into an agreement with the Fischers which 
directly impacted the Crostons' property rights even if the agreement was written and signed. See 
Huyett, 140 Idaho at 909-910 104 P.3d at 951-952 (affinning that no binding contract between 
I.S.U. and a head coach existed because, inter alia J.S.U. lacked authority to enter into a multi-
term employment contract). 
In addition to lacking the requisite authority th alleged oral agreement lacks necessary 
elements for a binding contract. 11 There is no offer-and-acceptance resulting in a meeting of the 
minds. Shapley v. Centurion Life Ins. Co., 154 Idaho 875, 878, 303 P.3d 234, 237 (2013) (' A 
meeting of the minds is evidenced by a manifestation of intent to contract which takes the form of 
an offer and acceptance"). There is no mutual assent. Intermountain Forest Mgmt. , Inc. v. 
Louisiana Pac. orp., 136 Idaho 23 3 23 7, 31 P .3d 921, 925 (2001 ). And there is no consideration. 
McColm-Traska v. Valley View, Inc., 138 Idaho 497, 501, 65 P.3d 519, 523 (2003) ("When 
consideration supp01ts a distinct and common understanding of the parties the understanding 
becomes an enforceable contract"). Because the alleged oral agreement lacks these crucial 
elements, no valid/enforceable agreement could exist between the Fischers and the Crostons. 
In addition to lacking requisite contract terms the Crostons' self-contradictory statements 
concerning the terms of the agreement belie its existence altogether. For e ample, the Crostons 
allege that this oral agreement somehow included a provision that the Fischers would "pay one-
half the cost of the fence. ' Answer & Counterclaim p. 6, ~ H. However, this allegation is 
11 While this point may seem redundant and unnecessary in light of the Fischers tatute of frauds argument the lack 
of fundamental contract elements demonstrates that the Crostons Counterclaim is pure ly the product of post hoc 
rationalization in litigation as opposed to a true be lief. 
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contradicted by the Crostons themselves. Specifically in their response to Interrogatory 18 of 
Plaintiffs' discovery requests the Crostons provided: 
Croston Statement Crom 8/31/15. Would pay half the cost of tlte new fence. (NOT AWARE OF THIS 
OFFER..) See Jim Ctoston Statement from 8/31/15. The Fischers have offered to pay the full pdce of the 
fence twice in their settlemeril offers ihbe Cr:ostons give the.en t:he property in questio1l. 
F. Fischer Deel., at 1 4 (Ex. C at p. 6). While it is befuddling that the Crostons would allege that 
the Fischers would pay for half the fence in their counterclaim, only to state later on that they were 
never aware of this offer, the statement still remains as a contradictory admission. Furthermore, 
this admission cannot be constrned as an inadvertent mistake, given that the same notation appears 
in additional responsive docLm1ents produced by the Crostons: 
replace the fence after the survey was completed. The Fischers have offered to pay the full price of the rence 
twice in their settlement offers if the Crostons give them the property in question. 
(I DO NOT RECALL WHERE THEY EVER OFFERED TO PAY½ OF THE COST TO REPLACE THE FENCE. THEY om 
INDICATE IN THEIR SETTLEMENT OFFERS THAT THEY WOULD PAY TO REPLACE THE FENCE AND MAINTAIN IT. ) 
Id at p. 14. Whil it is understandable that the Crostons may personally feel that the Fischers 
offers of settlement represent the Fischers ' (past) willingness to pay for half of the fence, cmmsel 
for the Crostons is undoubtedly aware that such statements made in settlement discussions cmmot 
be used to establish liability or the existence of an agreement pursuant to the Idaho Rules of 
Evidence, Rule 410. All in all the Crostons ' credibility to accurately recall a statement supposedly 
made by the Fischers is undermined by their inconsistent and contradictory statements made w ithin 
their An wer & Counterclaim ai1d di scovery responses. 
The Crostons fail to provide evidence supporting the existence of a binding agreement that 
forms the basis of their counterclaim. This is fatal to the Crostons' counterclain1. Cumis Ins. Soc'y 
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Inc. v. Massey, 155 Idaho 942,946,3 18 P.3d 932, 936 (201 4) ("The non-moving patty may not 
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but that patty's response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial" (citation and internal quotations omitted)); see also 1.R.C.P. 56(c)( l )(B) (a 
party may show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact by "showing that the materials cited 
do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse patty cannot 
produce admiss ible evidence to support the fact"). There is no evidence such an agreement was 
made between the Fischers and Crostons, apart from an alleged comment by Mrs. Fischer which, 
at best, could indicate that the Fischers may have contemplated making an agreement. Even then, 
Jim Croston Jacked the requisite authority to enter into any agreement in the first place. Finally, 
the Crostons do not even agree with the claimed terms of the agreement they allege exists (e.g. , 
relating to paying half the cost of any new fence). 
Altogether, there is no genuine issue of material fact; there was no agreement between the 
Crostons and the Fischers as described in the counterclaim. As a result, the Fischers are entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law and summat·y judgment should be entered on their behalf as to the 
Crostons' counterclaim. 
C. The Fischers are entitled to treble damages and an award of attorneys' fees for the 
Crostons' willful and intentional trespass upon the Fischers' real property and for 
committing waste. 
The Fischers are entitled to treble damages and their reasonable attorneys' fees and costs 
incw-red in this action against the Crostons for waste and trespass pw-suant to Idaho Code § 6-202. 
The Crostons willfully and intentionally entered upon the Fischers ' Property that had a ''No 
Trespassing" signs staked at its boundary, removed the signs, and constructed the New Fence upon 
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it. The ew Fence is a continuing trespass upon the Fischer Property. Accordingly the Com1 
should grant the Fischers treble damages consisting of their estimated costs of removing the ew 
Fence and surveying the true boundary line, as well as their reasonable attorneys fees and costs. 
Idaho Code § 6-202 states that '[a]ny person who, without permission of the 
owner .. . willfully and intentionally enters upon the real property of another person which property 
is posted with ''No Trespassing" signs . . . is liable to the owner of such land .. . for treble the amount 
of damages which may be assessed therefor or fifty dollars ($50.00), plus a reasonable attorney's 
fee which shall be taxes as costs, in any civil action brought to enforce the terms of this act if the 
plaintiff prevails." Here, it is indisputable that the Crostons willfully and intentionally entered into 
Tract 1 removed the Fischers ' "No Trespassing" signs, and constructed the New Fence. F. Fischer 
Deel. , at 1 13 (Ex. L). The only remaining issue is the ownership of Tract 1 at the time of the 
Crostons actions. As described above, Tract 1 was absorbed by the Fischer Property long before 
the dispute between the parties arose. See Stafford, 136 Idaho, at 225 31 P.3d at 247 ("[i]f a 
boundary by agreement is established, the parties to the agreement are no longer entitled to the 
amotmt of property provided for in their deeds and must absorb the effect of any increase or 
decrease in the amount of their property a a re ult of the new boundary. ). For this reason, the 
Crostons actions were done willfully and intentionally upon the Fischer Prop tty. 
Given the foregoing, the Crostons ' actions constitute trespass upon the Fischer Prope1ty 
with the New Fence constituting a continuing trespass . Pertaining to damages, the Fischers seek 
an award of $1 878 .00 which consists of the estimated costs associated with removing the Nev 
Fence and having a professionally sur eyor ascertain and mark the Old Fence line. F. Fischer 
Deel. , at 1 14 (Ex. M). According to LC. § 6-202, this amount is to be trebled which results in 
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$5,634.00. Finally, the Fischers seek an award of their reasonable attorneys' fees and costs 
associated with bringing this matter, as also required by Idaho Code§ 6-202. 
D. In the alternative, if the Court does not award the Fischers their reasonable attorneys' 
fees and costs under Idaho Code § 6-202, the Court should nevertheless grant the 
Fischers attorneys' fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121. 
The Fischers are also entitled to their reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in this 
action pursuant to LC. § 12-121. Specifically, the Fischers are the prevailing parties in this matter. 
Furthermore, the Crostons' defenses and counterclaims are frivolous, unreasonable and without 
foundation. Accordingly, the Court should grant the Fischers their reasonable attorneys' fees and 
costs. 
As a preliminary matter, the Idaho Supreme Court's admonition in Weitz v. Green against 
using self-help to solve boundary line issues strongly supports an award of attorneys' fees to the 
Fischers: 
This Comi strongly disfavors the reso1i to forceful self-help in resolving 
property disputes. See Burke v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 02C5910, 
2004 WL 784073, at *4 (N.D.111. Jan. 29, 2004) ("Self-help in litigation is 
not condoned by the coLu·ts."); Doles v. Doles, No. 17462, 2000 WL 
511693, at *2 (Va.Ci r.Ct. Mar. 10, 2000) ("[P]ublic policy favors the 
settlement of disputes by litigation rather than by self help force ... "). When 
paiiies have entered into a conflict over real property the rights ai·e usually 
fixed far in advance of the exchange of attorneys' letters, or subsequent 
filing of a lawsuit, motions, depositions, and hearings. Making a bold 
physical attempt to gain, or regain, possession or control of a real 
property interest, by demolishing or erecting gates or fences, 
bulldozing land, etc., results in no strategic advantage. Instead, 
passions become inflamed, positions become entrenched, damages are 
exacerbated rather than mitigated, and the parties end up spending far 
more money in litigation than their supposed interest was worth to 
begin with. Attorneys who counsel their clients to engage in self-help, 
without being ce1iain that the respective rights and responsibilities have 
been settled, do their clients a disservice. Clients who ignore the advice of 
counsel and take matters into their own hands do themselves a disservice. 
In short, parties who attempt to solve a property dispute through their 
MEMORA.1"\JDUM rN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 28 
63
own forceful action do so at their own peril. 
148 Idaho 851 864 230 P.3d 743 756 (20 10) (emphasis added). Among th p rils at risk by 
engaging in self-help is the risk of an award of attorney's fees against the offending paity. 
Had the Crostons not disregarded the Fischers ' multiple protestations against the 
construction of the New Fence, the paities would have had an opportunity to engage in meaningful 
negotiations without resorting to costly litigation. However, the Crostons ' decision to simply "put 
the fence up now instead of waiting" 12 foreclosed that option, thereby causing the parties to become 
entrench d and exacerbating damages as forewarned by the Supreme Court in Weitz. Altogether 
th policy set fo11h in Weitz strongly supports that the Fischers be compensated their attorneys 
fees in this matter. 
Turning to Idaho Code§ 12-121 , the Idaho Supreme Com1 in Hoffer v. Shappard recently 
stated that "prevailing pai1ies in civil litigation have the right to be made whole for attorney fees 
they have incurred 'when justice so requires. "' 160 Idaho 870, 380 P .3d 681 , 696 (20 16) ( citation 
omitted). Although, this change is not set to go into effect until March 1, 2017,° the Fischers posit 
that the Comt should still take into account the considerations outlined in Shappard given that, 
had this matter gone to trial on Mai·ch 21 201 7 the Supreme Court s interpretation would 
unquestionably apply. 
As it stands now, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(2) can be read to limit the com1s' 
discretion to award attorney fees to those instances where the case was "brought, pursued or 
defended fr ivolously, unreasonably or without fotmdation." However, because the upreme Court 
of Idaho specifically acknowledged that the comts ' adoption of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
12 Fischer Deel. , at 9 (Ex. H). 
13 id. 
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Rule 54(e)(l) distorted the legislatures' original intention of Idaho Code§ 12-121 , the ongoing 
validity of Rule 54(e)(l)'s "frivolously, um asonably or without foundation ' restriction is called 
into question (notwithstanding the Court' s attempt to delay the effect of their pronouncement until 
March l , 2017). See Hoffer, 160 Idaho at 870, 380 P.3d 681 at 696. Simply stated, if the intention 
of the legislature was "clear" 14 when they adopted Idaho Code § 12-121 , and the Comt had no 
"authority to an1end the laws enacted by the LegisJature," 15 then such purported amendment was 
void ab initio, and not just after March 1, 2017. 
Nevertheless, even if the Court applies Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(2), the 
Crostons defenses and counterclaims in this matter still satisfy the standard for granting the 
Fischers' attorneys' fees and costs. As outJi.ned above, Idaho 's doctrine of boundary line by 
agr ement is both well-known and supported by substantial case law. The issues presented here 
are neither novel nor nuanced. Rather this case contains significantly similar facts to many prior 
Idaho ca es wherein a boundary line by agreement was found in relation to the location of a historic 
fence (e.g. Flying Elk) . In spite of this, the Crostons engaged in self-help by constructing the ew 
Fence unreasonably filed an answ r containing ambiguous and inapplicable affi rmative d fenses 
and frivolously brought a counterclaim based upon facts that they would later contradict in their 
responses to the Fischers ' discovery requests. Assuming that the Fischers prevail in this matter, 
these facts suppo1t the Court's award of reasonable attorneys' fees tmder Idaho Code§ 12-121. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Fischers are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law in that there are no 
genuine issues of material facts in dispute. The Old Fence existed and served as the bom1dary line 
14 Hoffer, 160 Idaho at 870, 380 P.3d at 695. 
15 id. 
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between the Fischer Prope1ty and Croston Property for more than 64 years. Under Idaho 's doctrine 
of boundary line by agreement or acquiescence, the Court should declare that the Old Fence is the 
true boundary line between the properties and should quiet title in Tract 1 in favor of the Fischers. 
Fmthermore, the Court should award the Fischers ' damages and their reasonable attorneys' fees 
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 6-202 and/or Idaho Code§ 12-121. 
-\'"-
Respectfully submitted this lii_ day of December 2016. 
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I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho with my office in 
8 -\~ Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the O 1/ day of December, 2016, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct postage 
thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with IRCP S(b ). 
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Robin D. Dunn 
Dunn Law Offices, PLLC 
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P.O. Box 277 
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTIO FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 32 
Method of Service: 
\ • Mail 
~ Fax 
• Hand Delivery 
• Other: 
67
Karl R. Decker, ISB #3390 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FISCHER, Trustees of the William and Ann 
Fischer Revocable Trust, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAMES F. CROSTO and MARJORIE C. 
CROSTON, husband and wife; 
AND ALL UNKNOWN OWNERS AND/OR 
OTHER PERSONS OR ENTITIES 
CLAIMING ANY INTEREST IN THE 
FOLLOWING DESCRIBED REAL 
PROPERTY: 
Beginning at the Northeast comer of Lot 4, 
Block 12, of the Original Ammon Townsite, 
Bonneville County, Idaho; running thence . 
88°33'58" W. 330.00 feet to the Northwest 
corner of said Lot 4; thence S. 00°00'21 "W. 
along the West line of said Lot 4 a distance of 
8.99 feet to an existing fence line; thence S. 
89°41 '36" E. along said existing fence line 
329.90 feet to a point on the East line of said 
Lot 4; thence . 00°00'21" E. along said East 
line 2.50 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING 
Defendants. 
JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORJE C. 
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CROSTON, husband and wife; 
Counter Claimants , 
VS. 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FISCHER, Trustees of the William and Ann 
Fischer Revocable Trust, 
Counter Defendants. 
I, M. Ann Fischer, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 9- 1406 and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 2.7 
declare under the penalty of pe1jury as follows: 
1. I am over the age of 18, currently reside in Ammon, Idaho, and am a trustee of the 
named Plaintiff in this case. I am competent to be a witness in thi s matter and have personal 
knowledge of the facts stated herein. 
2. As a matter of clarification, the Verified Complaint fi led in this matter contains a 
minor enor. Specifically, paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 within the Verified Complaint mention that 
my husband and I purchased the "Fischer Prope1iy" (as defined within the Verified Complaint) in 
1991. However, this is technically inconect. Instead, toward the end of 1991, my husband and I 
began the process of negotiating the purchase of the Fischer Prope1iy and obtaining the requisite 
financing. While we filled out and executed most of the necessary paperwork to purchase the 
Fischer Property toward the end of 1991 , the actual deed was not signed and recorded until January 
1992. Furthermore, our home was not completed unt il 1992. 
3. Neither my husband nor I know when the Old Fence was built. The Old Fence 
existed back in 1991 when we first began the process of purchasing the Fischer Property, and it 
remained in the same location until August of 2015 when we began the process of replacing it. 
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4. Pertaining to the Access Road, after we buil.t the Garage we continu d to use the 
Access Road to access the Garage itself and used the space between the Garage and the Old Fence 
as access to the western part of our Property. However the location of the New Fence has 
significantly narrowed that space, preventing vehicular access to the westernmost pa.its of our 
property along that route. Instead, we now have to drive on our lawn around the north of the 
Garage. 
5. Since purchasing it, we have maintained the Fischer Property up to the Old Fence 
by mowing and controlling the lru·ge grasses that grow on the property, especially along the Old 
· ence. 
6. Since purchasing our property, the Old Fence had been steadily decaying to a point 
that certain portions of it had failed and fallen onto our property. Because of this, we decided to 
replace the Old Fence with anew one around August 2015. On or around September 4, 2015, we 
received a Demand Letter from the Crostons that stated that we had trespassed upon their property 
and that they would sue us unless we restored their property to their satisfaction. The Crostons 
also appeared to have copied the City of Ammon the Bonneville County Sheriff: and the 
Progressive Irrigation District as well. Because we disagreed with the allegations within the 
Demand Letter, we contacted our attorney and asked for advice. 
7. After speaking with our attorney concerning the Crostons' Demand letter, we 
decided to have the fence line surveyed in order to ensure that the Crostons would not try and 
sue us for fai ling to replace the Old Fence in the exact spot that it had been in before we began 
replacing it. When we commissioned the smvey we had no reason to believe that southern the 
lot line would be anything different that where the Old Fence had been since before we 
purchased the property. 
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8. Before the sw-veyors came out to conduct the survey, I observed a man at the 
boundary between our property and the Crostons' Property using spray-paint and a tape measw-e 
in an apparent attempt to approximately mark where the Old Fence had been on those sections we 
had removed. Thi s was on or about August 30, 2015. When I approached him, this individual 
identified himself as Jim Croston. At the time of our conversation, I was unware that Jim 
Croston was the son of our neighbors to the south. Rather, I assumed he was merely a relative. 
During our conversation, I informed Jim that we were in the process of having the Old Fence 
surveyed and that we would be replacing it with a better one. At no time during this conversation 
did Jim Croston state that he was authorized as the Crostons' power of attorney or that he owned 
the property. 
9. I have reviewed the statement written by Jim Croston which was provided by 
Defendants in Discovery. Contrary to what the Crostons clai m, I never said or implied that we did 
not know where the boundary line between the properties was at. Rather, I merely remarked to 
Jim Croston that we were going to have a surveyor provide us with the exact location of where the 
Old Fence used to be so we could put it back exactly where it was, so there would be no disputes. 
10. I have also reviewed Defendants' Answer and Counterclaim in this matter. I deny 
that Jim Croston and I ever entered into an oral agreement concerning the replacement of the fence. 
Rather, I merely informed Jim Croston of our intentions to replace the Old Fence with a newer 
one, in the exact place that the existing fence had been in. At that time, portions of the Old Fence 
still remained and in the areas that had been removed, there was still a clearly visible line 
demarking its location. Again, I had no reason to believe that the deeded boundary line between 
the properties was anyth ing more than the location of the Old Fence. [t also appeared that Jim 
Croston also believed the Old Fence to be the location of the boundary due to the fact that he had 
measured and spray painted the approximate location on the ground as shown by the picture 
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attached as Exhibit D. 
11. The first time we were made aware of the discrepancy between the location of the 
Old Fence and the deeded boundary line was when we first obtained the preliminary survey from 
Ellsworth & Associates. After reviewing this preliminary survey, we spoke with our attorney who 
drafted a letter to the Crostons asse1ting our legal right to Tract 1 and discussing potential 
settlement options. We overnighted this letter via Federal Express on September 24, 2015. 
12. Since the Crostons built the New Fence, they have neither lived in the Log Cabin 
nor grazed animals on the Croston Property. We have thought about calling the police and 
reporting the teenagers who trespass in the Log Cabin as we have in times past, however, since 
this lawsuit arose, we have been wary to make any police reports for fear that the Crostons might 
accuse us of impropriety. 
13. Attached hereto as Exhibit A are family pictures which show the location of the 
Old Fence taken around 1992 when we were building our home. 
14. Attached hereto as Exhibit B are fan1ily pictures which show the location of the 
Shed before we removed it. 
15. Attached hereto as Exhibit C are pictures I took showing the location of the New 
Fence in relation to the Shed' s concrete foundation. 
16. Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a picture I took showing the white line which Jim 
Croston drew when he was measuring the Old Fence line. 
I certify (or declare) under penalty of pe1jury pursuant to the law of the State ofldaho that 
the foregoing is true and correct. 
Ill 
Ill 
Ill 
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Signature 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in 
~ 
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the ?,..Q day of December, 2016, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct postage 
thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with IRCP 5(b ). 
Persons Served: 
Robin D. Dunn 
Dunn Law Offices, PLLC 
4 77 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby ID 83422 
Fax: (208) 745-8160 
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Fax 
• Hand Delivery 
• Other: 
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Karl R. Decker, ISB #3390 
W. Forrest Fischer, ISB #10009 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAH & CRAPO P.L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH ruDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FISCHER, Trustees of the William and Ann 
Fischer Revocable Trust, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. 
CROSTON, husband and wife; 
AND ALL UNKNOWN OWNERS AND/OR 
OTHER PERSONS OR ENTITIES 
CLAIMING ANY INTEREST IN THE 
FOLLOWING DESCRIBED REAL 
PROPERTY: 
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 4, 
Block 12, of the Original Ammon Townsite, 
Bonneville County, Idaho; running thence N. 
88°33'58" W. 330.00 feet to the Northwest 
corner of said Lot 4; thence S. 00°00'2l"W. 
along the West line of said Lot 4 a distance of 
8.99 feet to an existing fence line; thence S. 
89°41 '36" E. along said existing fence line 
329.90 feet to a point on the East line of said 
Lot 4; thence . 00°00'21" E. along said East 
line 2.50 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING 
Defendants. 
JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. 
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CROSTO husband and wife; 
Counter Claimants, 
vs. 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FISCHER, Trustees of the William and Ann 
Fischer Revocable Trust, 
Counter Defendants. 
I Sharon Anderson, nee Rowbury, pursuant to Idaho Code § 9-1406 and Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 2.7, declare, under the penalty of pe1jury, as follows : 
l . I am over the age of 18 and cmTently reside in Montgomery Alabama. I am 
competent to be a witness in th.is matter and have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein. 
2. In 1951, my family and I moved into a log cabin located at 3020 S. Western Ave., 
in Ammon Idaho ("Log Cabin"). 
3. I lived in the Log Cabin until I graduated from high school in 1958, when I moved 
away from home. 
4. My parents Denzel and Viola Rowbury continued to live in the Log Cabin until 
1959 when they so ld it. 
5. While I lived in the Log Cabin, the Barzees owned the property directly to the north 
of my parents' property. I was friends with their children and played with them often on both my 
parents ' prope1iy and the Barzee' s property. 
6. Between the Log Cabin and the Barzee s home was a pasture, which was also 
owned by the Barzees. 
7. My parents property was parated from the Barzee s pa mre by a fence that ran 
east-west from Western Avenue to the canal ("Old Fence"). Both my parents and the Barzees 
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kept animals on their properties and th Old Fence pr vented the animals from trespassing on 
either property. My parents also had a garden next to the Log Cabin which ran all the way up to 
the Old Fence. I do not know when the Old Fence was built, but know that it existed before my 
parents and I moved into the Log Cabin around 1951 . 
8. During my time at the Log Cabin, I and everyone I knew always treated the Old 
Fence as the boundary between my parents ' property and the Barzees' property. 
9. Neither rny parents nor the Barzees ever questioned whether or not the Old Fence 
was anything but the true boundary between their properties. 
10. In 2001, I traveled back to Idaho Falls to attend my mother' s funeral. While there 
I went to see the Log Cabin. I also noticed that a home was built in the pasture area between the 
Log Cabin and the Barzees' borne. I now know that this home belongs to the Plaintiffs in this 
case. 
I certify ( or declare) under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that 
the foregoing is true and correct. 
December 15 2016 ~<2~ 
Date Signature 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho with my office in 
~ 
Idaho Falls Idaho, and that on the 'lP day of December, 2016, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct 
postage thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with IRCP 5(b ). 
Persons Served: 
Robin D. Dunn 
Dunn Law Offices, PLLC 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby ID 83422 
Fax: (208) 745-:8160 
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Fax 
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D Other: 
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Karl R. Decker, ISB #3390 
W. Forrest Fischer, ISB #10009 
HOLDE , KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FISCHER, Trustees of the William and Ann 
Fischer Revocable Trust, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. 
CROSTON, husband and wife; 
AND ALL UNKNOWN OWNERS 
AND/OR OTHER PERSONS OR 
E TITIES CLAIMING ANY INTEREST 
IN THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED REAL 
PROPERTY: 
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 4, 
Block 12, of the Original Ammon Townsite, 
Bonneville County, Idaho; running thence N. 
88°33'58" W. 330.00 feet to the Northwest 
corner of said Lot 4; thence S. 00°00'2l"W. 
along the West line of said Lot 4 a distance 
of 8.99 feet to an existing fence line; thence 
S. 89°41 ' 36" E. along said existing fence 
line 329.90 feet to a point on the East line of 
said Lot 4; thence N. 00°00'21 " E. along 
said East line 2.50 feet to the POINT OF 
BEGINNING 
Defendants. 
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JAME F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. 
CRO TO husband and wife· 
Counter Claimants 
vs. 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FISCH R, Trustees of the William and Ann 
Fischer Revocable Trust, 
Counter Defendants. 
I Larry Kennedy, pursuant to Idaho Code § 9-1406 and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
2.7, declare under the penalty of perjury as follows: 
1. I am over the age of 18 and currently reside in Idaho Falls Idaho. I am competent 
to be a witness in this matter and have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein. 
2. In about 1973, I met Ron Barzee when I went to work for a local construction 
company. 
3. Ron and I soon became fast friends to the point that I would often go with him to 
visit his parents at their home located at 2910 S. Western Ave in Ammon Idaho (' Barzee 
Home"). 
4. Because Ron 's parents wer elderly Ron and I would frequently go to the Barzee 
Home to help with work around the house and in the yard. 
5. To the south of the Barzee Home was a .large pasture which was also owned by 
Ron' s parents in which they kept and grazed various animals in over the years ( Barzee 
Pasture"). Located on the south east of the Barzee Pasture was a shed which had a concrete 
foundation(' Shed ). Ron 's parents primarily used the Shed to store tools and animal feed. I an1 
not sure when the Shed was constructed, but I know it existed back when I began isiting the 
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Barzee Home back in 1973. To access the Shed, I and others would drive on an existing road 
that ran from the Shed along the southern boundary of the Barzee Pasture until it met up with 
Western Avenue. 
6. Immediately to the south of the Barzee Pasture was an old log cabin which I 
believe was abandoned ("Log Cabin"). Separating the Log Cabin from the Bru·zee Pasture was a 
post and wire fence which ran east to west from Western Avenue to the canal on the western 
portion of the Barzee Pasture ("Old Fence"). I remember that the Old Fence was decades old 
when I first saw it, given its rough condition. Attached as Exhibit A are photos which I have 
rev iewed and have confirmed depict the condition and location of the Old Fence. 
7. I remember several occasions that Ron and I fixed portions of the Old Fence, 
either replacing rotted posts or stapling new hog wire. 
8. In about 1974 or 1975, I married Ron's sister, Sharon. In about 1981 , Sharon and 
I wanted to build a house for ourselves in Ammon, and Ron's father, Levi, offered to sell us the 
Barzee Pasture for us to do so. We accepted Levi Barzee's offer and pmchased the Bru·zee 
Pasture. While Sharon and I owned the Barzee Pasture, I replaced the Shed with a larger Shed 
made of tin . While I was expru1ding the Shed, no one from the property to the south ever 
contacted me or complained about what I was doing. In fact, I don' t ever recall ru1yone living at 
the Log Cabin whi le I worked and owned the Barzee Pasture. Attached as Exhibit B are photos 
that I have reviewed and have confirmed depict the Shed I rebuilt. 
9. Unfortunately, Sharon and 1 were unable to build a home on the Barzee Pasture 
and eventuall y divorced in or ru·ound 1989. Following the divorce, we sold the Barzee Pasture in 
199 1 to the Ackermans. 
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10. At all times, beginning with assisting Ron in working on his parents ' property 
through my ownership of the Barzee Pasture, the Old Fence was always regarded as the true 
boundary line between the Barzee Pasture and the property to the south. I maintained the Old 
Fence even before I owned the Barzee Pasture and utilized all of the pasture grasses to graze 
animals up to the boundary line demarked by the Old Fence. Additionally, I frequently drove on 
the road from Western Avenue to the Shed in order to store my tools and equipment. 
I ce11ify ( or declare) under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho 
that the foregoing is true and correct. 
I D~te 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in 
~ 
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the '1Q day of December, 2016, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct 
postage thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with IRCP 5(b). 
Persons Served: 
Robin D. Dunn 
Dunn Law Offices, PLLC 
4 77 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby ID 83422 
Fax: (208) 745-8160 
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Karl R. Decker, ISB #3390 
W. Forrest Fischer, ISB #10009 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH ruDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FISCHER, Trustees of the William and Ann 
Fischer Revocable Trust, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. 
CROSTON, husband and wife; 
AND ALL UNKNOWN OWNERS AND/OR 
OTHER PERSONS OR ENTITIES 
CLAIMING ANY INTEREST IN THE 
FOLLOWING DESCRIBED REAL 
PROPERTY: 
Beginning at the Northeast comer of Lot 4, 
Block 12, of the Original Ammon Townsite, 
Bonneville County, Idaho; running thence N. 
88°33'58" W. 330.00 feet to the Northwest 
comer of said Lot 4; thence S. 00°00'21"W. 
along the West line of said Lot 4 a distance of 
8.99 feet to an existing fence line; thence S. 
89°41 '36" E. along said existing fence line 
329.90 feet to a point on the East line of said 
Lot 4; thence N. 00°00'21" E. along said East 
line 2.50 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING 
Defendants. 
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PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
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JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE 
CROSTO , husband and wife; 
Counter Claimants 
vs. 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FISCHER, Trustees of the William and Ann 
Fischer Revocable Trust, 
Counter Defendants. 
I W. Forrest Fischer, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 9-1406 and Idaho Ru! of Civi l Procedure 
2. 7 declare under the penalty of perjury as follows: 
l. I am an attorney with Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo P.L.L.C., the firm 
representing Plaintiffs in this matter. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A are true and correct copies of the recorded deeds 
relating to real property located at 3000 S. Western Avenue, Ammon, Idaho 83406. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit B are true and correct copies of the recorded deeds 
relating to real property located at 3020 S. Western Avenue, Ammon, Idaho 83406. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of relevant portions of 
Defendants' "Reponses to Plaintiffs ' First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Production, and 
Requests for Admission." 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of a letter from Defendants 
to Plaintiffs, dated September 4, 2015. 
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit E is a true and conect copy of an email from the 
secretary to Defendants' counsel on Nov mb r 14 2016 ("Email'). Attached to this Email were 
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additional discovery documents responsive to Plaintiffs discovery requests. 
7. Attached hereto as Exhibit F is a true and conect copy of a written and signed 
statement by Jim Croston, dated August 30, 2015 . This document was produced by Defendants in 
the Email and corresponds to Defendants' answers to Plaintiffs' interrogatories. 
8. Attached hereto as Exhibit G is a true and correct copy of the preliminary survey 
of the boundary between Plaintiffs ' and Defendants ' respective properties, conducted by Ellsworth 
& Associates, and dated October 2015. 
9. Attached hereto as Exhibit H is a true and correct copy of hand written notes made 
by Maijorie Croston on September 28 2015, a digital transcription of these notes and notes typed 
by Linda Penning from of phone call with Maijorie Croston on the same day. Both of these 
documents were produced by Defendants in the Email and con-espond to Defendants' answers to 
Plaintiffs ' interrogatories. 
10. Attached hereto as Exhibit I is a true and correct copy of the relevant po1tions of 
the Ammon City Code regarding the keeping and grazing of livestock in the City. 
11. Attached hereto as Exhibit J is a true and correct copy of a written transcript of 
two voice messages left on the Crostons answering machine by me as the attomey for the Fischers 
on September 24, 2015. The audio file from which this transcript was made was provided by 
Defendants in the Email described above. 
12. Attached hereto as Exhibit Kare pictures depicting the location of the New Fence 
in relation to the foundation of the Shed. These photos were provided by Defendants as pait of 
their discovery disclosmes, contained on a D that as del i ered tom firm s office on ovember 
I 4 20 16. Also attached as part of Exhibit K is an email to Defendants counsel confirming my 
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receipt of the CD with the aforementioned pictures. 
13. Attached hereto as Exhibit L are pictures depicting the location of the Fischers' 
"No Trespassing" signs before they were removed, as well as pictures of unknown individuals, 
apparently acting under the direction of Linda Penning, removing the Fischers' "No Trespassing" 
signs and dumping dirt and gravel onto the Fischers ' property. These photos were contained within 
the CD provided by Defendants as described in paragraph 12 above. 
14. Attached hereto as Exhibit Mare invoices detailing the estimated costs of removing 
the New Fence and having a surveyor mark the Old Fence line. The cost of removing the New 
Fence is estimated to be $1,278.00 while Eagle Rock Engineering and Land Surveying P.C. 
("Eagle Rock") estimates the cost of marking the location of the Old Fence line to be $600. 
Because the invoice from Eagle Rock was not generated on its letter head, I have included Eagle 
Rock's email attaching the invoice as well. Altogether, these invoices total $1 ,878.00. 
15. Attached hereto as Exhibit N are pictures depicting the location of the Old Fence. 
These photos were provided by Defendants in response to Plaintiffs' discovery requests. 
I certify ( or declare) under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State ofldaho that 
the foregoing is true and correct. 
"D€..c_,. \C\ I 1...0\ ~ 
Date 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in 
~ 
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the 1.,.0 day of December, 2016, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct postage 
thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with IRCP S(b). 
Persons Served: 
Robin D. Dunn 
Dunn Law Offices, PLLC 
4 77 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby ID 83422 
Fax: (208) 745-8160 
D CLAXATION OF W. FORREST FISCHER 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTlO FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 5 
Method of Service: 
Mail 
Fax 
• Hand Delivery 
• Other: 
-------
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doyol 
,byaadbttftra 
, Countrof 
1 ... , •• Day 1nd L<>lllu o.y, IN•bood Gd ,ire I 
i 
i 
Idaho 
ol tho llnt part, ond L, o, J!ar•H al>II Ion I, e.r-, _maa_ ind •lf• I I 
tho · ,Co,.Jn(yor . Barr.ivlho ··•.•.~to·~ Idloho i,I 
: I 
.,. ,.: : : !, 
., 
·;. ·._. · : 
. .D:O~, : : .•. 
u, ~ po!d by the pwt1H · ol 11,o ...,.,..S ~ ~ .-ipt_Jri!,no( '! , 
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!) • ~ .. • • • • • • 
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_______ J.eue...ll-_, ilo¥ _., ____ (..,.,,) 
~.. •• • I 
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WARRANTY DEED 
THIS INDENTURE, mMI• lli/1 . 12t):\, d•y ol March 
hotwo.,n L. D. BARZEE and ~N.ZA. _j;:_, • .1:!~RZE~ , )!ush.~t!ld and wife, 
. , ~82 . 
ol the • C:ounly of . B.on ne~.Ule 
rhe parl i es ol rho tint p,,rt •nd .~ll.¥ ... ;J , .. J<~:tfflEiP¥. i!-114 
and wife, whose mail i ng. a\l.cl~e!UI . is 315 Lu\' 
. st .. to al . Idaho 
SH.ll,.RQN .. ~~~D¥., husband 
PJ.,;>.ce, Idaho Fal ls, Idaho 
o1 the 
Coun ty ol Bonn.e v ille , S tot1 ol .. I.dah.o , Iii• p1,1i es ol tho ... ·ond p•rt , 
W ITNES!5 ETH, lh•t IN said f'l!l l ·o/ t he .fi rst p1rl, ,lot and in con, i(!er.rion ·.01, lhe ·,;.,m al 
----·- ---'l'EN AND NO/100 .. ($'10) 0'0J ::: .-:.-,,-:, :, -:- ."." --:-.· ·--·- . •:• · ·, Dni1.,". 
{n,/ul mOMY of /he United State, ··o1 ,(mo;;c,; and.'. other good . ana. valuable doii'siderat':i,o'It\• 
10 t hem in h~nd paid b y tM parlies · ·,,/ th,, oeeond •P•rt, the recoipt · whe;-eol 'r', ' herub'y 'ackn·o,jil~di~'i{ ·· .. : 
/\.a-Ve ,ranied, b6rt.aiMd 1 sold, and .by)hes~-i,·r~~nt•., do ,,.,,,1, b"r;ain, ~II .a-n'cl tonvey a·nd i·orilirn; lin t~ 
the H id part. ·of the ~ coiid p~rt, . .,,.ac10 t .ne.i;i: heui •nd ault n>, /ore iter; ,,11' Ilic /ollowiiii d,'scri~d 
roal • •t•t• , ,itu,ted ;n t he · , Cou~ty··o/ ~ Bonneville . 
S1 ate nl Idaho, to-wit : r· 
Lot Three · (3 ) anc); the South 59 fe,; t of Lot Two (2), Block 
· Twe l ve ( 1?. l ,· -Airunor:• 'I:ownsil•~·, Bonneville Coun ty , 
: State of Id!l,ho \ .i:l,:S' per · the r.ecorc\ed_ plat t her eQf ·. 
. SUEl.1EC'I· T O all . condi t ions, r e ser 11ations , easeme nt s, 
r -i ghts, Righ.t !l'-9f'-way'; zon i ng orlii nances and· go11e/ .~enta l 
r egu l a t ions of r _e c ord . ' . ~" ~ 
::J, 
.· o ·-.. 
•' : 
1:, :..· .. ,, 
..,,.-. 
. ~ .. ·. 
;< 
TOGE TH /:.R w,th .,JI 1Jnd· ·,;n,uC~r the /er,emenl•, hored/(,1.,nont• und 1ppurten•t>C41• therou ,.to bt:lont > 
in, or in anY}vi,e iipperl•i1Ul1.t , a~td th6 ... 1eVenion and r11venion.1,. · 1~mainder a.nd rr.mainde~~, •'•nd reiit:11 i.stties .-. ·_:.-
and r,rolits thereof,· tJnd all d:J tat,: .. f4ht; ,·itl• ~,vi i_r,~1tred in and t i) flv, a.:tid pr~p.:rly, ·,u " "'!II ~ ... , .. ,;. ·a:., ;_ equii,.:~ .. 
ot ti,., "'id part ol 11,. fl r• t p•rl . . • : . . •·-; 
-~ . ,•:· I"/.,~ .. •· • . 
TO H_A Vl': -,..r,D TO HQL D, aJ/ _.tnd ain.ultt ,,-,. ·.obovo m•ntio,.,., an<! J<ocrit,ad pr,mi~• lo,-: ther . , 
wilh tho oppurtenan~• u nt j 1M P•r l i'es .. oJ. -tho ooeond part~;_,-,.,wJ,/c. · .. ~heir 'hom , rid· a11itn• lorove,: '_ '·. 
ltnd tho auid part ie s ,,, the ·i; ra t p.ri, ~ .. . their. ·.:.'· h,rir1; tlla 11,id"ptemixo ,;, tfM ·,1uio1 und po•uab/e ·: ' '. ". 
po-•aion of the ,aid po11 ies"· ,,1 ttie. -,;,nd port, .the ir :,..,,. 11nd nMitn., •a,un•I Iii. laid p.,i..es :; . ~ I, 
al the llnl put. :.nd t he i r hoir•, ·/ind·•pinol all and ovfiy per,011 .niJ p,rr,i,,,. .,...,_;,;,oo,i.--, ,- ·;,;.,1~in,: . . , , . /' ·: 
c/aimin, ,;,r u, cl• im the ••me 1haJl,•1t!d wi11 w.• .·ranl and by ll»N p11 N11I• /or•••• iJ; l•nrl . ... , ·· ' ' ' ,.... · •· 
.. ' : • '· V ••, !, 
I N WITNE!jS WHEREOF, lho ,aid parties · 111 /h,o 6:,r .o ,rl 1.,.ve h.r,un!o ,..,, the i r h~ndS 
il.nd w • ; ::i r,'·,c ~p ;, and y .;.;1 f:nt .!:bove written . 
, ,: 
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. · . · : .. · ~, ;_r}, '.-~· ,-:. ~- . .'1 · ~~: • .. : 
c~ lllurranty: Ile.eh~\_ 
ltf or Value Received 
r.ARRY J . , KENNEDY Mm SHAf<ON. KEflNP.DY, husband and' ..Ue 
OOUGUS M. AGK!lRMAN AND CHERYL A. ACKEIU-!AN, lrus band and wife 
·2390 dI!IIDOn lid. 
1.mmon, Idaho BJ406 
.t~~ p";)n~ s, tbi!.follo1,1;ing d!~bed premises, i~ lJonnoville County lqaho, ~ wit: ·: 
Lot _3, and c-h~ Socth 59· feet. of t.""c..r. 2.; Block 12 • .A?::ruooa Town.site, , Bonneville 
·c~u.."lty . State of ldahll, according t:o ihe re.curded plat t:her4;-of. 
-· .: __ .,. ·_ 
; . _ _. ._-; ,sm_1i;r IQ:.· m eusting p1t1ut m~rr;t,ons , .,;,.,.t,·,· ;i;bt; cf .. ~. ~•~teeti·'" cc~en,l~, 1oni~ij '";/ '.;. -\ ~, 
, •· · · · ordin .. ees-ao,i! •Pillc•b!• boildi.og ,c;.,_ Im nd nS"l at!o,,._ • • ·.->:. 1 .. ,;. 
·-,~J ~--- ·. · . ... _:-:,_~ -- .· . .,...,-: -~:.}-- : 1 \, "I{ • - r ~ mo ~.-\ VE-AND T~ HOLD the ~id-~~~l!e5, wlch chcir"appuTlcn41nc~ unto~ the .said Gr~tet s, .- . ~ :: .; -;_"_ ~ _ ,tne;-r · .•- · ,. heirs,..andu.ssigrndor~r-An_dth~s.aidGnmtoJS do herchycove-nanr.roandwith.thdSaJd .,. 
'~ !·_ ~. i'.9ranra; :i: t~.:a.t ~ they fhe Owners in fC'C' sifuple of said pn!mis~; 1har they .a.re frtt from ali· lncmnb~nces · -.. 
-,;_,~ CD . w,-· ~ 0 
. ~~ ll:['''ey;: ~:::·-····-··-·""·":;z:~ 
:,;' LAR~. -,K~ _ SHARON KE~NED~. . 
... .. 
\' &r;;E.oF t~AHO. co~ 01; 
,.. a;,· ,his_ , 'lid 1.br of 
Jo~nuill~ 
JOI! .ll'Jl, 
bd"nte rue,-. 0notar, poolic. 1n t:irid for :uid .St&tt-, pmoh.:1llr :tppc.,,ti:d • 
. · •• -..,, - '.i • . • '. . . :,. 
·;1mr1: mmY 
·,"" ·'. •H!lOI IEJliQ~ 
.i!umiam11m 
•ft~-~·-....-.=ei::= 
I ~~;;u·:~r ~c;: ~-~-'-±:;¢~ 
I INST. COOo · --::;,-,+~~h 
t flCHE NO. 
! ;El, ·--~--) ~!A1: OF IOAHO . ) 
l C J ~-·iT'( O? 0::JNNFVULE} .1$ 
: I ~:c~~i .tw1if,i Mt ~£ whhln 
. • • : ~;.:'!:..'M ....... ,..._,rdf'd. . 
,;.-.--
'-;•~ •-·:; • • '.·" J,.- .j.,"r_ ',t~ :, 
.-·:.:•: ~.ro..· 
\0 ' tD 
.. 
·- ~. 
,- ..... 
. -.;, ·~ 
. : .,, 
~ -· • ?-
.:t,· 
' . ,· i 
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WAR}iANTY DEED 
, .. ' . . \ ,, 
l)ouglas !'.. Ack.er111an .and Cheryl A. Ackerman. Husband & Wife 
the grantors ."do hereby grant, bur-rln, ~ and convey unto 
-Wi llia,; F.isduir and An11 Fisch.or. 'Husband & \.ii_fe 
whose current addres,, ! s 
3150 Central, Aanon, Idaho 
the a:rantee ~ the folio~. deiscribed !'zeml5ea, in 1lONNEVlLI.E r,,unty Idaho, to wit: 
Lot 3, and the South 39 feet of Lot 2 • .Bloclr. U, t.mmon l'olfllsite. Bonneville 
Coll!lty, St'at:e of Idaho. accordint to the rccordl!<l. pl;:,t tlun:eof •• • 
. ' ... 
. ... ·~· 
•,,· 
smic! !fl: ll,1, uistitg p2te:it r<!!mlins • .-ts. rislli :~ nr, m tt:!if! <n!!U.!s, i:iiliJ 
OIGUillCU ud it!'lielhl• nm~ t!l\l!I, liWS i.l !?;".Jitia::!S. 
TORAVEANDTOROLD 0thesaldllff!IIU-.wilh. their ~ : unln ' the •~ GntJ!a!~", 
their heirs and 28Sjgns fo~ And 1h!! aaid Grantor s t1a lY!reby _,.,.t" tD am1 
with the said Grantees, that they ere the awner·s infeesimpleofsaid~;thattm:y;aiifree 
fraD aD inClD'llbrances · · 
and that 
~; ·<~ 
. . . ,, :- . ~ . 
they · wtll warrant and d.el'"114 lhe -e from all lawlul dairq whaboever. 
. . ' ' .. .. ,_ 
992 
' co 
~-
··~ 
, ..:• 
~-.! . : 
·•; . 
...... 
-· 
. · . 
i 
't: 
Exhibit A - Page 004 
104
1--
1-.-
I. 
QUITCLAm: DEED 
For Value R,ceived 
lrr',LIAM FISCHER AND A,."'ffl FISCHER, hushartd nnd wife 
do hereby convey, release, remise and forever quit claim unto 
WILl.IAM R. FISCII:Eli AND M. ANN FISCJll!li , husband an d wife 
whose current addre.s5 is 
3000 WESTERN DRM IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO 83406 
the following described P!'1lIDises, to-wit: 
LOT 3 AND TRE SOUTH 59 FEE! 0"/1 LOT Z, BLOCK 12, ,A.'IMON TOliNSITll , llONNEVILLE 
COUNTY, IDAHO, ACCORDING TO THE RECOBDEr PLAT THEREOF ••• 
together with their appurtenances. 
I 
~ 
1----$-T_A_T_E_O_l'_ID_A_H_O_, _CO_U_N-'TY--•F-ll_O_N_NE_'_H_L_L_E __ 'l;-------- -------------J i 
Oo thl, 7TH day of OCTOBER , tn 92 , \ ~~--
l 
before me1 11. notary l)Ublic in and !01· e;iid State, person;alty lMSTr.fJ,",\'ENT NO. 3'I. ~ 
appe~nd OATE 
:z 
~ I~., !":~-. C".r:ir •:=; _§ • 
WILLIAM AND ANN FISCl!ER. husband and wife \ ; !·'. '.,e sc,. -:j£).D j ~ ~~il:\I•' , .... -~ ... : •:: -. ~.•.n;'-~,c )) - .. - \I ~ 
k0-0wn tq,·~~.t~ b~\the- tie.non s whose nnme s are 
eubgcfibjd 1.0: thq-,_wtt in .fiukumenti and ac.knDW1!:Jl(ed to 
mo tb~I',~ ,,: · ,!= hC,Y,f'· / . . ~ji'°u!cd th, 17.t.'e . 
. '-~2· i,~(/11; /(/(((( "' 
-f-.1..1:. . . / ,r· Notary Public 
l!o,lding Al I.DAllO FALLS , ld•ho 
C,omm, Expires 03 /08/96 
',: t:...... p 
\ !":<·,:"-,::,,,.,_.:.:">;~;,t w;,hln \ j 
Lc:o•,1,1w·n--•''I" ' . l f • 'V . I L;,{,W"I ,, __ Ocputy I ,, y ·-+,,wq. ~
~oquo>t o f Jtt.. T~- -·· .. __ . I 
~ }-. ••.~· M 
,';·.::; ·. !,- .. :-:~ .• 
': ~ 
·i 
: ·i. 
:.:':' 
~ 
. , ' 
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BOHUILLE COUHTY R£Coo:£R 
10623B9 t-UV 9 '01 P111212 
THIS IS ALEGALLYBINDINGCONTRACf. IFNOTUNDEllSTOOD, SEEK COMPETENT ADVICE. 
Recorded at Request of Gallian. Westfall, Wilcox & Welker. L.C., 59 S. 100 E .• St. George, UT 84770 
at _ _ .M. Fee Paid$ ______ _____________ _ ____ _ _ _ 
by _ _ ___ _ __ ~ Dep. Book ___ __ Pagc ____ Ref.: _ _ _____ _ _ 
Mail tax notice to William R. & Ann Fischer Address 3000 Western, Idaho Falls. ID 83403 
WARRANTY DEED 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN FISCHER, husband and wife, 
as joint tenants 
Grantors, 
of Idaho Falls , County of , State of Idaho, hereby 
CONVEY and WARRANT to the WILLIAM AND ANN FISCHER REVOCABLE TRUST, 
under Agreement dated November s2::J-2001, William R. Fischer and M. Ann Fischer, or Successors, Trustees 
,,-N-ST_A_U....,ME_t_ff_N_o __ ~~~....,.,...,...., ... 
DATE. 
of3000 Western, Idaho Falls, ID ~file ~6£ 
TEN ($10. 00 )-------------·· 0 ---------------------------------- - ----------------- ----- 9W,5&s:36 
and other good and valuable consideration 
the following d_escribed tract ofland in Bonneville 
State ofldaho: 
STAT~J;l_f._!(W-b ) 
co~~ ~EVILLE) ~ 
I ~ c~ tiat !111 'PAl·rifl 
·in!ltrum&nt ~ ~-
Lot 3, and the South 59 feet of Lot 2, Block 12, Ammon Townsite, -~onald Loogno,e, 
Bonneville County, State of Idaho, according to the recorded platther ofunty A 
By--...!~~~:::;;:,::___ 
SUBJECT TO all existing patent reservations, easements, rights-of-w~R-oq_u_es_1_0_f ~- ~~~__._~~* 
protective covenants, zoning ordinances and applicable building codes, laws 59 S. I OD ~ -, 
and regulations 
.s;...-., ~ . UJ-
fJl.f770 
WITNESS, the hand of said grantor, this 
November .2.,/ , A. D. 2001. 
Signed in the Presence of 
STATE OF UTAH, 
ss. 
County ofWashington ) 
~ •yof ~ M. Ann Fischer 
On the ;2. day of November ,A.D. 2001 , personally appeared before me 
William R. Fischer and M. Ann Fischer, the signers of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged 
to me that they executed the same. 
Notary Public 
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I 
1650 Elk Creek Drive Idaho Falls, ID 83405 {208) 524-6600 
While this is e 'photographic reproduction of portions of the recorded plat, 
no representa1ion is made to accuracy and AmeriTitle assumes no li~bility tfierefore. 
Any re ference le the plat of the .subdivision is to the plat recorded with the County Recorder 
and not to tl,is pla~ whi::;h is provided only to reflect the apprbximate location of the property. 
E 
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WARRANTY DEED 
THIS fNDENTURE, Made this .. ....... 13..tb. ................ day of ............•...... 9-eP.t.~.!i:!!?.!U.' ......... _ ....... , 19.?.). .. 
by and between .. .. Al .Y..iJ'.1 .. l.Sa.!l~.~ .... ~!}9: . ..l3-J,.a.-n.~J:l.e . :[_~ a.-.a.-s 5..Lh.~:S.l:l_~~ .~~ ... ~!.!.f..':.! ......... ·-···· ·•· 
of the County of ....... .B.or.u:ie.v.il.le . ...... ········- • State of _l!l.<ihQ.~_ ..................... , the part.:i..~.S .. , of the first 
part, and ................ . .D.enz.eJ. .. . K, .... R.Q1f.RJJ.I:Y . .1rn.4 .. Y.:!.2;!,~ .. .U .. ,.... fl.Q.\lP.J,ll.'.Y, ... !l.~.~.R-¥19: ... ~ .ct ... Y.J..f.~, 
of the County of ... .. ... Bonnevill e ............. ..... , State of ..... Idaho., ..... •······-···• the parti .es.. of the second 
part. 
WITNESSETH, That the said part.ies. of the first part, for and in consideration of the sum of 
.. .. , .. ... . . T.wentyc:f.iYe ... l:lundred ... a\1.d . .Jfo/lD:0 .... :-: .... :-: ... ::: ... ::: ... :c ... :, .. .. :-: .. . ::c ... ::: ••• :-: ..• ,:-: .•.• :-: .•• . :-: ... ·,.noLLARS 
lawful money of the United St,ates of America, to ... them. .... . in hand paid by the part.ie.s: of the second 
part, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, haY.e ........... granted, bargained and sold, and by these 
presents do ............ ....... grant, bargain, sell, convey and confirm unto the said part .. ie.;; of the second part 
and to ... th.~t.t .. .. ....... heirs and assigns forever, all the following described real estate, situate in the 
County of ···-···.B·onn.e.v.ill.e .............. , State of Idaho, towit: 
Lot Numbe red 4 in Blo cik Numbered 12 of the Ammon Townsite, 
Bonneville Co.unty, Idaho, as per the recorded plat thereof, 
containing one_ and one .fourth acres , more or less, to-
gether with bu~lding and improvements thereon. 
TOGETHER, With all and singular the , tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto be-
longing or In anywise appertaining, ' and the reversion or reversions, remainder and 'rem~a~rs: . r~;,ts, 
1s.s1:1~s and profits thereof, and all estate, right, tjtle. and .interest in and to . the saJd property, as well in 1 , 
law as In equity, of ,the said part .. ie.s ...... of the first part. . . . 
· · TO HA.~· AND' TO HOLD, All and sin:gular,·t,he above .mentioned -and described p..r~.s. Jo- .. 
gether with the appurtenances, unto the piu-t.;l,~JL of the second part, and to .... the1'.r ........ - .. heirs and 
assigns forever. And the sald part .. .1.!UL. .. .i.. of the first part; and ... their. .. , .... heira, the said premlaes _ · 
in• the quiet and peaceable possession at th~ said part .. ie.s ........ ,.. o~ the second part, and .. th.e1r.' ... :. heirs 
and assigns against the said parl ... ie.lL .. o~ the first part and .... their. .............. heirs and against all and 
every person and persons, whomsoever la..,;fully claiming or to cialm the same, shall and will WAR-
RANT and by these presents forev~ D~ND. ' 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, ·The saJd ·p~.i(?.S ... . of. th,e ,first part-ha .. :v.e, . .-... ,-... ·hetfUD,to·set:,.:t!:!.~;!.X .. 
hand ... s ........... and seal.s. .......... :. th~ day and year ~/tten~ t2. . , ·:··: ., 
!!::::~eS:1"d and delivered in the :,- ~ ·-· ... ~(SE~),-· 
·······-··········· ............ ············· .. ··- ···· •·• .. ,·............ §_L~ ...... ~.~·····-··· (SE~) ·• 
• ··········· .. ················ ·· ········· ................ ·········· ···············'··-····· ··· .. · (SEAL) ., . 
I ! -. ............................... :·················•···-···-·········-················-······· (SEAL) -
Exhibit B - Page 001 
108
~ , 
~ 
f· 
'-i 
""' 
---~~ .. -.. ----·------
STATE OF IDAHO. t ss. 
County of ... /39.1":L'le'{.f l),~. ) 
On this .. ....... J ... ~ ......... . day of ......... .. S.~wt.e.(l\"!J.~J:... .. . ... ..... . ..... , in. the year 19 .. .5.l ...... before me, 
..... ............. til.e ... unde.r.sigo.ed .... : . . ·····-···• a Notary Public in and for the State of ldaho, personally 
appeared Af.yin_ J$.a~&ii. <!Pd .. :E!l .aT) CJl.EL.ls.aacs., .. husband .and. .. :wif.e, .... -·····-·····•···········-·· 
known to me to be the person .. & ... whose name s ... ar.e . ... . ... subscribed to the within instrum.ent, and 
acknowledged to me that... ... .. .... t he .. .. y. ... ... .. executed the same. 
S: J>.L 
~ 
l:l 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my• official seal, 
the day and year in this certificate fir~ove w~itten . 
............... ~ .... ~ .. \~~·~~bii~:··· 
gj 
~ 
g J p:: . s~ 
r,. 
'g 0 
al ~ c 
" 1, ~ :, 0 A Cll u 
• ....,,....-.....::== .7':.:....=u---~· - ~-~:s,,,,.,.. 
Residing at Iq.ah9 .. . .f.aj.:J,.;;., ... J.dahP., ................. ... . 
My commission expires }l!l,f~.~ } .2..~.ll ....... , 19 ... ?..~ 
'i: o¼ 
''J E g. ; ~ LJ . ~ ~ : :; 1l t{ fJ: ~= ] .: ; 
ii~ 
~~ i i ; 
..c; ' 
H :ii ! 
~ . 
.s ~ 
al 
"Cl 
8~ t u; 
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...... _ .. • . I 
f {:-
---
l.r) 
O') 
0,J 
"Q'-
County of ~:::;~::.:.:~~.~~············· ······...} ••· 
On tlii• . ......... .. .... :2.?.th.. . ... day of .. .. .. ..... J•!/1.~~.h ............................. ... .. in tho yoar 19 .. ?.':/., before mo 
The .. \lr.ld!3r . .,;.l.gn.~.i:! ... .. .. . . .. .. .............................. .. , n Notory Public in and /or sold Slate, personally nppoarad 
.. ,.P.~.n~.E:1 JI., .. !!9.~ll,.Y .amL '.l'.~!?.k.fi., .. !l.9Ym~t.Y., .. . ~J.~ ... ~H.L .. .. ... .. ...................................... ......... ............... .. 
,,... .. ... .... ...... ... ............... .. ... ........... ...... ........... .................. ..... .. ..... , ... ...... ............. .... ... .. .. .. .... . 
lrnow,, to rTlc tn be tho person ~ who.so nama 6 . •. J;t.~ ... sul.isorihod to thtJ wlt11Jn ir'l!Itrumcnt, and acknov.·ledlfed 
to u_1o ;thut V10V .. c.t:ecuted tha same. 
I p r.~ 
~ p 
:>; ~ 
J ~ 
~ 
I ~ p:; 0 
~ ~ 
.. 
I <tl 
...,. 
' t> 
II 
-.i 
~ 
!l:: ' 
0... 
"' .,r 
0,J 
en 
<.:, 
"" 
""" 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I ha vo l,orounto ••I my hand aM alli.wd my ol!lc/o/ ,cal 
Ilic d::::..?2d ye.arr! this ccrUlicata firs/ above ,rritten. 
<'-·~ ,f.:f . ..J.!/?.tl.n.~ 
~J;,,y Public for Ilic Slate o/ ld11./10, 
Ro, idln: at .. . l:i,th , ldolio. 
j\l! ,• t .. t·-. ! 
" 
'.7-
-r-:, 
::.:=.:.· .. - ' ::...·:· -=--=---
: I. 
~====•~======•~ =====:=;:;!, 
.J -
~·-
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1'HIS INDENTURE, ninde 1/tis ..... .. ..... i.;i\JL ........... day ol ......... .. . M~1'.~.h .......... ............................ , 19."l'/ ... , 
betweer1 0.Etl1.l'.!!.l .. . Y/ .•... B.Q)Y.ITT!.f.Y. .. ~)).II .. Y.~i;,J~.JJ., .... IJ.m~P.V,.Y.,.Jl.i~ .. ,v.U.~ .......................... ........................................ . 
ol ......... /\lJ\ll)0.11 ... ... . . .. .. . . ... , County oi .. ....... P.Q.OJ:W.Y.H.l.~ .................. .. . , Stotu ol ...... . J9~.ho ............... ......... , 
l/10 part .~~.!\ .. of a,. firs/ part and .. . J.~.m\".~ ... f.., ... ~.rn.~JQ.Q .. ~.i:11!.}!.~ .• J\l.,.ie. G., ... G.rn.~.to.n,.J-!J~ ... wv~ .......... .. 
:::::::::::.:::::::::::.:::: :: ::.:::· .... · ·.:·::.:::.::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :.•.·.·.-.·.·.·.·.·.·.·_-.·.·.·.·_-· .~_-_-.· ··.·.:·:.· ..·.:::.·.:.·_-·;;::::t~~·hq.::f.ifI~·:::::::::.::::::::::~:; 
CounlJ• o/ . .. .. Bonnevi IL~ .. .. , State of .......... .ld.~ho ............... ........ , /lie pnrt .iN, .. al /1,c ,econcl part, 
WITNESSF.TH. 1/,nt 1110 ,.,id pnrt l.~~ . al I/Jo first part, /or and in considerution of 1/,e wm of 
.T.~.11 .. !'!.9.t).~.I:.§ .. . ,::7.-:-:::--.7::-.••."'.'.::::::-::~::.::::::.:::.::::::.:-:.~.::::.7.:::::::::.::.7.7.::.7.::::.::::.:::::•.::::.::::.7.~:-:.~::.-:-.::.":.'.':.":.::.~.::::Dollor, 
lawful money of t/10 United St,Jtcs o/ Amcrica .. J..00 .. 0.th.ei: ... 90.QP. .. il.r:\d .. v,;i.'luab.le ... coosid~,r.il:t.iP.O ..... .. ...... , 
to .. ~.h~m .... 111 hrind paid by rhe p:irt .it:.~. of t/10 .second pnrt, t/10 receipt whereof is /Jercby nc1mowTccJaed, 
/ta V..e. .. Crat1lcd1 bnr-tJ•tin~d, &r:::/d, and by thcso presents, do ...... ~rnnt, bar{1nin1 sell nm! com•ey nncl confirm unto 
/110 lla.ic! pntt .if!'.S ... of the ~n:i;oud partJ and to .th.~i.~ . heirs and n.s,iJJns, /orcl'cr, 111/ tho lof/owiniJ dascribcd 
roa/ estate, siluoled in.. ... ~.mmo.n ... .. . .... ...................... , County o/ llo.nn.~Y.Ul..!l .. .... ........... , 
Sta/a of Jdalto, lo•wit: 
Lot number four (4) 1 Block nu~.ber twelve (12) of the Ammon Townsite, 
Bonneville County, State of Idaho as per recorded plat thereof, 
Containing li acres (more o;i;- less) together with buildings and 
improvements thereon. 
f'}\ TOGETHER w'th all and singular tho tenements, hereditamonts and appurte11nnces thereunto be/on~-. ::.{{fog or in anyivirn appcrt,,foi'ng, Md ille te1:crsion and rcvcrsian9, remllinder and remWndersJ and rents, issues i.{(a. nd profits thereolj and all ,:State, r1{fl1t, title .and interest in and to the suid propcrlyJ ns weJJ in Jaw DS in oquUy · :itof the said part.i .e.r: .... of thej first part. 
·"'!;;;,- TO HAVE Al'ID TO :HOLD, :,JI and sindular the abovo menlioncd and described premises toget/,or 
• .;;f:tt;i;t11 the oppurtfn.mc~s unto! me part ... ie.s. of the .second part, and to ...... "t.0.1;J~ .... Iieirs and assif1ns forever. 
:I -\:And the snid port .J .. 1;1~ .• of th'e first part, and ... . .1:.h.~.h'. .......... heirs, the said premises in //Jo quiet and pcacenble l :. }-:/:i?<<o,;/Jn r,f: t/,e said pnrt.. .. j . .l~.• ol .the second ~•rt, ...... t.h!l.~L. I,eirs and nsslan,, against the suid part .. i.l!.~ .. . . w,,f the Brst µnrr, and ..... t.l:i~lr., ..... hms, and aJl.mnsl u/1 Dlld c1•cry person and parsons w/lomsoovar, /awfully 
r~-tI(liiiring:or lo .claim tl1c satric shall Dnd wiJJ warrant arid by these presents forever d•:!lcnd. 
~~ . . I I 
1 'si / ');' ,·· IN 1VITNES5 WHE:JE:OF, the ,old parl.l~.e .... of Ilic first parl /10 :V.~ .. liereunto sci .. . !h.~k ... ./1ond . .S 
{1-· ·aniJ",ou/.s .. 'tho day nnd year1fir,t above written. 
~ ~: ;_ ~{F::~: . . . . ! 
- -~ :/:l;f'":. E:.,yl.,•cutr;;J and De.Jiverecl in tho Pcesen~ of 
.-:~it::-? . i ,[) -A/./lf?_~.~ .,- ;,. 
Tc ·· ... ··- ···· .. ···· ·· ....... ... ....... , ............. .... ................... ... - .... ~.y. ... U/. ... f/"J::j"7.ft, .. v.i-z:?•······ [SEAL] .\~'•'.;· 
,!/.,t.t:.-:r:!..v..,6/... 4..-<f-.~, . -7,'_.;;,,,.,l~/--~ .[Sr.1,L]. :i ~ ? . ~~ . ~---
....................................... .......... ............................. [Sui,J ;.;'c" 
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DU1'.7N LAW OFFICES, PLLC. 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903 
477 Pleasant Counuy Lane 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby ID 83442 
Telephone: (208) 745-9202 
Facsimile: (208) 745-8160 
rdunn@ dunnJawoffices.com 
Attorney for Defendants James F. and Marjorie C. Croston 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FISCHER, Trustees of the 
William and Ann Fischer Revocable Trust, 
Plaintiff.'>, 
vs. 
JAMES F, CROSTON and MARJORIE C. 
CROSTON, husband and wife; 
A.J'-ID ALL UNKNOWN OWNERS AND/ OR 
OTHER PERSONS OR ENTITIES 
CLAIMING ANY INTEREST IN THE 
FOLLOWING DESCRIBED REAL 
PROPERTY; 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 4, Block ) 
12, of the Original Ammon Townsite, Bo11neville ) 
County, Idaho; running thence N . 88°33'58" W. ) 
330.00 feet to the Northwest corner of said Lot 4; ) 
thence S 00°00'21"W. along the West line of said ) 
Lot 4 a di stance of 8.99 feet to an existing fence ) 
line; thence S. 89°41'36" E. along said existing ) 
fence line 329.90 feet to a point on the East line of ) 
said Lot 4; thence N. 00°00'21" E. along said East ) 
line 2.50 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING. ) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-16-2894 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' FIRST 
SET OF INTERROGATORIES, 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION, 
AND REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
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COME NOW, the defendants, JANIES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. CROSTON, 
husband and wife, by and through the undersigned counsel, and respond to Plaintiffs' First Set of 
Interrogatories, Requests for Production, and Requests for Admission as follows: 
I. 
INTERROGATORIES 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Please identify all persons who provided information for the 
preparation of answers and responses to these Interrogatories and Requests for Production of 
Documents and state the specific answer(s) and/or response(s) to which they contributed. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Linda Penning,James F. Croston and 
Marjorie C. Croston; they all talked and provided and answer to each discovery item contained 
herein. Matjorie C. Croston gathered additional information via telephone and conversations with 
third parties that were incorporated in these answers. She (Marjorie) also provided photographs and 
google pictures along \vith other documents. H e parents are the named defendants and are too 
elderly to gather or supply such information. Rod Croston provided pictures and contributed to some 
of the questions. 
INTERROGATORIES NO. 2 through 12 & RESPONSES TO 
INTERROGATORIES NO. 2 through 12: OMITTED 
RESPO NSE TO PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQliESTS FOR PRODUCTION, 
A.ND REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Please state all facts upon which you base your denial of 
paragraph 31 of the Complaint. 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION, 
AND REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
8 
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RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORYNO.13: 
Facts upon w hich denial of Paragraph 31 of the complaint is based. 
There is no way to know what the intent of the old fence was at the time it was constructed. It is 
unknown when the old fence was constructed. As far as we are aware it separated fields and did not 
demarcate any specific boundary or property line. The old fence was removed by the Fischers, 
destroying any implied property line . 
INTERROGATORIES NO. 14 through 17 & RESPONSES TO 
INTERROGATORIES NO. 14 through 17: OMITTED 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET O F INTERROGATORIES, REQ UESTS FOR PRODUCTION, 
AND REQUEST S FOR A.D-"IISSION 
9 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 18: Please identify and describe in detail the factual bas is for each 
affianative d efense D efendants assert in their Answer, and identify each document D efendants 
contend constitutes evid ence of or provides support for each affirmative defense D efendants assert in 
this ac tion. 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 18: 
Plaintiffs failed to allege proper elements for quiet title, boundary disputes and trespass. 
Plaintiffs recognize old fence in disrepair or removed. 
This is the Fischers claim. T he Crostons s tate the fence did need some repair. 
The o nly place it was falling down were the Fischer's had slowly and 
sys tematically shoved it over beginning in 2011 per the Google Earth maps . As 
noted in the pic tures taken August 2015, it was not falling into the Fischers 
prnpcrty but was leaning into the Croston's property 
RESPONSE TO PL.A1NTIFFS' FIRST SET Of INTERROGATORIES, REQL'ESTS f.OR PROO UC'l'ION, 
AND REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
10 
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They requested a survey & indicated would contro l. They i.ndicated would put up a new, much 
nicer fence to be placed on the Survey line and would be no dispute. See Ellsworth survey report. See Jim 
Croston Statement from 8/ 31/15. Would pay half the cost of tl:te new fence. (NOT A WARE OF THIS 
OFFER.) See Jim Croston Statement from 8/31/15. The Fischers have offered to pay the full pcice of the 
fence twice in their settlement offers if the Crostons give them the property in question. 
The Fisd1.ers stated to Jim Croston were going to replace the fence and get a survey with the 
Surveyors the City of Ammon uses so will be no disputes. See J im Croston Statement from 8/31/15. The 
temporary fence was placed 4" south of the Survey line. This does not give away or permission for use of 
the additional 4" of the Crostons pro petty. 
a. Aci.:ord on location of new fence. 
See Jim Croston Statement from 8/31/15. No written agreement. 
b. No agreement between panies on boundary designated by old fence. 
The Crostons have never discussed with the Fischccs the boundary lines between their 
properties therefore no agreement ever existed. Ms. Croston, Linda Penning and others 
were on the Croston property August 17 to 20th doing cle an up and maintenance. At that 
time the destroyed fence and irrigation ditch was intact. The Fischers had ample 
opportunily to discuss the destroyed fence:; and any need for tepairs with the Crostons at 
that time . They did uoc speak wi th Ms. Croston or Linda Penning. 
Agreement survey would be controlling. 
See Jim Croston Statement from 8/31/15. No written agreement. 
RESPONSE TO l'Lt\JNTIFFS' f[RST SET Of INTERROGATO!UES, REQ uESTS FOR PRODUCTIO ' , 
AND REQUESTS FOR ADMfSSION 
l1 
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Fischers no problem until boundary m oved nor thward with Survey. The Fischers stated to Jim 
Croston were .going to rep lace the fence and get a survey with the Su.rveyors the City o f Ammon 
uses so will be no d ispu tes. Se e Jim Croston Statement from 8/ 31/ 15. See notes from Fischer's 
sons phone calls and letters from the Fischer's son. 
INTERROGATORIES NO. 19 through 21 & RESPONSES TO 
INTERROGATORIES NO. 19 through 21: OMITTED 
RESPONSE TO .l'LAJNTIFFS' FIRST SET OF L'ITERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION, 
AND REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
J2 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 22: Please identify any and all persons and entities which have a 
current legal incerest in the ownership of the Croston Property and the nature and percentage of such 
ownership. 
R ESPONSE TO INTE RROGATORY NO. 22: 
Current legal interest in the ownership of the Croston Property. 
James and Marjorie Croston. Full ownership. 
INTERROGATORIES NO. 23 through 24 & RESPONSES TO 
INTERROGATORIES NO. 23 through 24: OMITTED 
& 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1 through 20 & 
RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1 
through 20: OMITTED 
& 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION NO. 1 through 2 & 
RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION NO. 1 
through 2: OMITTED 
RESPONSE TO PLA1NTIFFS' FIRST SST OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION, 
AND REQUESTS FOR ADMlSSION 
13 
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 3: Admit that the Old Fence existed at the time 
Defendants purchased the Croston Property in 1959. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 3: Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 4: Admit that no written contract exists between 
Plaintiffs and Defendants evidencing that they were in agreement as to ownership of Tract 1, the 
location of the New Fence, and that Plaintiffs would pay Defendants one-half of the cost of 
constructing the New Fence. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 4: Admit. Everyone relied on the 
verbal responses and integ rity of the parties. 
Admit. No written contract. Was verbal intel'chaoge between Ms. Fischer and Jim Croston as to 
replacement of the fence and location to be survey line. 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION NO. 5 through 9 & RESPONSES TO 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION NO. 5 through 9: OMITTED 
& 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: OMITTED 
RESPONSE TO l'LAli"<"TiFFS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR PRODIJCTION, 
A1'/D REQU ESTS FOR ADMISSION 
18 
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Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P. 0. Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
(208) 745-9202 (t) 
(208) 745-8160 (f) 
Attorney for Defendants James F. and Marjorie C. Croston 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
WILLl.AJ.\.I R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
PISCHER, Trustees of the 
William and Ann Fischer Revocable Trust, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAt'\-IES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. 
CROSTON, husband and wife; 
AND ALL UNKNOWN O\VNERS AND/OR 
OTHER PERSONS OR ENTITIES 
CLAil'vIING ANY INTEREST IN THE 
FOLLOWING DESCRIBED REAL 
PROPERTI': 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Beginning at the Northeast comer of Lot 4, Block ) 
12, of the Original Ammon Townsite, Bonneville ) 
County, Idaho; running thence N. 88°33'58" W. ) 
330.00 feet to the North\vest comer of said Lot 4; ) 
thence S 00°00'21"W. along the West line of said ) 
Lot 4 a distance of 8.99 feet to an existing fence ) 
line; thence S. 89°41'36" E. along said existing ) 
fence line 329.90 feet to a point on the East line of ) 
said Lot 4; thence N. 00°00'21" E. along said East ) 
line 2.50 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING. ) 
· Defendants, 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-16-2894 
VERIFICATION 
JAMES F. and ?vIARJORIE C. CROSTON, being first duly sworn, depose and state: 
That they are the defendants in the above-entitled action; that they have read the 
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foregoing Defendants' Respo11se to Plaintiff's FiJ:st Set of Interrogatodes, Requests for 
Production of Documents-, and Requests for Admissiorr, know the contents thereof, and 
verily believe the statements contained therein to be true. 
Page•2· 
l .+'Yi (1l· ' DATED this __lQ__ day of . J\y,i ,~n""~{ , 2016. 
;:2 . ,-w_ ~'-:/" ;Ji(! ',,,- . 
JAMES F. CROSTON 
Defendant 
MARJ,o'RIE C. CROSTON 
Defendant 
)" ·fu· "-\ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ~ day of (J~"-;\f)oe..v.' . , 2016. 
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RESPONSE TO FIRST INTERROGATORIES 
POINTS OF FACT FOR ROBB DUNN 
Picture ofTin shed and fence l ine taken looking North In 1987. 
Page 2 of Points of Fact: Omitted 
Page 1 of 53 
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t··.-
Measurements taken September 201S, from the old shed foundation to the old fence line indicates the shed was 
approximately 5 feet from the old fence line and is now approximately 2 feet inside our property line. (O ld fence 
measurements are based on the comp leted survey) Since the Fischer's tore down the old shed in 1996 when they built 
their garage and no longer used this area for over 20 years it is no longer relevant tha t the old shed foundation is now 
slightly on our side of the established property line. 
Pages 4 through 46 of Points of Fact: Omitted 
Page 3 of 53 
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12. Fact s upon wh ich we base our al legation that Plaintiffs desi red new fen ce pe r survey, Response to Paragraph 25 
of the complaint. 
Ms. Fischer stated to Jim Croston on 8/30/15: "we are going to replace the fence. Going to get a survey to find 
out where t he line is at. We are using the same surveyors as the City uses so shou ldn' t be any disputes." This 
implies the Fischers desired the new fence be placed on the surveyed property lin e, 
13. Facts upon wh ich denial of Paragraph 31 of the complaint is based, 
The re is no way to know what the intent of the old fence was at the t ime it was constructed, It is unknown 
when the o ld fence was constructed. As far as we are aware it separated fields and did not demarcate any 
speci f ic boundary or property line. 
-
15 . Facts upon which we base ou r allegation t hat Plaintiffs desired new fence per survey and wou ld pay ha lf the cost 
in ou r second affirmative response. 
Ms. Fischer stated to Jim Croston on 8/30/15: "we are go ing to get a survey to find out where the line is at . We 
are using the same surveyors as the City uses so should n't be any disp utes." This implies the Fische rs desired 
t he new fence be placed on the surveyed property line. Ms. Fischer had t old Jim Croston they inte nded to 
re place the fence after the survey was completed. The Fischers have offered to pay the full price of the fence 
twice in the ir settlement offers if the Crostons give them the prope rty in question. 
(I DO NOT RECALL WHERE THEY EVER OFFERED TO PAY½ OF THE COST TO REPLACE THE FENCE. THEY DID 
INDICATE IN THEIR SETTLEMENT OFFERS THAT TH EY WO ULD PAY TO REPLACE TH E FENCE AND MAINTAIN IT, ) 
Pages 48 through 51 of Points of 
Fact: Omitted 
Page 47 of 53 
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James & Marjorie Croston 
6806 S. 3rd St. 
Spokane Valley, WA 99212 
(509) 893-9445 
September 4, 2015 
William & Ann Fischer 
3000 S. Western Ave. 
Ammon, ID 83406 
RE: Trespass and Destruction of Property : Removal of Fence 
and Irrigation Ditch 
Dear Mr. & Mrs. Fischer, 
We were in Ammon working on our property located at 3020 S. Western Ave from August 17 to August 
20, 2015. At that time our fence and irrigation ditch were intact. 
We are aware that you have recently removed our fence; filled our irrigat ion ditch and added gravel 
adjacent to your property. You have done all of this without our consent or knowledge. 
Your actions are not acceptable and constitute t respass and mal icious injury to our property. You are 
hereby notified that you must restore our property to our satisfaction by September 24, 2015 or face 
prosecution pursuant but not limited to Idaho State Law Title 18: Cri mes and Punishments; Chapter 70: 
Trespass And Malicious Injuries To Property; 18-7001-Malicious Injury To Property and 18-7008: 
Trespass. 
In the future, please contact us directly before doing any action that will impact our property. 
Sincerely, ~ 
- -~~%~~~ 
James and Marjorie Croston -,:l' -
Sent Certified w/Return Receipt,# 7013 2250 00018905 3033 
C: Ron Folsom, Am mon City Adm inistrator, Ammon Administrative Office, Ammon City Hall, 
2135 S. Ammon Rd., Ammon, ID 83406 Certified #7013 2250 0001 8905 3040 
Shawna Avery, Enforcement Officer, Ammon Enforcement Office, Ammon City Hall, 
2135 S. Ammon Rd., Ammon, ID 83406 Certified #7013 2250 00018905 3064 
Bonneville County Sheriff, 605 N. Capital Ave., Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Certified #7013 2250 0001 8905 3057 
Progressive Irrigation District, 2585 N. Ammon Rd., Idaho Falls, ID 83401-1949 
Certifi ed #7013 2250 0001 8905 3026 
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William Forrest Fischer 
From: 
Sent: 
To: 
Subject: 
Attachments: 
Judy Mccowin <jmccowin@dunnlawoffi ces.com> 
Monday, November 14, 2016 4:52 PM 
Wil liam Forrest Fischer 
FW: Fi scher v. Croston - Req uests for Production 
Linda 2015 Ca lendar Aug -Oct.pdf; Jim Statement 8-30- 15.pdf; Phone Messages 
9-27-15.m4a; Mom Notes Fischer Atty Cal l 9-25 -16.pdf; Mom conversat ion with 
Fischers Atty 9-25-15.doc; Conversation with my Mom 9-25-15 re-Atty Cal l.docx 
Mr. Fischer, attached is a partial response to your di covery requests. We will supplement with the letter from Ammon, 
Ms. Croston's journal; surveys and the police report. Thank you for your patience. 
Judy Mccowin 
Secretary to Robin D. Dunn 
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Statement from Jim Croston regarding Interchange with Ms. Fischer regarding survey. 
I went to my parent's property at 3020 E. Western Ave. Ammon, ID after the Flschers took It out their 
fence and filled In their Irrigation ditch. This was on August 30, 2015. I was marking and measuring 
where the original fence had been. Ms. Fischer came out and asked me who I was and what I was doing. 
I answered her questions. When I told her I was determining where the fence line used to be, she 
replied, "We will be replacing the fence with a much better fence. We are going to get a survey to find 
out where the line is at. We are using the same surveyors as the City uses so shouldn't be any disputes." 
l said OK. Ms. Fischer then returned to her house. 
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RECORD OF SURVEY 
PART OF THE SE 1/4 OF SECTION 27 
TOWNSHIP 2 NORTH, RANGE 38 EAST OF THE BOISE MERIDIAN 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY, IDAHO 
I 
LOT 2 I 
I 
r::,- ----
---- - -N./!JB 'J.2"2• - ;,-
" 
I 
..330.QO' 
~ 8 
~ ~ ~ 
------ - - - ----------- -
AMMON TOWNSITE 
LOT 3 
BLOCK 12 
K_• 1 ~~;-.-;·.J~~c. },w.so• 'IC 
I ~=~0 • ,-~ '\._TRACT 1 
I .... 0.044 AC. 
LOT 4 
r-,.,oo· 
• ,2:,. I 
I 
I 
1, 
!~ 
12 
I~ 
I 
I 
I 
~~--, --, __!_~:n-,2~~!J':~007 ==--=-=,=-= =-' 
~I 
arg ___ _ 
8 l~ 
0 1 w.oo· 
~ 
8;; 
• 2 
• 8 
~ 
•- ·--•--·--•--· ~~--·--·-·- ,-,_ 
S {Je'.:J:,•,2 ·e.- ~-;;,,;;; - - - - - - - - -, 
A~ WN TOWNS lTE 
LOT 1 
BLOCK 13 
~ 
·" 2 
8 
• 
r.j 
> 
<t 
z 
P:: 
[:l 
E-< 
U) 
[:l 
"' ~ 
0 
I 
I 
I L _ _ _ _ _ 
E. MOLE_ RD 
r- - ---
1 
I 
EXISTING LEGAL DESCRIPTION 
TRACT 1 
~~"'oe~. ~~~. c~~~~,~~/n.1~~ ~~~ ~~ Ot'giM 
H.88"33'S!IW. Jl0.00 feet lo t.'1e North;oKt com11· of aa·d Lot 4: 
thenc1 S.00'00-21-W. alori.g e. West tine 1;11 solo Lo-1 • a di~tonu or 
tt.5•9 feet to an ~i•lir.g fe.nc:1 l;ne: :hence S8Q" 4 1'J6"E olo119 soid 
u ll lUI; fonco llne J:2:9.90 he.t lo o point o n tr,\! Elll$t 1;ne of ,,Olid 
Lat -4; U11nce N.0(Y00'21'E.. along .sa'd Eon line 2 ,o 11111 to tne 
P01t.'l OF BEGINNING. 
SUBJECT TO: 1JU1Unq ea9em1nl1 01 rec ord . 
CONTAfNING, 1,896 Sq. Ft er 0.0'14 oc.,n . 
~ 
N 
~ 
SCALI I" • ID' 
0 #1 B(J' 12()' 
LEGEND .& NO TES 
• :TU:-r ,~~:If X ,:,- ./IIJ'f'Q 1,C-4,,,.Jt .,..,.. ~ "-~ 
,sr.....-Ml) P.'--$. ' IU <U 
( ~ ) -An"D DIST.AN!X 
(It) ,.._"°on, P~ I IO.Na_ 
SURVEYOR'S CERTIFICATE 
I, RODN[Y L [LLSIV()RTH, A lANO SURVEYOR LJCENS[O 
8Y TH£ srATE OF IDAHO, H£R£8Y CCRnFY THAT 
THC rRACT OF LANO WAS SURVE:Y£D UNDER MY 
SUPCRl/lSJON AND STAKCD AS SHOWN H~R£0N. 
PREllMINAR'l 
RECORD OF SURVEY 
ANNF/SCHEF/ Job No. 
PART OF TIIE SE l /4 OF SECTION 27 
T. 2 N., R. 38 E., B.M. 
1139 
Sca le 1 .. ~n 
eoo 02:2 "" ' "' 253 tsl Slrae t 
BONNEVILLE COUN'l'Y. IDAHO 
81\L. 1ot 1 
me.le: OCi"QBER. 201-. 
. nn,j e: JI g .., 
Fax 206 523 2614 
ldl'l.ho fnlla . ID 83401 
l'.11. Ells...-orth & I ~ AB::1ociaLe::1, Pl.LC lnfin.Nn, " l.mcl s-an-., ..... 
Exhibit G - Page 001 
129
( 
130
- -·--- - ---- ---- -
- . ---·---- --- -~7'~ ~~~ J:of/--~-
----------~ -~-7/42~µ£ _ _ _ 
--- -
--- - - -
---- -- - - - ------ - -- -
---- ------ --- -
Exhibit H - Page 002 
131
Reference call received 9/25/15. 
I received a call from Forrest Fischer. He identified him self as an attorney with Houser 
Allison and was calling regarding our property at 3020 Western Ave, Ammon, Idaho. He 
stated said he was representing William and Ann Fischer. They are planning on taking us 
to court for adverse possession. He stated fencing companies had been on our property. 
He advised me not to put up any fence until this was resolved .I asked him if he was 
related to the Fischers. He said he was their son. I told him I had given my daughter 
power of attorney and we were hiring an attorney, He asked fo r his name. 1 told him we 
had not retained him yet that he was out of town unti I the 28th . He asked me to give hi 111 
my daughter's phone number. 1 to ld him to give me his name and number and 1 will have 
her call you if she wants. He gave me the phone number 206 596 7838. I mentioned my 
daughter had been on our property working and his parents hat.I nut sait.l unt: word Lo her. 
He said that was because he had advised them not to talk to us. He stated that he had 
advised his parents to put up a sign on the property line stating ' Do not put up a fence'. 
I-le advised me not to proceed with any fence, that they are taking us to court for adverse 
possession. He mentioned a temporary restraining order until things can be reso lved. He 
sa id he was sending us a letter fax UPS. He said he would like to work this out with us. 
He said it would be better if we could resolve this with out going in to litigation, because 
if we end up in litigation it could be very costly for us. He asked me what I think and I 
said no comment. 
Ma1jorie Croston 
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Conversation with my Mom, Marjorie Croston, Friday 9/25/15 
My Mom called me at 12:54 PM. Sh e was extremely distraught and upset. Said the neighbor's attorney 
had called and was threatening to stea l her land. I got her ca lmed down enough to find out what was 
said. It was Fo rest Fischer, the neighbor's son who is representing them . Said he is with Holden, Holden 
& Kidwell. Here are the notes I jotted down during this conversation: 
• He is sending letter today overnight. 
• Filing a claim for adverse possession. 
• Told Mom she could not put up a fence . 
• He told his parents not to talk to us. 
• She told him I was here and representing her. Told him he could talk to me. 
• He asked for my number and was told I would call him if I wanted to talk to him. His number is 
206-596-7838. 
I had to calm my mom down several t imes during this conversation. She wanted to know what we can 
do to prevent t hem from stea ling her property. Told her I would put the fence up now instead of 
waiting. We want to run some livestock anyway so no reason to wait. Mom will fax me the letter as 
soon as it arrives . 
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SECTION: 
5-3-1: 
5-3-2: 
5-3-3: 
5-3-4: 
5-3-5: 
5-3-6: 
5-3-7: 
5-3-8: 
5-3-9: 
5-3-10: 
5-3-11: 
5-3-12: 
5-3-13: 
5-3-14: 
5-3-15: 
5-3-16: 
Title 5, Chapter 3 
CHAPTER 3 
Cruel Treatment 
Animal Fights 
ANIMALS 
Cruel lmpoundment of Animals 
Failure to Provide Minimum/Adequate Care 
Beating 
Herding Animals 
Keeping of Certain Animals Prohibited 
Keeping or Maintaining Animals 
Non-Conforming Uses 
Keeping and Maintaining Animals Constituting a Nuisance 
Keeping of Beehives 
Animals Running at Large 
lmpoundment of Animals 
Abandonment of Animals 
Definitions 
Penalty 
Page 1 of 13 Adopted 10-1 5-2015 
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documenting the violation, may enter upon any place where such animal is confined, and 
supply it with necessary food and water. 
5-3-4: FAILURE TO PROVIDE MINIMUM/ADEQUATE CARE: Every owner or person 
having the custody or control of any domestic animal who shall fail to provide proper care and 
attention to such animal shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Nothing herein shall prevent the 
humane disposal of any sick, disabled, infirm, crippled or abandoned animal. 
5-3-5: BEATING: Every person who cruelly whips, beats, starves or otherwise ill treats 
any animal in his care or charge, whether belonging to him or any other person, is guilty of a 
misdemeanor. 
5-3-6: HERDING ANIMALS: Any person who herds or drives any fowl, cattle, swine, 
goats, sheep, horses, mules, or other animal upon any street, alley, or public way shall be guilty 
of a misdemeanor. Nothing herein shall prevent the riding of any horse or mule, or the driving of 
a horse, mule, ox, or cow hitched to a carriage or conveyance, for the purpose of any public 
parade or exhibition. 
5-3-7: KEEPING OF CERTAIN ANIMALS PROHIBITED: Except as provided and 
allowed in an RE or Animal Overlay (AO) zone or by prior established non-conforming use, any 
person who keeps or maintains any horse, mule, ox, cow, swine, goat, sheep, fowl, bison, 
llama , or other domestic animal of a related nature or any person who keeps any feral , 
poisonous, dangerous, or fetid animal within the City is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
Nothing herein shall prohibit the keeping or maintenance of any domestic dog, cat , bird, or fish , 
or any such household pet which shall not present a danger, menace, or nuisance to other 
residents. 
Nothing herein shall prohibit the keeping or maintenance of such described animals within any 
public zoo, circus, exhibition, pet show, pet store, veterinarian clinic, auctioneering business, or 
in any duly licensed business dealing in livestock, provided the operators thereof shall have first 
obtained a license under the provisions of this Code and being subject always to the provisions 
of all laws relating to nuisances. 
5-3-8: KEEPING OR MAINTAINING ANIMALS: It shall be unlawful to keep and 
maintain swine within the City limits, other than as provided in Section 5-3-7 hereinabove. It 
shall be unlawful to keep, maintain, stable, or pasture any horse, mule, ox, cow, swine, goat, 
sheep, fowl, bison, llama, or other domestic or feral animal of related nature except as provided 
in the RE or Animal Overlay (AO) zones and under the following conditions which shall apply 
therein, or by prior established, non-conforming use. 
(A) That the livestock or fowl may be maintained for pasturing upon any lot or area which 
shal l be adequately and securely fenced or otherwise enclosed to prevent any such 
animal or fowl from becoming loose or straying or in reaching over or through such fence 
or enclosure under all normal and reasonable conditions; providing further, that upon 
any lot on which there is a dwelling house located, such area in which animals, livestock, 
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or fowl are maintained and pastured must not be on that portion of said lot and area 
which is a yard or lawn appurtenant to the dwelling, and in an Animal Overlay (AO) Zone 
must not be in any area to the side or front of such dwelling; and provided further, that 
upon any unimproved lot, the whole thereof may be pastured but the same shall be 
adequately and securely fenced as above stated. 
(B) That in pasturing of such areas as provided in the preceding and next subsections, no 
more than the number of livestock that can be pastured with the amount of pasturage 
then available upon such area, under the conditions and circumstances of such area and 
lot then existing, with only normal and reasonable supplemental feeding, may be kept or 
maintained upon such area at any one time. 
(C) That no livestock or fowl shall be kept and maintained where the normal pasturage 
grown shall not maintain the same and where feeding is necessary except when the 
portion of the lot, area, or parcel where pasturage is permitted by the zone wherein it is 
contained consists of: 
For lots, area, or parcels in the Animal Overlay (AO) Zone: no less than seven 
thousand (7000) square feet of area per one (1) one animal or 25 fowl. 
For lots in the RE Zone: 
No less than one half (½) acre (twenty-one thousand, seven hundred 
eighty [21 ,780] square feet) of area per one (1) animal. 
No more than fifty (50) total fowl or small animals . 
Provide further, that in an Animal Overlay (AO) Zone such pasturing and feeding and 
maintaining and keeping of said animals shall be done only on the rear one-half of said 
lot and that any feeding area, resting, or loafing area or shed, barn, or stable shall be no 
closer than 100 feet from any dwelling home or residence, other than the dwelling home 
or residence of the owner or such animals or livestock. 
(D) No person or persons keeping, maintaining, stabling, or pasturing animals or fowl herein 
provided shall allow any accumulation of manure or refuse to the extent that the same 
constitutes a nuisance or hazard in such area and any such area shall at all times be 
maintained and kept by such person or persons in a clean and neat manner so as not to 
be objectionable to, nor to constitute a nuisance to, the inhabitants and residents of the 
City; to cause no undue odors or hazards, and to be kept and maintained in a manner to 
conform to all applicable health and sanitary laws, rules, and regulations of the State of 
Idaho, County of Bonneville, and City of Ammon now existing or hereafter enacted. 
(E) Nothing within the contents of this chapter shall prohibit the keeping or maintenance of 
domestic hens as allowed below: 
1. The keeping of domestic hens is hereby permitted within the following residential 
zones within the City subject to the provisions of this section: R1 , R1A, RP, RPA, 
R2 (the R2 zone is limited to those properties developed as townhomes and shall 
not pertain to properties built and/or developed as apartments as defined in Title 
10, Chapter 2 (10-2-1) of the City Code). The keeping of such hens is allowed 
only when the primary use is for the production of eggs. 
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2. Domestic hens shall be allowed on any single fami ly residentially zoned lot, 
meeting the terms of this chapter and with the following restrictions: 
(A) On any lot with a detached home a maximum of six (6) domestic 
hens shall be allowed. 
(B) On any lot with an attached home a maximum of three (3) domestic 
hens shall be allowed. 
3. All buildings, shelters or enclosures used for the purpose of housing or sheltering 
domestic hens shall be located no less than twenty feet (20') from the primary 
residence located upon the lot or parcel for such uses and no less than twenty 
feet (20 ') from any primary residence located upon an adjacent lot to the parcel 
for such uses. 
4. The side yard requirements of any building, shelter or enclosure used for 
domestic hens shall meet the minimum side yard requirement of the zone and/or 
lot in which the structure or fence is located. The side yard requirement shall be 
as defined in Title 10, Chapter 2 (10-2-1) of the City Code. For lots containing 
townhomes with zero lot line divisions, the side yard required shall be the 
minimum distance allowed for the side yard not considered to be a zero lot line. 
5. All buildings, shelters or enclosures used for the purpose of housing or sheltering 
domestic hens shall be located in the rear yard of the property as defined in Title 
10, Chapter 2 (10-2-1) of the City Code. 
6. Domestic hens shall at all times be kept within a secure enclosure having a total 
area of not less than six (6) square feet per domestic hen. Domestic hens shall 
not be kept within any building or structure designed for human occupancy. 
(A) In addition to the above requirement, there shall also be a coop 
provided for nesting. This area shall be a minimum of two (2) square feet 
per domestic hen. The coop area may be elevated within the required 
enclosure area or included as an attachment to the enclosure. If elevated 
there must be a minimum of eighteen (18) inches between the bottom of 
the nesting area and the ground within the enclosure. 
7. The area within which domestic hens are kept shall be cleaned and maintained in 
a manner that does not unreasonably attract fl ies, emit foul or objectionable 
odors or create a public health hazard nor shall the keeping of domestic hens 
disturb the peace of the adjoining properties or otherwise constitute a nuisance. 
Any building, structure or coop used for housing domestic hens shall provide 
adequate ventilation to prevent excessive odors or create a public health hazard. 
8. Hens shall have access to feed and unfrozen water at all times . 
9. All domestic hens found running at large are declared to be a nuisance, and it 
shall be the duty of the Animal Control Officer to confiscate the same. Domestic 
hens picked up by the Animal Control Officer shall be confined at the animal 
control shel ter fo r twenty-four (24) hours; after such time the Animal Control 
Officer may release said hen(s) to any person(s) who can show the ability to 
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provide the immediate care and shelter required for said hen(s) or at the 
discretion of the Animal Control Officer dispose of said hen(s). 
10. Nothing in section 5-3-8-(E) shall disallow any animal overlay or zon ing that may 
allow for additional domestic hens as provided in another portion of section (5-3-
8). 
11 . Under no circumstances shall the allowances within this chapter be perceived to 
allow any rooster within the City. 
12. An animal control officer shall be authorized to inspect any property where hens 
are kept upon receipt of any complaint or observation that the requirements of 
this section have not been met. 
5-3-9: NON-CONFORMING USES: Any prior established non-conforming use for the 
keeping and maintenance of animals may be continued within the scope of the prior use but 
subject to all provisions relative to the maintenance and keeping of said animals without 
creating a nuisance. Any non-conforming use which becomes abandoned or is discontinued for 
a continuous period of one (1) year shall not thereafter be entitled to further use for the 
maintenance and keeping of animals but will be subject to all other provisions of this Code 
relative thereto . 
5-3-10: KEEPING AND MAINTAINING ANIMALS CONSTITUTING A NUISANCE: No 
provision of this Code shall allow any person or persons within the City to maintain and keep 
animals in a manner which shall constitute a nuisance. Any act which shall constitute a 
nuisance shall subject the violator thereof to the provisions of this Code and the laws of the 
State of Idaho for a violation thereof or for an abatement, but nothing shall be herein construed 
to limit the right of any citizen or any person to bring an action for any civil damages alleged to 
be mainta ined . 
5-3-11: KEEPING OF BEEHIVES: 
(A) Purpose. The purpose of this Section is to protect the public health and safety 
by establishing terms and conditions under which domestic honeybees and 
beehives may be kept within the City. 
(B) Defi nitions. For the purposes of this Chapter, certain terms shall have the 
meanings ascribed below: 
Apiary. Any place where one or more colonies of honeybees are located. 
Beekeeper. A person who owns or has charge of one (1) or more colonies of honeybees. 
Colony. Honeybees in a hive including queens, workers, and drones. 
Hive. A frame hive, commonly referred to as a Langstroth Hive, or a Top Bar hive, which 
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Transcription of voicemail messages left for Crostons 
Hi Mr. Croston this is Forrest Fischer, an attorney with Houser and Allison, calling with 
regards to the previous conversation we had a day or so ago. It appears that your daughter 
or daughter-in-law is putting up a fence despite our previous conversation. We have handed 
her the Demand Letter and she has proceeding nevertheless. You are hereby placed on notice 
that we will commence with the lawsuit for trespass adverse possession on which you will 
be liable for damages. It is advisable that you do cease these activities at this point. 
Otherwise it will end up being very costly for you. Thank you . B-bye. 
Hi Marjorie this is Forrest Fischer calling to clarify my previous message that I left. I wanted 
to clarify that I am personally representing the Fischers, that I am licensed to practice in 
Washington but I am associating with a local law firm in Idaho Falls called Holden, Kidwell, 
Hahn and Crapo. We do ask that you stop work out on the boundary line so that we can 
possibly work out settlement. Unfortunately if the boundary line does go up right now it 
might hurt settlement in the futme. So if you have any questions or you can have your 
daughter who you said was your Power of Attorney or your attorney who you have said you 
have retained, give me a call. My cell phone is (425) 941-2753. Thank you. 
G: \WPDATA\ WF F\J 86 1 l (Fischer Propetty)\Voicemail trnnsc1iptio11.msg for Croston. wpd:j l 
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William Forrest Fischer 
From: 
Sent: 
To: 
Cc: 
William Forrest Fischer 
Monday, November 7, 2016 12:54 PM 
'Robin Dunn' 
Charles Homer 
Subject: RW: Fischer v. Croston - Requests for Production 
Dear Mr. Dunn: 
We received a CD at our office today from you conta ining pictures of the Croston Property and fence . However, we are 
stil l missing several documents identified within you r clients' answers to Pla intiffs discovery as ident ified 
below. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 37, which we again request t hat you produce no later t han noon on November 14, 
2016. These documents include, but are not limited to, the following: 
As identified verbatim with in Defendants' response to Interrogatory No. 4: 
o Linda 2015 Calendar for August th rough September; 
o Recording of Fischer's son harassing Ms. Croston; 
o Statement from Jim Croston regarding survey to establish property line 8-30-15; 
o Letter from Ammon; 
o Transcript of Ms. Croston conversat ion with Fischer' s son harassing the Crostons; 
o Receipts and pictures as proof of residence at Ammon property 1985-1987 and 1992; 
o Ms. Croston's journal regarding residency and activities at Ammon property 1985-1987; 
o Ms. Penning's statement of events when temporary fence was erected; 
o Copy of surveys pertaining to Tract 1 showing different survey numbers; and 
o Police report, Case #2015-11057 
As identified with in Defendants' response to Interrogatory No. 8,18, and 19: 
o Jim Croston statement 8-31-15 
If you have any questions concerning th is letter, please reply to this emai l. Tha nk you . 
Sincerely, 
W. Forrest Fischer 
B W. Forrest Fischer Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo P.L.L.C. P.O. Box 50130 Idaho Fall s, Idaho 83405 Phone: (208) 523-0620 
Fax: (208) 523-95 I 8 
Email: wfischer@holdenlega l.com 
Phvsical Address: 
I 000 Riveiwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Fall s, ID 83405 
Confidentiality otice: The information contained in this e-mail and any accompanying attachments, all of which may be confidential and/or privileged, is intended 
only for use by the person or entity to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient, any unauthorized use, disclosure, or copying of this e-mail and its 
contents is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. lfyou are not the intended recip ient, please immediately notify me by return e-mail and/or telephone at 208-523-
0620, and delete the original message and all copies from your system. Thank you. 
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From: William Forrest Fischer 
Sent: Wednesday, November 2, 2016 1:36 PM 
To: 'Robin Dunn' <rdunn@dunnlawoffices.com> 
Cc: Charles Homer <chomer@holden legal.com> 
Subject: RE: Fischer v. Croston - Requests for Product ion 
Dear Mr. Dunn : 
I am writing to follow up on my email below. Because we have not heard back from you, please consider this our final 
Rule 37 good faith attempt to obtain disclosure of the documents identified within your client's answers to discovery, 
without court action. Accordingly, we request that you produce the CD and/or documents on or before noon on 
November 7th . Thank you . 
II W. Forrest Fischer Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. P.O. Box 501 30 Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 Phone: (208) 523-0620 
Fax: (208) 523-95 18 
Email: wfischer@holdenlegal.com 
Physical Address: 
I 000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Confidentiality Notice: The information contained in this e-mail and any accompanying attachments, all of which may be confidential and/or privileged, is intended 
only for use by the person or entity to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient, any unallthorized use, disclosure, or copying oftb is e-mail and its 
contents Is strictly prohiblled and may be unlawful. lfyou are not the intended recipient, please immediately notify me by return e-mail and/or telephone at 208-523-
0620, and delete the original message and au copies from your system. Thank you. 
From: William Forrest Fischer 
Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 10:22 AM 
To: 'Robin Dunn' <rdunn@dunn lawoffices.com> 
Cc: Charles Homer <chomer@holdenlegal.com> 
Subject: Fischer v. Croston - Requests for Production 
Dear Mr. Dunn: 
In your cl ients' recent answers to the Fischer's discovery requests, they indicate the majority of their document 
production is contained with in a CD. However, no such CD accompanied your client s' answers. Accord ingly, when ca n 
we expect to have t his CD? Th ank you . 
Sincerely, 
Forrest 
2 
Exhibit K - Page 006 
145
• 
W. Forrest Fischer 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Phone: (208) 523-0620 
Fax: (208) 523-9518 
Email: w:fischer@holdenlegal.com 
Physical Address : 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
( 
Confidentiality Notice: The information contained in this e-mail and any accompanying attachments, all of which may be confidential and/or privileged, is intended 
only for use by the person or entity to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient, any unauthorized use, disclosure, or copy ing of this e-mail and its 
contents is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. lfyou are not the intended recipient, please immediately notify me by return e-mail and/or telephone at 208-523-
0620, and delete the original message and all copies from your system. Thank yo u. 
3 
Exhibit K - Page 007 
146
Exhibit L - Page 001 
147
Exhibit L - Page 002 
148
Exhibit L - Page 003 
149
Exhibit L - Page 004 
150
Exhibit L - Page 005 
151
Exhibit L - Page 006 
152
Exhibit L - Page 007 
153
Exhibit L - Page 008 
154
Exhibit L - Page 009 
155
'Wi1liam and·Ann Fischer 
3000 Western 
Ammon, Iaaho '8340'1 
208-522-1414 
{t.,t'! ~h m1 
3.709 Shale Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401 
Robertjacksonconstrnction@vahoo.com 
Idaho Contractors License number RCT-998 l 
208~520-3691 
RE: Removal of ~xisting fence (souHh} appro». 3QO ft. 
Bid includes: Tractor rental \.vith operator 8 hrs@ $65 
2 men 8 hrs @ $27.00 each 
$520.00 
$432.00 
$ ] 26.00 
$200.00 
Overhead 
Profit 
Total a01om1t $1278.00 
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Bi ll To 
Forrest Fischer 
PO Box 50 130 
Idaho Falls, LD 
83405 
J 6 188 Forrest Fischer 
Description 
2 Man Survey With GP 
take Fence Li.ne between Lots 3 & 4 
Thank you for your bu iness. 
Prior Amt Total % 
Invoice 
Date Invoice# 
12/16/20 16 7699 
Terms Due Date 
et l 0 12/26/20 16 
Work Perform ed Amou nt 
600.00 
Total $600.00 
Payments/Credits $0.00 
Balance Due 600.00 
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William Forrest Fischer 
From: 
Sent: 
To: 
Subject: 
Attachments: 
Dear Customer: 
Eagle Rock Enginering and Land Surveying, PC <replyTo@ intuit.com> 
Friday, December 16, 2016 8:51 AM 
Will iam Forrest Fischer 
Invoice 7699 from Eagle Rock Engineering and Land Surveying, PC 
lnv_7699_from_Eagle_Rock_Engineering_and_Land_Surveying_PC_3428.pdf 
Your invoice is attached. Please remit payment at your earl iest convenience. 
Thank you for your business - we appreciate it very much. 
Sincerely, 
Eagle Rock Engineering and Land Surveying, PC 
208-542-2665 
*** Pay th is invoice online *** 
Pay Now > https: / /connect. i ntuit.com/portal/app/CommerceNetwork/view/ed660825-00f4-4fOc-95dd-
253afl fe2249?1 oca le= en_ U S&cta =viewi nvoicenow&src= qbdt 
To view your invoice 
Open the attached PDF file. You must have Acrobat® Reader® installed to view the attachment. 
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DEC/30/ 20!6/ FRI 03: 42 PM 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC. 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box'277 
Rigby ID 83442 
Telephone: (208) 745-9202 
Facsimile; (208) 745-8160 
rdunn@dunnlawoffices.com 
FAX No . 
2016 DEC 3D PH J: I J 
M .. UI S Hoc , COURT 
,.G JST R •TEDI 
DONN£ Ytt'u._ C VIS ION 
rr,:•.Hc OLJNiy 
Attorney for Defendants James F. and Marjorie C. Croston 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR Tl-lE COUN1Y OF BONNEVILLE 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FISCHER, 
Trustees of the William and Ann Fischer 
Revocable Trust, Case No. CV-16-2894 
Plaintiffs, 
P. 005/ 007 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBIN D. DUNN IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
CONTINUE TRIAL 
JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. 
CROSTON, husband and wife; 
AND ALL UNKNOWN OWNERS AND/OR 
OTHER :PERSONS OR ENTITIES 
CLAIMING ANY INTEREST IN THE 
FOLLOWING DESCRIBED REAL 
PROPERTY: 
) 
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 4, Block ) 
12, of the Original Ammon T ownsite, B onne'rille ) 
County, Idahoj running thence N. 88°33'58" W. ) 
330.00 feet to the Northwest corner of said Lot 4; ) 
thence S 00°00'21"W. along the West line of said ) 
Lot 4 a distance of 8.99 feet to an existing fence ) 
line; thence S. 89°41'36" E. along said existing ) 
fence line 329.90 feet to a point on the East line of ) 
said Lot 4; thence N. 00°00'21,, E. along said East ) 
line 2.50 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING. ) 
) 
Defendants. 
162
DEC/ 3 / 2 16/ FRI 03: L Pl 
STATE OF IDAHO) 
)ss. 
County of Jefferson ) 
FAX No. 
ROBIN D. DUNN, ESQ., being first duly sworn, hereby deposes and states as 
follows: 
P. 0 6/00 
1. That I am the attorney of record for defendants in the above~entitled mater. 
2. Ttial is scheduled in the above entitled case for Mai:ch 21, 2017. 
3. I have made plans beginning March 2, 2017 for ttavel to Israel, Egypt, Jordan, 
Dubai, and the United Arab Emirates a.ad will not re.rum until March 25, 2017, 
4. A continuance of the trial will not prejudice either the plaintiff or the 
defendants. 
trial. 
5. I therefore respectfully request that this court enter an order continuing tl1e 
DATEDthis29'"dayofDecembe<,62 ~ C 
Robin D. Dunn, . 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 29th day of December, 2016. 
Notary Pub~ for l_~ho 
Residing at: 'fn , J:'-,1e i/ 
My Commis~i~~E"-'])ires: elf ·D-)- Z,,/ 
2,- A.Fl'IDAVIT OP ROBIN 0 . DONN, ESQ., IN SUPPORT OP MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL 
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DEC/30/ 2016/ FRI 03:42 PM FAX No. P. 007/007 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ___ day of December, 2016, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing was delivered to the following person(s) by: 
DOCUMENT SERVED: AFFIDAVIT OF ROBIN D. DUNN, ESQ. IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CONTINUE TRlAL 
ATTORNEYS AND /OR INDMDUALS SERVED: 
W. Forrest Fischer, Esq. 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 834205 
( 
( 
( 
( 
) First Class Mail 
) Facsimile 523 9518 
) Hand Delivery 
) Courthouse box 
Robin D . Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
J- AFPID1\VIT OP ROBIN D. DUNN, ESQ., lN SUPPORT OF MO"l"ION TO CONTINUE TRIAL 
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JAN/ 03/20!7/ TUE 06 : 10 PM 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC. 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box277 
Rigby ID 83442 
Telephone: (208) 745-9202 
Facsimile: (208) 745-8160 
tdltmn@,·r:llmml!~s:.com 
FAX No. p_ 0!5/0 2 
20!7 JAN -4 Al-I 
, I-in 8: / 8 
H • CI S T" . C r , ,, 
., Gts u,, . T"..., v UR T 
BOfiNt'-,. 11•• L D1-., , ..... , .J 
' •. I. £ C -, _ , d N 
: l ' • - ·· ( /INT '-( J' ,. , / J. , ' 
Attorney for Defendants James F. and Marjorie C. Croston 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FISCHER, 
Trustees of the William and Ann Fischer 
Revocable Trust, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAMES P. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. 
CROSTON, husband and wife; 
AND ALL UNKNOWN OWNERS AND/OR 
OTHER PERSONS OR ENTITIES 
CLAIMING ANY INTEREST IN THE 
FOLLOWING DESCRIBED REAL 
PROPERTY: 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Beginning at the Northeast comer of Lot 4, Block ) 
12, of the Original Ammon Townsite, Bonneville ) 
County, Idaho; running thence N. 88°33'58" W. ) 
330. 00 feet to the Northwest corner of satd Lot 4; ) 
thence S 00°00'21"W. along the West line of said ) 
Lot 4 a distance of 8.99 feet to an existing fence ) 
line; thence S. 89°41'36" E. along said existing ) 
fence line 329.90 feet to a point on the East line of ) 
said Lot 4; thence N . 00°00'21" E. along said East ) 
line 2.50 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING. ) 
) 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-16-2894 
AFFIDAVIT OF LINDAD. 
PENNING IN OPPOSITION OF 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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JAN/ 03/ 2017/ TUE 06 : 10 PM 
STATE OP ____ _ 
County of ___ _ 
) 
)ss. 
) 
FAX No. P. 016/021 
LINDA D. PENNING, being first duly sworn, hereby deposes and states as follows: 
1. That I am the person with power of attorney for my elderly parents, James 
and Marjory Croston, defendants in the above-entitled mater. 
2. I am over the age of 18 and competent to make this affidavit. 
3. Attached as Exhibit A and incorpotated herein is the tract description 
between the plaintiffs and the defendants. 
4. Attached as Exhibit B and incorporated herein is the sketch or the original 
survey between the parties. 
5. Attached as Exhibit C and incorporated herein is the statement I made when 
putting up a temporary fence. 
6. Attached as Exhibit D and incorporated herein is the police report of 9 /21/15 
containing the statements of the plaintiffs . 
7. The "old fence" separating the properties between the plaintiffs and 
defendants had been torn down by the plaintiffs . Virtually nothing remained of the fence 
when it was torn down. The plaintiffs also placed gravel about the area on our property; 
and, removed the remains of a ditch that used to water the properties. 
8. I was present on an earlier date when Ann Fischer indicated that the fence was 
being torn down, a new survey was being obtained and the new fence would be placed on 
the new survey line. 
9. On 9/27 / 15, the date of my statement, we went to put up a temporary fence on the 
survey line as engineered by Ellsworth and obtained at the reqnest of the plaintiffs. We 
placed the new temporary fence on the actual survey line as presented by the survey marks. 
2- AFFIOAVI'f OF ROBlN D. DUNN, ESQ., IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL 
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JA / 03/ 2017/ TUE 06 : l l PM FAX No P. 0 7/ 21 
This is the first date that we were 1old not to put up the fence. The plaintiffs had indicated 
previously that a nice new fence would be installed as agreed. We wanted co fence the 
property to put in animals to keep the grass and weeds do·wn. 
10. We learned at a later point that the City of Ammon would not let us put 
animals in the pasture. We took no further action until this legal action was commenced. 
11. The histo1y of the old fence is not disputed. It had been removed and we had 
agreed upon a new fence being placed on the survey line. We knew of no other reason why 
the plaintiffs would obtain a smvey. The survey was slightly in the favor of the defendants; 
but, the issue was where to place the new fence. Our initial desire was to simply get along 
with the plaintiffs and have them place the new fence where they promised. 
12. I do not know what changed from the date of Jim Croston's statement on 8/31/15 
to the date of the temporary fence being constructed. 
DATEDthis3rd dayofJanuary,2017. ~ r) .AJ 
., ,~='-~1 a)_..1 ---=-
,..,., . . 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
(Attached verification of Linda Penning) 
,. AFFIOAVIT OF ROBIN D. DUNN, ESQ., IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL 
167
JAN/03/ 2017/ TUE 06: I I PM FAX No. P. 018/ 021 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ·:;fJ.,,1 day of January, 2017, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing was delivered to the following person(s) by: 
DOCUMENT SERVED: AFFIDAVIT OF ROBIN D. DUNN, ESQ. IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CONTINUE TRlAL 
ATTORNEYS AND/OR INDIVIDUALS SERVED: 
W. Forrest Fischer, Esq. 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 834205 
( (✓ 
( 
( 
) First Class Mail 
) Facsimile 523 9518 
) Hand Delivery 
) Courthouse box 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
<· J\FFIDAVIT OF ROBIN D. DUNN , ESQ., IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CONTI>IUE TR.LU 
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A /03/ 20[7/ T E 06 ID PM FAX No. P.O l l/ 02 . 
Temporary Fence constructed on North property survey line Sunday 9/27 /15. We arrived at our property at 
approximately 9:30 AM. There were two No trespassing signs placed on our property approximately where the Fischers 
tore down our previous fence . We removed these placing them on their side of the survey line. 
Approximately 10:00 the Flschers drove into thelr garage driveway. Don Penning was inside the front fence line. The 
Fischers stopped their car, not getting out Ann Fischer asked Don If he was the owner. He told her no. She then asked 
If he was a relative. He said "yes, I am authorized to speak for the owners." Ann Fischer didn't say anything further. 
William Fischer then said nthis property is under dispute, please don't put up a fence." Don told him we were going to 
put up a fence. They said nothing further but proceeded to back out of the drive and pulled back into the house drive 
and parked their car. They went into the house. 
After about 5 minutes Mr .Fischer came out of the house and started to walk over. My brother Rod was watching and 
when he stepped over the survey line Into our property, Rbd told him he was trespassing and to get off our land. Mr. 
Fischer left. 
After about another 5 minutes both Mr. Fischer and Ms. Fischer c.ime back out of the house, got into the car and drove 
down the garage driveway to where we were gathered. 
I was at the property survey llne on our side with my brothers determlnlng where the survey markers where next to the 
Fischers' garage. One marker was no longer visible where it was the (art time I was there. More gravel had been piled 
up. The Fischers drove their car down their drive and on to our property next to their garage. While approaching they 
yelled out the window for us to get off their property. I yelled back it is our property and they are trespassing and to 
leave. They parked their vehicle and got out of the car, approaching us. Ann Fischer asked If I was Linda. I told her yes. 
She introduced herself. Stated they had not Intentionally done anything. Had hired a contractor and they made a mess 
of things. I told her all It would have taken was a phone call. She did not respond to this. She asked that I not put up a 
fence. I dld not respond. She stated it was not a "legal" survey and was not recorded. I told her the survey pins were in 
pla ce clearly showing It was our property. She handed me a letter and her attorneys name and phone number. The 
letter was addressed to my Mom from their attorney. Mr. Fischer stated the property is in dispute and asked us not to 
put up a_ fence. My brother, Rod stated it was being fenced today. The Fischer's got back In their c.ir and began backing 
down the driveway. They stopped and came back up. Ann Fischer got out of the car, she was on her cell phone. She 
asked me if I would talk to her attorney. I told her no. He could talk to my attorney. She asked who my attorney was 
and his phone number so her attorney could call him. I told her my attorney would call her attorney. She got back in 
the car and they left. 
They did not talk to any of us the rest of the day but did observe periodically. My Mom called twice because their 
attorney had called leaving phone messages t hreatening her with costly litigation and the taking of her property. She 
was very upset both times. I told her notto answer the phone or talk to them or their attorney. She had not received 
the letter their attorney told her he was Fedexlng on Thursday. 
EXHIBIT----"-C_ 
171
JAK/0 / 2017/ E 6:1 FAX o. 
Case Summary Report 
Agency: BCSO 
DHCITimc R,porred 
Case Number: 2015· l I 05 7 
Incident Information 
Ofnccr 
Date: 9/2l /2015 11 ;28 :20 
L;ist Modified: 9/21/2015 00: 13 :45 
09/151201 :5 l 5:09 
I D~tctTimt Fou111J f Dutcmmc Pound 
(348DMSJ SCHWARTZ. DAV(D MICHAEL 
l11 cidc1H Loc~Ciu11 
-
, Idaho Fnlls. IlJ 
... . : ... : 
. . ' 
... ' -
' ' 
. 
•' 
-Charges -. .. ...... '' ... "' : .. ' • 
' • 
'• 
-·· ' • ' ,· . 
,. ., Chnrgc Typ e I o~cription Stnh1rc ! CCR 
-.1· State C[V[L PROB LEM 999 999 
Alcohol, Dru!:'s or Co1nputcrs l:sctl I Loc :uion Type j Pr~m is~s E:11 tcrcd I r,ircccJ En try Wen polls 
0 Alcohol O Drugs O Computers RESIDc'NCE/HOME D Y~s Ii] Na I. 
Entry I E.~ir I Cri111lnal .-1.crivlr1• 1. 
J. 
ll illS ,\ lorivn tiu,1 j Bi:1s T,1rgct I Bia1 Circumstonccs H:\lc Gr11up 
'. 
. , ,· .. 
'• 
. Ot.her· Pe·rson·s Involved , , 
. ' 
.. 
NJlmcCode .. . · ·· 1 S_cq, II _, ,';:imc ( l:is t, f ir.st, ;1,1) j ~ce Sex loon .. R·eporting Party · } . P£1'il'J[}.IG, lI>-'DA D F 
Adanss Home PhOllC 
£mploycr :-,'umc/Adilr•~• Business Phon~ 
.Niro e Code . . · : I Sccq. U 
Tn~olv~d, Othe~ · . ,: 1 
I ,'li:lme (Last, firH, M) 
FISCHER. W!Ll!Ai\1 ROBERT 'Rm w I Sc.t M I 1D013 
Acl t.l rcss Home Phone 
Employer :-.=Rmc/,\Lldre~, B11~inc1s Phon~ 
N~mc Code. I Se~( . I :-,·~me (L:.H. Flm, ~fl I lb cc Sex 100B 
Involved, Other FISCHER. A:.'-<'NE w r-
Adilrcss flomc Ph o,1~ 
Emp loyer ;'\comc/Atlil rcss B11 si 11cB Phone 
EXHIBIT D 
P. Ol / J. 
I~ An Com 
<'. 
RcpMt: r_l,•lnl.fr( Pri 11tct.l ~I : 9/~l /2tll5 11 :?a Pugc I <tf'J 
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A / 03/ 2017/ E 06 : I P 
Ag<!ncy: BCSO 
[.: 
On 9/1 SI I 5, I responded co 11 property nc : 
FAX No. 
Case Summary Report 
Case Number: 201.5- 1 l 057 
. N'btes/N ~rra tives 
Date: 9/21 11015 11 :28 :20 
Last Mod ified: 9/2 l /20 15 00: 13 :45 
P. l 3/ _ 
I contacted Linda Penning ac that address. She wus a relative or one of ti e 011rn~rs of the 
prooeny. ~nd wished co report a problem at the property. Linda snid she hud a pow~,· of anorncy co do so. Por in fo rmu tion. tile pro perry ill 
,. is a ciry lot wi<h a small ~bundoned house which sits 011 the lot. No on~ lives on the prop~rl} . The hous~ ilas been abando1\i;d for mJny 
years. and has hnd numerous issues with vanclulism and subj ects breaking inco thl! house to do crimi nal activicy. 
Linda ,vished to rcpofl on th is dare that rhc neighburs to the: no11b ac : .. 1 had rnl~~n down pun oftlie fence b~tween til e prope11i~s. und 
thc:n left the meral fe nce in a pile near the house. Lindu also reponed tllat the neighbors had fi lled in pai1 of th e irrigation ditcl1 on the no,til side of 
rhc: propcny which ran along the fence goin.g west Linda believed it may be the neighbor's intention to bu ild 11 ne"' fe nce. but she was unsure they 
would fo lio"' through with tl1is. Linda said chat neighbor j,;st had a new property survey com pieced. in which chat neighbor may luiv~ nc tually lost 
some lnnd. I could see !h i: new surve}' marl,;ers a.long with !he torn down fe nce. l photographed !hese irem s. 
I \D id Linda [ b~licvcd thnt th is dispute was more likely a civil problem. and that [ did no t believe there was m(llicious imenl in tnking do"'n the 
fence. especially if they were afrc:ady in agreement to replace it It appea.ed there may alrendy be a plan ro fo: or improve the fence . I did also 
mention to Linda that to improve isibilit)' in di~ are:i and see crim inol activicy on the property, along wi1h discourn.ge some. tile brush ~nd trees 
should be trimmed back on Western. 
! spoke with Bi ll and A;me Fischer later that ev ening at : . They bdic.ed there was a!n::ady an agreement in place wbcre th,:y were 
go ing lo tilke down the fence and repl~ce it wiLh a new fence. They also said that the old fence was broken and leani ng down O\~r the ir propmy. 
or m kast where th~y origirrn lly though !he property line WuS to be. They we(e aware of the land surve) and kni:w chat the::, indeed had ended up 
losing par, of che 1Jnd in the back of cheir property . They told me: tl1at all <he lots in that area had bad proptrty lines to the rear. and chat wou ld 
have tc be addressed through ocher means later on. 
I believe this is a civil problem. no furlhu action t11ke 
De puty Dave Schw:l!lz. #348 
[ Notes/Continuation 
Hcporr: r_lw t1iJ n Prinr~u ,1 1: 9/21 !?0l5 tt :28 
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Agency: BCSO 
Repo,·t: r_twlnUn 
FAX No. 
Case Summary Report 
Case Number: 2015-11057 
Pr i11rc~ ~r ; 9/:?J/2015 11 :28 
Date : 9/21/2015 l l :28:20 
Last Modified : 9/21 /20 l 5 00: 13 :45 
P. l /0_ 
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DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC. 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box277 
Rigby ID S3442 
Telephone: (208) 745-9202 
Facsimile: (208) 745-8160 
ndvmn~dluru!Jz,woilices.com 
FAX No. 
( 
P. 002/ 2. 
2017 JAN - 4 Ari 8: 11 
• q1srn 1c, COURT 
H ,. (,fSJR ,':. Tt: DIVIS ION 
BONNE YIU f. co ur~T'r' 
ID.•. HO 
Attotney for Defendants James F. and Marjorie C. Croston 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FISCHER, 
Tru9tees of the William and Ann Fischer 
Revocable Trust, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. 
CROSTON, husband and wife; 
AND ALL UNKNOWN OWNERS AND/OR 
OTHER PERSONS OR ENTITIES 
CLAIMING ANY INTEREST IN THE 
. FOLLOWING DESCRIBED REAL 
PROPERTY: 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Beginning at the Northeast comer of l.ot 41 Block ) 
12, of the Original Ammon Townsite, Bonneville ) 
County, Idaho; running thence N. 88°33'58" W. ) 
330.00 feet to the Northwest comer of said Lot 4; ) 
thence S 00°00'21"W. along the West line of said ) 
Lot 4 a distance of 8.99 feet to an e:i..-isting fence ) 
line; thence S. 89°41'36" E. along said existing ) 
fence line 329.90 feet to a point on the East line of ) 
said Lot 4; thence N. 00°00'21" E. along 9aid East ) 
line 2.50 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING. ) 
) 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-16-2894 
MEMORANDUM OF THE 
DEFENDANTS IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAJNTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COME NOW, the defendants, by and through the undersigned attorney, and submit 
the following Memorandum in Opposition to the Plaintiffs' Request for Summary 
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Judgment: 
STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
This Court is requited to re.,;ew a motion for summary judgment by applying the 
following standard: 
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits, 
and discovery documents on file ,vith the court, read in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrate no 
material issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter oflaw. The burden of proving the 
absence of material facts is upon the moving party. The 
adverse party, however, "may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing thM there is a genuine issue for trial." In 
other words, the moving party is entitled to a judgment when 
the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to 
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's 
case on which that party ,vill bear the burden of proof at trial. 
Baxterv. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P .3d 263,266 (2000) (citations omitted). The Court 
should "liberally construe the record in favor of the party opposing the motion fot summary 
judgment, drawing all reasonable inferences and conclusions supported by the record in 
favor of that party. Walker v. Hollinger, 132 Idaho 172, 175, 968 P.2d 661, 664 (1998). 
Notwithstanding, the following also applies: 
[W]hen a motion for summary judgment which has been 
properly supported with evidence indicating the absence of 
material factual issues, the burden shifts to the non-moving 
pa.tty to make a showing of the existence of a genuine material 
fact which would preclude summary judgment. This standard 
of review is not affected by the fact that both parties have filed 
motions for summary judgment. Rather, each motion must be 
separately considered on its own merits, with the court drawing 
all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is 
under consideration. 
Treasure Valley Gastroenterology Specialists, P.A., v. Woods, 135 Idaho 485, 488-489 20 P.3d 
21, 24-25 (2001). 
Mcll\oronduN of che Oe(end~nl.~ 
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Idaho law is very clear on the standard used in summary judgment proceedings that 
has been cited in numerous cases. That initial standard is as follows: 
Summary judgment should be gtanted if no genuine issue as to any material 
fact is found to exist after the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits 
have been construed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the 
summary judgment motion. Sahnon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna 
Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 544 P.2d 306 (1975). 
Thereafter, the court follows often cited points, as follows: 
If the court determines, after a hearing on a motion for summary judgment, 
that no genuine issues of material fact exist, the court may enter judgment for 
the parties it deems entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Barlows, Inc. v. 
Bannock Cleaning Corp., 103 Idaho 310,647 P.2d 766 (Ct. App. 1982). 
In summary judgment proceedings the facts are to be liberally construed in 
favor of the pa1:ty opposing the motion, who is also to be given the benefit of 
all favorable inferences which might be reasonable drawn from the evidence. 
Smith v. Idaho State Federal Credit Union, 103 Idaho 245, 646 P.2d 1016 (Ct. 
App.1982). 
When a party moves for summary judgment, the initial burden of establishing 
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests with that patty. Thompson 
v. City ofidaho Falls, 126 Idaho 527, 887 P.2d 1094 (Ct. App. 1994). 
If a genuine issue of material fact remains unresolved, or if the record contains 
conflicting inferences and if ceasonable minds might reach different conclusions 
from the facts and inferences presented, summary judgment should not be 
granted. Sewell v. Neilsen, Monroe, Inc. 109 Idaho 192,706 P.2d 81 (Ct. App. 
1985). 
If an action will be tried by a court without a jury, a judge is not required to 
draw :inferences in favor of a party opposing a motion for summary judgment. 
Kaufman v. Fairchild, 119 Idaho 859, 810 P.2d 1145 (Ct. App. 1991), 
Thus, the court has at least two tasks concerning a summary judgment motion. 
First, the court must determine that no material facts are in dispute. Second, the court must 
draw reasonable inferences from those facts co detecmine which party should be granted 
summary judgment/partial summary judgment. 
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BACKGROUND 
This case involves a boundary dispute between the plaintiffs and the defendants. An 
old fence had e..xisted for numerous years between the real properties of the two parties. The 
old fence ran east and west which separated the two properties. The plaintiffs' real property 
is on the north and the defendants' real property is/ are on the south. This property is 
located in the tmvn site of Ammon. 
The initial recitation of facts by the plaintiff is fairly accurate to the top of page 7. 
The defendants do not matetially disagree with the introduction and facts set forth by 
plaintiffs nor do the defendants think or believe that these facts materially affect the 
outcome of the case. Where the parties reach disagreement is on some material facts that 
occurred in the year 2015. 
The facts, believed to be accurate relying on both the written submissions of both of 
the parties, are as follows: 
1. An old fence that had separated the real properties was in a complete state of 
disrepair and was removed by the plaintiffs. The fence no longer existed. 
2. The plaintiffs obtained a survey from Ellsworth Engineering to determine the 
boundary lines per engineered standards. 
3. The material disputed facts are that the pa1ties agreed to be bound by the survey 
and place a new fence on the survey line. The defendants would argue that no 
reason existed to obtain a survey unless the parties were going to rely upon the 
survey. The plaintiffs did accomplish the task of obtaining the survey. The 
plaintiffs disagree with the new fence being placed on the surveyed line. 
4. The plaintiff also removed a ditch and placed a large amount of gravel about the 
area in question. 
Mc,rnor.1nduru 0I1ho-Ocfc11,d:11n1e 
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5. The defendants placed a fence on the survey line as prepared by the engineer 
work and the pins that were placed by said engineers. 
ARGUMENT 
P, 006/ 021 
Boundary by agreement ot by acquiescence is not applicable to this cause. The 
events which took place between the parties had nothing to do with the years prior to the 
old fence and the history of the two properties. The parties either entered into an agreement 
to relocate the fence or, on the other hand, did not reach such an arrangement Under either 
scenario, the court has conflicting versions of the material facts on this issue. The 
defendants rely upon both of the parties declarations, sworn statements, pleadings and 
documents. 
For instance, the following factual assertions preclude summary judgment. 
l The affidavit of Linda Penning disputes the assertions of the plaintiffs as to an 
agreement. 
2. The plaintiff tore down whatever remained of the old fence. In reality, an old 
fence no longer existed. The plaintiffs also remoYed natural land.marks such as a 
ditch AND hauled in gravel to supplement the area in question. 
3, The old fence no longer existed. Therefore, how did either party use the land up 
to the old fence or claim adversity to the fence that no longer was in existence. 
4. Exhibit D to the affidavit of Linda Penning indicates that the plaintiffs stated: 
"They believed that there was already an agreement in place ... ". See also, 
Exhibit F to the declaration of Fischer, 
5. The plaintiffs argue for fees and yet they "demolished the existing fence". See 
Weitz v. Green, 148 Idaho 851 (2010). They ate guilty of the very issue that they 
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are trying to enforce. See also, Exhibit D to the declaration of Fischer. See the 
threats to the elderly Mrs. Croston, Exhibit H to Declaration of Fischer. 
6. Exhibit L to the declaration of Fishe.t shows no fence and the gravel that was to 
be spread on the defendants' property, 
Until the factual basis can be determined it is difficult, if not impossible to apply 
legal theories. The plaintiffs argue legal theories pertaining to the boundaries; on the 
theories of trespass; on the issue of fees and other related matters. Until the fact-finder 
determines the facts, the briefing of the parties is nothing more than pre-trial opinions. 
CONCLUSION 
The legal theories of boundary by acquiescence and by agreement are irrelevant to 
the events after the 2015 year. Fees and costs should be decided after the court has made 
initial rulings. Summary iudgment is precluded by disputed material facts between the 
parties. The plaintiffs are the parties that have taken matters into their own hands and 
ignored the peaceable attempts by defendants to resolve the issues. 
The defendatits plan to point out the inconsistencies in the declarations and sworn 
testimony of the plaintiffs at oral argument. However, the central and material point is the 
belief that an agreement existed to place the new fence on the survey line. The photos, the 
declarations, the affidavits and the swom pleadings support this position. 
DATED this 3rd day of January, 2017. 
~ 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
Mcmor.lndum ofchc Dc(cnd.1nts: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~l day of January, 2017J a true and coirect 
copy of the foregoing was delivered to the following person(s) by: 
DOCUMENT SERVED: MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ATTORNEYS AND/OR INDIVlDUALS SERVED: 
W. Forrest Fischer, £9q. 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 834205 
Mcmo,a.,,dum 0r1n.e Dcrcnc:h .n1.1, 
( / ) First Class Mail 
( ✓ ) Facsimile 523 9518 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Courthouse box 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
181
JAN/0 4/20 17/WED 04: 14 PM 
DUNN LA ·w OFFICES, PLLC 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB 112903 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Boxl.77 
Rigby ID 8.l442 
Telephone: -(208) 745-9202 
Facsimile: (208) 745-8160 
rdunn@dunnlawoffices.com 
FA X No. 
Attorney fr.,r Defendants James F. and l\htjorie C. Croston 
( 
2017 JMl - 4 PH 3: 40 
DI ST~,IC T COU RT 
H AGI S TR:,., T£ DI VISION 
BON N[VILLl COIJNT y ID .•. ,.1 ,., 
IN THlE DISTR.ICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF _IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
WILLLW R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FISCHER, Trustees of the 
William. and Ann Fischer Revocable Trust, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. 
CROSTON, husband and wife; 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
AND All UNKNOWN OWNERS AND/OR ) 
OTHER PER.SONS OR ENITIJES ) 
CLAIMING ANY lNTEREST IN THE ) 
FOUOWING DESCRIBED REAL ) 
PROPERTY. ) 
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 4, 
Block 12, of the Original Ammon Town.site~ 
Bonneville County1 Idaho; running thence N. 
ssci.u~58" W. 330.00 feet to the Northwest 
comer of s:li.d Lot 4; thence S 00°00'2t"'W. 
along the ,vest line of said Lot 4 a distance of 
8. 99 feet to an existing fence line; thence S. 
89°41'36:i, E. along said existing fence line 
329.90 feet to a point on the East line of said 
Lot 4; thence N . 00°00,21~ E. along said East 
line 2.50 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING. 
Defenrumu. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-H,-2894 
VE.RIFICATION 
P. 002/003 
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LINDA PENNING, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That she is the agent for the Defendants, James f. Croston :rod Marjorie C. Croston, 
in the above-entitled action; that she has read the foregoing Affidavit in Opposition to Motion 
for Summary1 Judgment, knows the contents thereof, and verily believes the statements 
contained therein to be true. 
DATED this J/7A- day ofJ:muary, 2017. 
~/dk~· 
'7i~hokg ~~ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this t/1'>-day of January, 2017. 
(SE.AL) 
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DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box277 
Rigby ID 83442 
Telephone: (208) 745-9202 
Facsimile: (208) 745-8160 
rdunn@dunnlawoffices.com 
FAX No. 
Attorney for Defendants James F. and Marjorie C. Croston 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN'IY OF BONNEVILLE 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FISCHER, Trustees of the 
William and Ann Fischer Revocable Trust, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. 
CROSTON, husband and wife; 
AND ALL UNKNOWN OWNERS AND/OR 
OTHER PERSONS OR ENTITIES 
CLAIMING ANY INTEREST IN THE 
FOLLOWING DESCRIBED REAL 
PROPER'IY: 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 4, Block ) 
12, of the Original Ammon Townsite, Bonneville ) 
County, Idaho; running thence N. 88°33158" W. ) 
330.00 feet to the Northwest corner of said Lot 4; ) 
thence S 00°00'21''W. along the West line of said ) 
Lot 4 a distance of 8.99 feet to an existing fence ) 
line; thence S. 89°41'36" E . along said existing ) 
fence line 329.90 feet to a point on the East line of ) 
said Lot 4; thence N. 00°00'21" E. along said East ) 
line 2.50 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING. ) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-16-2894 
VERIFICATION 
P. 019/ 021 
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LINDA PENNING, being first duly sworn, depo9es and says: 
That she is the agent for the Defendants, James F. Croston and Marjorie C. Ctosto11, in 
the above-entitled action; that she has read the fotegoing Affidavit in Opposidon to Motion for 
Summary Judgment, knows the contents thereof, and verily believes the statements contained 
therein to be true. 
DATED this ___ day of January, 2017. 
Linda Penning 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ___ day of January, 2017. 
(SEAL) 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at: 
Commission Expires: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the '7Yi\, day of January, 2017, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing was delivered to the following person( s) by: 
DOCUMENT SERVED: AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA PENNING IN 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
ATTORNEYS AND/Oll INDIVIDUALS SERVED: 
W. Forrest Fischer, Esq. 
P.O. Box 50130 
ldaho Falls, ID 834205 
( / ) First Class Mail 
( ✓ ) Facsimile 523 9518 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Courthouse bo:x 
/ ~ ;----, ~ 
f~ ,-l.~~·- µ ~-=-
Robin D , Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
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Karl R. Decker, ISB #3390 
W. Forrest Fischer, ISB #10009 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH WDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FISCHER, Trustees of the William and Ann 
Fischer Revocable Trust, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. 
CROSTO , husband and wife; 
AND ALL UNKNOWN OWNERS AND/OR 
OTHER PERSONS OR ENTITIES 
CLAIMING ANY INTEREST IN THE 
FOLLOWING DESCRIBED REAL 
PROPERTY: 
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 4, 
Block 12, of the Original Ammon Townsite, 
Bonneville County, Idaho; running thence N. 
88°33 ' 58 " W. 330.00 feet to the Northwest 
corner of said Lot 4; thence S. 00°00'21"W. 
along the West line of said Lot 4 a distance of 
8.99 feet to an existing fence line; thence S. 
89°41 '36" E. along said existing fence line 
329.90 feet to a point on the East line of said 
Lot 4; thence N. 00°00'21" E. along said East 
line 2.50 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2016-2894 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO 
SHORTEN TIME TO HEAR MOTION 
TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF 
LINDA D. PENNING 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME TO HEAR 
MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA D. PENNING - I 
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JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. 
CROSTON, husband and wife; 
Counter Claimants, 
vs. 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FISCHER, Trustees of the William and Ann 
Fischer Revocable Trust, 
Counter Defendants. 
COMES NOW Plaintiffs/Counter Claimants, William R. Fischer And M. Ann Fischer, 
Trustees of the William and Ann Fischer Revocable Trust ("Plaintiffs"), by and through their 
counsel of record, Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. , and pursuant to Rule 7(b)(3)(H) of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, respectfully move that the Court shorten the time limits for 
hearing Plaintiffs Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Linda D. Penning in Opposition of Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment ("Penning Affidavit"). There is good cause for this motion, as 
required by Rule 7(b)(3)(H), in that the Penning Affidavit was effectively filed on January 4, 2017 
(although it was faxed the prior evening after 5:00 p.m., see I.R.C.P. 5(d)(3)(A)(ii)) in anticipation 
of the hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, scheduled for January 18, 2017. 
Plaintiffs could not respond to the Penning Affidavit on the same day it was filed- as would be 
required without this motion-and have exercised all due diligence in preparing and filing their 
motion to strike the Penning Affidavit. Correspondingly, Plaintiffs have no objection to shortening 
the time required for any response and reply under Rule 7. 
lt\a DATED this_( _ day of January, 2017. 
~ !i dw 
.Forrest FICher 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
Attomeys for Plaintiffs 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME TO HEAR 
MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF LlNDA D. PENNING - 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in 
\t'-' Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the \ day of January, 2017, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct postage 
thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with IRCP S(b ). 
Persons Served: 
Robin D. Dunn 
Dunn Law Offices, PLLC 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby ID 83422 
Fax: (208) 745-8160 
Method of Service: 
• Mail 
)8l'. Fax 
• Hand Delivery 
• Other: 
-------
\\Law\data\ WPDA TA\ WFF\18611 (F ischer Property)\Pleadings\6 - Motion to Strike\Motion to Shorten Time.docx 
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Karl R. Decker, ISB #3390 
W. Forrest Fischer, ISB #10009 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FISCHER, Trustees of the William and Ann 
Fischer Revocable Trust, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. 
CROSTON, husband and wife; 
AND ALL UNKNOWN OWNERS AND/OR 
OTHER PERSONS OR ENTITIES 
CLAIMING ANY INTEREST IN THE 
FOLLOWING DESCRIBED REAL 
PROPERTY: 
Beginning at the Northeast comer of Lot 4, 
Block 12, of the Original Ammon Townsite, 
Bonneville County, Idaho; running thence N. 
88°33'58" W. 330.00 feet to the Northwest 
comer of said Lot 4; thence S. 00°00'21"W. 
along the West line of said Lot 4 a distance of 
8.99 feet to an existing fence line; thence S. 
89°41 '36" E. along said existing fence line 
329.90 feet to a point on the East line of said 
Lot 4; thence N. 00°00'21" E. along said East 
line 2.50 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2016-2894 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE 
AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA D. PENNING 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA D. PENNING - 1 
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JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. 
CROSTON, husband and wife; 
Counter Claimants, 
vs. 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FISCHER, Trustees of the William and Ann 
Fischer Revocable Trust, 
Counter Defendants. 
COMES NOW Plaintiffs/Counter Claimants, William R. Fischer And M. Ann Fischer, 
Trustees of the William and Ann Fischer Revocable Trust ("Plaintiffs"), by and through their 
counsel ofrecord Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo P.L.L.C., and pursuant to Rule 56(c)(2) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, respectfully move that the Court strike the Affidavit of Linda D. 
Penning in Opposition of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Penning Affidavit"). This 
Motion is supported by "Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike the Affidavit of 
Linda D. Penning" and the "Declaration of W. Forrest Fischer in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Strike," which are filled concurrently herewith. 
t½ 
DATED this _I{_ day of January, 2017. 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C., 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA D. PENNING - 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in 
1 I ,\-Y\ 
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the _lL_ day of January, 2017, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct postage 
thereon or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with IRCP 5(b ). 
Persons Served: 
Robin D. Dunn 
Dunn Law Offices, PLLC 
4 77 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby ID 83422 
Fax: (208) 745-8160 
Method of Service: 
• Mail 
){ Fax 
• Hand Delivery 
• Other: 
-------
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Karl R. Decker, ISB #3390 
W. Forrest Fischer, ISB #10009 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
l 000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FISCHER, Trustees of the William and Ann 
Fischer Revocable Trust, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. 
CROSTO , husband and wife; 
AND ALL UNKNOWN OWNERS AND/OR 
OTHER PERSONS OR ENTITIES 
CLAIMING ANY INTEREST IN THE 
FOLLOWING DESCRIBED REAL 
PROPERTY: 
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 4, 
Block 12, of the Original Ammon Townsite, 
Bonneville County, Idaho; running thence N. 
88°33'58" W. 330.00 feet to the Northwest 
corner of said Lot 4; thence S. 00°00 '21 "W. 
along the West line of said Lot 4 a distance of 
8.99 feet to an existing fence line; thence S. 
89°41 '36" E. along said existing fence line 
329.90 feet to a point on the East line of said 
Lot 4; thence N. 00°00'21 " E. along said East 
line 2.50 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING 
Defendants. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTlFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
Case No. CV-2016-2894 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
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JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. 
CROSTON husband and wife; 
Counter Claimants, 
vs. 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FISCHER, Trustees of the William and Ann 
Fischer Revocabl.e Trust, 
Counter Defendants. 
Plaintiffs/Counter Defendant William R. Fischer and M. Ann Fischer, Trustees of the 
William and Ann Fischer Revocable rust ("Fischers"), by and through th ir couns I of record, 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. , hereby submit this Reply Memorandum in Supp011 of 
their Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs will refi r to terms as defined in prior briefing. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Within their "Memorandum of the Defendants in Opposi tion to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment" ("Opposition"), the Crostons concede the vast majority of the arguments 
contained within the Fischers' "Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment" 
("Motion' ). Key an1ong these issues is that the Old Fence demarcated the true boundary line 
between the Fischer Property and Croston Property by operation of boundary line by acquiescence 
or agreement, and has done so since at least 195 1. The Crostons concede this, and other issues 
by failing to rebut the Fischers' facts and arguments. Instead, the Crostons wish to focus only on 
the events which transpired during the latter end of 2015 conveniently ignoring more than half a 
century of facts in evidence. However, the Crostons' effo11s to limit the scope of the Court's 
inquiry are unpersuasive and ineffective. 
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Ultimately, the Crostons provide no material facts or evidence which precludes the Court 
from rendering a judgment as a matter of law in favor of the Fischers. Indeed, the utter lack of 
any meritorious argument by the Crostons conclusively demonstrates that their Opposition and 
Counterclaim are frivolous. Accordingly, the Comi should grant the Fischers' Motion and award 
them damages in addition to their reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. 
II. CORRECTED STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Crostons' Opposition contains a series of block quotes included to provide the Court 
with the proper standard of review on summary judgments. Yet some of these quotes contain 
language no longer present in the current version of I.R.C.P. 56. Furthermore, the Opposition 
lacks sufficient citations to the record or evidence, but states instead that the Crostons plan to raise 
their arguments at the hearing. Opposition, p. 6. This is neither sufficient, nor appropriate. 
Accordingly, the Court should consider the following standards as they directly apply to summary 
judgment in this case. 
Specifically, the Fischers met their burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue 
of material fact which would preclude summary judgment in their favor. See Losee v. Idaho Co., 
148 [daho 2 19,222, P.3d 575,578 (2009). Moreover, the Court, as the trier of fact in a non-jury 
case, "is entitled to arrive at the most probable inferences based upon the undisputed 
evidence properly before it and grant the summary judgment despite the possibility of 
conflicting inferences." Shcrwver v. Huckleberry Estates, L.L.C., 140 Idaho 354, 360-61 , 93 P.3d 
685, 692 (2004) (citation omitted, emphasis added). In doing so, the "trial court is not required to 
search the record looking for evidence that may create a genuine issue of material fact; the party 
opposing the swnmary judgment is required to bring that evidence to the couti's attention." 
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Morrison v. St. Luke's Reg'/ Med. Ctr., Ltd. , 160 Idaho 599, 605-06, 377 P .3d 1062, 1068-69 
(2016), reh 'g denied (Sept. 6, 2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). As applied, it is the 
Crostons' "obligation to bring the evidence of the genuine issues of material fact to the trial com1's 
attention." Silicon Intern. Ore, LLC v. Monsanto Co. , 155 Idaho 538, 552, 314 P.3d 592, 607 
(2013). 
Given the foregoing, it is not proper for the Crostons to wait until oral argwnent to rai se 
"additional issues at the motion hearing" which they refused to brief. See Aardema v. U S. Dairy 
Sys., Inc., 14 7 Idaho 785, 793, 215 P.3d 505, 51 3 (2009). On this matter, the applicable rule states: 
If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fai ls to properly 
address another party' s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56( c ), the court 
may: 
(1) give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact; 
(2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion; 
(3) grant summary judgment if the motion and suppo11ing 
materials, including the facts considered undisputed, show that 
the movant is entitled to it; or 
( 4) issue any other appropriate order. 
I.R.C.P. 56(e) (emphasis added). The Idaho Supreme Cout1 stated that when "an issue[] is unique 
to the fact[s] ... [it] is not one which may be addressed without the benefit of full briefing and the 
oppo1tunity to reply." Aardema, 147 Idaho at 793, 215 P.3d at 513. In such a case, a court may 
" impose [sanctions] upon a party for failure to comply with the requirements of [Rule 56]." Gem 
State Ins. Co. v. Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 14, 175 P.3d 172, 176 (2007). These sanctions include 
the imposition of"costs, attorney fees and [ other] sanctions against a pruty or the party's attorney." 
I.R.C.P. 56(b)(3); see Hutchison, 145 Idaho at 14, 175 P.3d at 176 (citing fo rmer Rule 56(c), now 
Rule 56(b)(3)). 
The Fischers object to the Crostons' stated intention to broaden the issues involved in this 
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Motion at the hearing without the benefit of any pre-hearing briefing on those issues. See State v. 
Rubbermaid Inc. , 129 Idaho 353, 356-57, 924 P.2d 615, 618-19 (1996). In light of this objection, 
this Coru1 should not allow the Crostons to raise new issues at the summary judgment hearing. If, 
however, the Court does allow the untimely introduction of such new issues, this Court should 
impose appropriate sanctions against the Crostons and/or their attorney pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
56(b)(3). 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Because the Crostons have not legally or factually contested the Fischers' arguments, 
the Court should declare that the Old Fence is the true boundary line between the 
Fischer Property and Croston Property under the doctrine of boundary line by 
agreement or acquiescence. 
The Crostons effectively make only one argument within their Opposition - that summary 
judgment is inappropriate because "[t]he parties either entered into an agreement to relocate the 
fence, or, on the other hand, did not reach such an arrangement." Opposition, p. 5. By raising 
only one argument, the Crostons fai l to rebut much of Plaintiffs' Motion. Accordingly, the Court 
should consider the facts and arguments in Plaintiffs' Motion which are not challenged by the 
Crostons as tmdisputed. J.R.C.P. 56(e)(2). 
The Crostons submit that "[t]he initial recitation of facts by the [Fischers] is fairly accurate 
to the top of page 7." Opposition, p. 4. In other words, there is no disputed fact as to the events 
occurring between at least 195 1 and 201 5. See Motion, pp. 2-7. As applied, it is undisputed that 
"the Old Fence existed since at least 195 1," (Motion, p. 4) and that up u11til 2015, the respective 
owners "always treated the Old Fence as the true boLU1dary between what is now the Croston 
Prope1ty and the Fischer Property." lvfotion, p. 5. In such circumstances, "the trial court is not 
required to search the record looking for evidence that may create a genuine issue of material fact; 
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the patty opposing the summary judgment is required to bring the evidence to the court's attention. ' 
Silicon lnt'l Ore, LLC, 155 Idaho at 552, 314 P .3d at 607. Thus, this Com1 may accept the Fischers' 
uncontested facts as true. I.R.C.P. 56(e)(2) . 
By refusing to address the Fischers' arguments the Crostons concede that the location of 
the Old Fence is the location of the true boundary line between the pa11ies ' respective properties 
pursuant to Idaho's doctrine of boundary line by agreement or acquiescence. Although the 
Crostons attempt to conflate the fact that, at the time the dispute between the parties arose, portions 
of the Old Fence had been removed in preparation for replacement th.is fact does not change the 
legal location of the true boundary line. 1 Again, the existence of a fence is merely evidence of the 
location ofa boundary, and not the legal boundary itself. Luce v. Marble , 142 Idaho 264, 271-72, 
127 P.3d 167, 174 (2005). Thus, the removal of the Old Fence does not change the location of the 
true boundary line between the Fischer Property and Croston Property established decades prior 
by agreement or acquiescence. It is enti rely immaterial that the Old Fence was removed in 2015, 
as its decades-long existence provides sufficient evidence of the true boundary. 
Because these facts are not disputed the Court's determination of th only remaining 
issue- the legal effect of those undisputed facts-is perfectly suited to adjudication by summary 
judgment. The Fischers demonstrate within their Motion that, under the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence or agreement the true boundary between the Croston Prope1ty and the Fischer 
Property was fixed by the Old Fence since at I.east 1951. See Motion pp. 12-18. In response the 
1 Additionally, the Fischers point out that they were i.n the process of removing and replacing the Old Fence befo re 
they received the Demand Letter from the Crostons, whereupo n they ceased further work. Motion, pp. 7-8. The 
Crostons statement that no fence existed at the time this dispute arose .is both disingenuous and purposely misleading. 
The fact remains that the Fischers ceased their replacement of the Old Fence in order to work with the Crostons, 
whereupon the Crostons wrongfully seized upon an opportunity to grab more land than they had previously by 
con truct ing the New Fe nce over the Fischers' objections. Motion, pp. 7-1 1. 
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Crostons make no counterargument- instead focus ing their solitary argument on the narrow 
events of 2015. See Opposition, p. 6 ("The legal theories of boundary by acquiescence and by 
agreement are irrelevant to the events after the 2015 year"). The Crostons' only argument is that 
"the central and material point is the belief that an agreement existed [in 2015] to place the new 
fence on the survey line." Opposition, p. 6. While the Fischers contest the issues arising in 2015 
raised by the Crostons, there is no di spute that for decades prior to 2015, the true boundary between 
the prope1ties was the Old Fence. Thus, whatever happened in 2015 ( discussed in detail below) 
must be considered against the uncontested backdrop of everything that occurred decades prior. 
B. The Crostons provide no rebuttal to support their Counterclaim that an agreement 
behveen the parties exists for the relocation of the Old Fence. 
The Fischers contend that the Crostons' Counterclain1 is defective on its face. Motion, p. 
18. Specifically, the Crostons failed to identify a specific cause of action within their Counterclaim 
and similarly failed to cite any statutory authority supporting their request for attorneys' fees and 
costs. Id. Fai ling to provide such authority renders the Crostons' Counterclaim ineffective and 
inapplicable. See PHH Mortg. Servs. Cmp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 63 1,641 , 200 P.3d 1180, 1190 
(2009); See Gillespie v. Mountain Park Estates L.L.C., 138 Idaho 27, 29, 56 P.3d 1277, 1279 
(2002) ("The key issue in determining the validity of a complaint is whether the adverse party is 
put on notice of the claims brought against it."). Accordingly, this Court should dismiss the 
Crostons' Counterclaim outright. Moreover, because the Crostons raise no argument in rebuttal, 
they waive their ability to do so at oral argument. See Maroun v. Wyreless Sys. , Inc. , 14 1 Idaho 
604, 613, 114 P .3d 974, 983 (2005) ('" A cause of action not raised in a paity's pleadings may not 
be considered on summary judgment nor may it be considered for the first time on appeal. "') 
( citation omitted). 
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If, however, the Cowt finds that the Crostons' Counterclaim is not defective on its face, 
the Comt should nevertheless grant sutmnary judgment in favor of the Fischers, finding that no 
valid or enforceable agreement ex ists between the parties concerning the location of the boundary 
fence dividing their respective properties. Again, the Crostons fail to address, let alone rebut, any 
of the Fischers' arguments on this issue. Instead, the Crostons make bare allegations that ru1 
agreement exists between the parties and that the terms of this purported agreement constitute a 
disputed material fact, precluding summary judgment. Opposition, pp. 5-6. This is a 
fundamentally flawed argument. 
First and foremost, the Crostons fail to cite, describe, or articulate in ru1y way, the alleged 
agreement upon which they predicate their position. Instead, they merely state that the agreement 
was to "relocate the fence." Opposition, p. 5. Yet, the Crostons fail to provide any evidence to 
support this statement. The Fischers theorized that the statement by Jim Croston provided in 
discovery might be the basis for the Crostons' agreement defense. Motion, pp. 19-20. However, 
the Crostons never assert that the Jim Croston statement describes the oral agreement to which 
they refer. Accordingly, the Fischers can only guess at which facts the Crostons might believe 
support their Counterclaim. 
In actuality, the only reason the Fischers addressed the Jim Croston statement in the first 
place was to raise and refute a potential counterargument from the Crostons. As it stands now, the 
Fischers (and the Court for that matter) have no idea as to what evidence the Crostons might 
eventually rely upon to demonstrate the existence of the alleged bindu1g agreement between the 
pruties. 
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At oral argument, the Crostons will likely attempt to point to a police report attached to the 
Affidavit of Linda D. Penning as evidence of an agreement between the parties. However the 
Fischer object that this document is inadmissible hearsay and should not be considered on 
summary judgment.2 Neve1theless, even if not excluded, the police report contains no evidence 
as to what the supposed agreement between the patties entailed. The fact that the Crostons fai l to 
provide sufficient evidence undermines their Cow1terclaim and Opposition. As a result, the 
Crostons fail to properly suppmt their assertion that an agreement to move the boundary exists. 
I.R.C.P. 56(c)(1) ("A party assuming that a fact . . . is genuinely disputed must support the assertion 
by .. . citing to particular parts of materials in the record."). Therefore th Court should conclude 
that no agreement exists to move the boundary for the purposes of this Motion. I.R.C.P. 56(e)(2). 
The second flaw in the Crostons' argument is that they admit that the alleged agreement 
between the parties to relocate the fence was oral and not written. See Exs. C and F to Declaration 
of W Forrest Fischer . On this matter, the Fischers argued within their Motion that an oral 
agreement concerning the transfeITing of an interest in real property is barred by Idaho's statute of 
frauds - LC. § 9-505. Motion, pp. 19-2 l. Furthennore because ownership of Tract 1 passed to 
the Fischers long before the filed their Verified Complaint (see Staffordv. Weaver, 136 Idaho 223 
225, 31 P.3d 245 247 (2001)), any future conveyance of Tract 1 is required to be in writing. 
Motion, p. 20-2 1. The Crostons provide no counter argument within their Opposition to rebut this 
point. For this reason, even if the Cami were to find that an oral agreement between the Fischers 
2 Th is police report is appended as Exh ibit D to the Affidavit of Linda D. Penning which was submitted alongside the 
Crostons' Opposition. The Fiscbers have moved the Cou1i to strike thi s affidavit as well as Exhibit D for evident iary 
reasons. Accordingly, it is only in an abundance of caution that the Fischers refer to Exhib it D within their Response, 
in the event that the Cowt does not grant their Motion to Str ike. 
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and the Crostons to move the boundary existed, it would be invalid and unenforceable under 
Idaho's statute of frauds. 
The third fatal flaw in the Crostons' Opposition pertains to the lack of legal authority of 
Jim Croston to enter into a binding agreement with the Fischers on behalf of the Crostons. Even 
if the Court finds that an oral agreement exists between the Fischers and Jim Croston, and even if 
such agreement somehow does not fall within the prohibitions of the statute of frauds, the 
Crostons' counterclaim still fajls. This is because the Crostons present no evidence that the alleged 
oral agreement was between coterminous owners of the Fischer Property and Croston Property. 
The Crostons Counterclaim is further undermined by the concession that Jim Croston is neither an 
owner of the Croston Property nor designated as the Crostons' attorney in fact. Motion, p. 23. As 
a result, and as a pure matter of law, Jim Croston is totally unable to enter into contracts or 
agreements affecting title to the Crostons' real prope1ty. 
For the reasons above (which are more fully explained within the Fischers' Motion), the 
Crostons provide no persuasive rebuttal to defend their Counterclaim. Indeed, the Crostons 
provide no rebuttal whatsoever, but merely point to some ambiguous alleged agreement which 
they contend precludes summary judgment. As a result, the Crostons have conceded defeat on this 
issues, freeing the Court to rule in the Fischers' favor as a matter of law. 
C. The Crostons provide no rebuttal to the Fischers' request for damages, attorneys' 
fees, and costs. 
Finally, the Crostons provide an insufficient counterargument against the Fischers' request 
for damages, attorneys' fees, and costs. Rather, the Crostons merely argue that " [fJees and costs 
should be decided after the court has made initial rulings," while saying nothing concerning the 
Fischers' damages claim. Opposition, p. 6. Accordingly, the Crostons do not dispute the Fischers' 
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claim for damages and have waived their ability to do so at oral argument. Concerning attorneys' 
fees and costs, there is no rule which precludes the Court from awarding these to the Fischers on 
summary judgment. As such, the basis for the Fischers' request for attorneys' fees and costs as 
contained within the Motion remains unchallenged by the Crostons waiving their ability to 
challenge it at a later date. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
There is no dispute that, for at least the past six decades, an old post and wire fence between 
the parties ' respective properties existed and served as the parties' mutually accepted boundary 
line. Moreover, there is no dispute that parties' predecessors-in-interest also considered and 
regarded the fence as the boundary between their properties. Under Idaho law, these facts create 
the presumption that the location of the decades-old fence is the true boundary between the parties' 
properties. The undisputed facts presented in this case satisfy all of the requisite elements for a 
boundary line by agreement or acquiescence. As a matter of law, nothing the Crostons claim 
occurred in 2015 can change the location of the true boundary line. Despite this fact, the Crostons 
engaged in self-help by forcibly taking almost 1,900 square feet of the Fischers' prope1ty as their 
own. Accordingly, the Court should grant summary judgment in favor of the Fischers and award 
them their reasonable attorneys' fees and costs based. Furthermore, the Court should grant 
summary judgment in favor of the Fischers, dismissing the Crostons' counterclaim as a matter of 
law. 
-\_\I\ 
Respectfully submitted this_\\_ day of January 2017. 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAH & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in 
\ -\-V' 
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the \ - day of January, 2017, I served a true and correct copy 
of th_e foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct postage 
thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with IRCP 5(b ). 
Persons Served: 
RobinD. Dunn 
Dunn Law Offices, PLLC 
4 77 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby ID 83422 
Fax: (208) 745-8160 
Method of Service: 
• Mail 
){ Fax 
• Hand Delivery 
• Other: 
-------
G:\ WP DATA\ WFF\18611 (Fischer Property)\Pleadings\5.1 - Reply ISO MSJ\Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment.docx 
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P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
.. , ..,. .,. .. 
no'.)• c-y 0 
.. : 0 ... E COUN TY 
DA' 
,. ,. , ,. 
u, • -., B1 11 p I: 3 f 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FISCHER, Trustees of the William and Ann 
Fischer Revocable Trust, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. 
CROSTON, husband and wife; 
AND ALL UNKNOWN OWNERS AND/OR 
OTHER PERSONS OR ENTITIES 
CLAIMING ANY INTEREST IN THE 
FOLLOWING DESCRIBED REAL 
PROPERTY: 
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 4, 
Block 12, of the Original Ammon Townsite, 
Bonnevil.le County, Idaho; running thence N. 
88°33'58" W. 330.00 feet to the Northwest 
corner of said Lot 4; thence S. 00°00'21"W. 
along the West line of said Lot 4 a distance of 
8.99 feet to an existing fence line; thence S. 
89°41 ' 36" E. along said existing fence line 
329.90 feet to a point on the East line of said 
Lot 4; thence . 00°00'21" E. along said East 
line 2.50 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2016-2894 
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JAM S F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. 
CROSTON, husband and wife; 
Counter Claimants, 
vs . 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FISCHER, Trustees of the William and Ann 
Fischer Revocable Trust, 
Counter Defendants. 
Plaintiffs/Counter Defendants William R. Fischer and M. Ann Fischer Trustees of the 
William and Ann Fischer Revocable Trust ("Plaintiffs"), by and through their counsel of record, 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. , hereby submit this Memorandum in Support of their 
Motion for to Strike the Affidavit of Linda D. Penning. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On January 4, 20 17, Defendants/Counter Claimants James F. Croston and Marjorie C. 
Croston ("Crostons") filed their Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Smmnary Judgment. To 
support their opposition, the Crostons filed the Affidavit of Linda Penning in Opposition to 
Plai_ntiff s Motion for Smmnary Judgment" ("Penning Affidavit"). However the Penning 
Affidavit is inadmissible on its face because it does not satisfy the requirements of sworn affidavits 
under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure ("1.R.C.P.") and Idaho Code ("I.C.") § 51-109. 
Furthermore, the Penning Affidavit contains exhibits which are inadmissible under the Idaho Rules 
of vid nee ("l.R.E.") because they lack foundation, contain hearsay and contain hearsay v ithin 
hear ay. Finally, the Penning Affidavit also contains a document which was not produced in 
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discovery despite being completely responsive to Plaintiffs' discovery requests. 
Ultimately, any one of these issues provides the Court with substantial j ustification in 
striking the Penning Affidavit. Moreover, these flaws compound upon one another to the point 
that no portion of the Pe1ming Affidavit is salvageable. Accordingly, Plaintiffs request that the 
Court strike the Penning Affidavit. 
II. ARGUMENT 
1. The Court should consider and determine this Motion before deciding Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Under I.R.C.P. 56(c)(2) "[a] party may obj ect that the material cited to support or dispute 
a fact is not admissible in evidence at the hearing." As stated by the Idaho Supreme Com1, 
admissibility of evidence supported in summary judgment is a threshold issue: 
lt is axiomatic that objected-to evidence may not be admitted before the 
objection is considered and determined. As this Court has frequently held: 
Evidence presented in support of or in opposition to a motion for 
smnmary judgment must be admissible. Hecla Min. Co. v. Star-
Morning 1\1in. Co. , 122 Idaho 778,785,839 P.2d 1192, 11 99 (1992). 
This threshold question of admissibility of evidence must be decided 
"before proceeding to the ultimate issue, whether summary 
judgment is appropriate." Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 45, 844 
P .2d 24, 27 (Ct.App.1992). 
Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 811 ,979 P.2d 1165, 1169 (1999). Or, as 
stated in Ryan v. Beisner: 
[I]f the admissibility of evidence presented in support of or in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment is raised by the court 
on its own motion or on objection by one of the pai1ies, the court 
must first make a threshold determination as to the 
admissibility of the evidence before proceeding to the ultimate 
issue, whether summary judgment is appropriate. 
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Nield v. Pocatello Health Servs., Inc., 156 Idaho 802, 814, 332 P.3d 714, 726 (2014) (emphasis 
added). Given the foregoing the ColU't should consider Plaintiffs Motion to Strike before 
considering swnmary judgment in this matter. 
2. The Court should strike the Penning Affidavit because it does not satisfy the 
requirements of I.R.C.P. 56(c)(4) and does not comply with J.C.§ 51-109. 
Pursuant to l.R.C.P. Rule 56(c)(4), "[a]n affidavit used to support or oppose a motion must 
be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that 
the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated." Affidavits submitted under 
this rule must also comply with LC. § 51-109. Evans v. T·win Falls County, 118 Idaho 2 10, 218-
2 19, n. 5, 796 P.2d 87, 95-96, n. 5 (1990). J.C.§ 51-109 provides the requisite elements and format 
for notarizing and witnessing affirmations made in writing. When considering both l.R.C.P. Rule 
56( c )( 4) and J.C. § 51-109 together, Idaho courts have consistently held that if an affidavit fails to 
comply with the rules and statutes, it is not admissihle as evidence. See Evans, 118 Idaho at 218-
219, n. 5, 796 P.2d at 95-96, n. 5; Puckett v. Oakfabco, Inc., 132 Idaho 816, 820-821, 979 P.2d 
1174, 1178-1179 (1999); Neild, 156 Idaho at 814, 332 P.3d at 726. Here, the Penning Affidavit 
satisfies neither the court rule nor the state statute and the Verification does not remedy these facts. 
a. The Penning Affidavit is unsigned and the Verification does not cure this fact. 
Inexplicably, the Penning Affidavit is actually not signed by Ms. Penning herself. Rather, 
it is signed by the Crostons' coLmsel, Robin Dunn. Penning Affidavit, p. 3. This fact alone renders 
the entirety of the Penning Affidavit deficient, inadmissible, and of no evidentiary weight. See 
Camp v. Jiminez, 107 ldaho 878, 882, 693 P.2d I 080, 1084 (Ct. App. 1984) ("Un sworn statements 
are entitled to no probative weight in passing on motions for summary judgment."). 
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In reply the Crostons will likely argue that Ms. Peru1ing signed her affidavit via her 
Verification which was filed separately from the Penning Affidavit. However, this Verification is 
ineffective for several reasons. First nothing within either I.R.C.P. 56(c)(4) or LC. § 51-109 
mention, let alone permit, the use of I.R.C.P. 11. l verifications in place of sworn affidavits or 
declarations. Second, I.R.C.P. 11. I verifications are only allowed in pleadings, 1 and pleadings do 
not include affidavits under I.R.C.P. 7.2 Third, even if verifications were allowed as a substitute 
for affidavits the language of the Verification itself is defective. 
Concerning the third reason - deficient language - the Verification states that "Linda 
Penning ... has read the foregoing Affidavit in Opposition to Motion/or SummmyJudgment knows 
the contents thereof and verily believes the statements contained therein to be true." Verification, 
at p. 2 (emphasis added). This language is particularly problematic because there are no 
substantive statements foregoing/preceding the Verification. Rather there is citation to a 
document that appears nowhere in the docket. amely, there is no document entitled Affidavit in 
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment. 3 
While this argument may see like splitting hairs the Idaho Supreme Court recently focused 
on the exact use and meaning of the word "foregoing when used within an affidavit. In Garcia 
1 The pertinent part ofl.R.C.P. I I. I state as follows: 
" Verification of plead ings authorized or permitted under the e ru le or by law mu t be a written statement or declaration 
by a party or the party's attorney of reco rd sworn to or affirmed before an officer authori zed to take depo itions by Ru le 
28, or that otherwise complies with Idaho Code Sec tion 9-1406 and Rule 28 of these rule , that the affiant believes the 
facts stated to be true, unle s a verificatio n upon personal knowledge is required." 
2 l.R.C.P. 7 deLine pleadings a '( I) a complaint ; (2) an answer to a complaint; (3) an an wer to a counterclaim de: ignat d as a 
counterclaim· (4) an answer to a cross claim; (5) a third paity complaint· (6) an answer lo a third party complaint; and (7) if the 
court orders one, a reply to an answer."' 
Although it is probable that Ms. Penning wa attempting to refer to the "Affidavit of Linda D. Penning in Opposition of Plaintiffs · 
Motion/or Summary Judgment," the fac t rema ins that the document referred to in the Verification does not exist. Wh en dealing 
with sworn statements made under the penalty of perjury, clai·ity and conc i e language is paramount if not required. O therwise, 
the a.ffiant is afforded the opportunity to hedge her tatements wi th ambiguity. 
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v. Absolute Bail Bonds, LLC. , et al., Docket No. 43315-2015 (Slip. Op. December 21, 2016),4 the 
plaintiff filed an affidavit which certified and declared "under penalty of perjury pursuant to the 
law of the state ofldaho that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of [plaintiffs] knowledge." 
Id. at pp. 3-4 . This introductory statement was then followed by numerous statements intended to 
be the substance of the document. Id. However, because plaintiff specifically used the word 
"foregoing," the fdaho Supreme Court refused to consider any statements which followed 
plaintiffs introductory paragraph. Id. at p. 4. Garcia is directly on point here. 
As in Garcia, the Verification signed by Ms. Pennjng contains no statements which precede 
her signature. Instead, the Verification is a self-contained document, filed separately with its own 
case caption. Accordingly, it cannot be used to cure the fact that the Penning Affidavit is unsigned. 
Thus, the Court should strike the Penning Affidavit for being unsworn and unsigned. 
b. The Penning Affidavit does not satisfy the affidavit requirements. 
Even if the Comt were to find that the Penning Affidavit was signed by merit of the 
Verification, there is yet another fundamental flaw which still renders the Penning Affidavit as 
inadmissible. Specifically nowhere within the Penning Affidavit does Ms. Penning state that its 
contents or statements were made by her personal knowledge. However, this statement is 
expressly required by I.R.C.P. Rule 56(c)(4) ("[a]n affidavit used to support or oppose a motion 
must be made on personal knowledge"). Because the Penning Affidavit fails to include this key 
language, the Court should strike it entirely. 
Finally the jurat at the end of the Verification does not meet the requirements ofl.C. § 51-
109. As was the case in Evans v. Twin Falls County, Ms. Penning s signatur was "merely 
4 A copy of this decision is attached hereto as Appendix A. 
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acknowledged by a notary public" as opposed to being a certification defined and described I.C. § 
51-109. 118 Idaho at 218-219, n. 5, 796 P.2d at 95-96. Because the Penning Affidavit is not 
subscribed and sworn to as an oath or affirmation in accordance with LC. § 51-109, the Court 
should strike it. 
3. In the alternative, the Court should disregard and strike all the Exhibits to the 
Penning Affidavit as they lack proper foundation, contain inadmissible hearsay, and 
violate I.R.C.P. 37(c)(l). 
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Court does not strike the entire Penning 
Affidavit for being defective on its face, the Court should nevertheless disregard and strike all of 
the exhibits appended to it for the fo llowing reasons: Exhibits A and B to the Penning Affidavit 
lack proper foundation and authenticity to be admitted to evidence; Exhibit C contains 
inadmissible hearsay and constitutes a violation of I.R.C.P. 37( c)(] ); and Exhibit D also contains 
inadmissible hearsay. For these reasons, Plaintiffs request that the Court strike these exhibits from 
the Penning Affidavit. 
As discussed above, I.R.C.P. 56(c)(4) requires an affidavit submitted to support or oppose 
a motion for summary judgment must, inter alia, "set out facts that would be admissible in 
evidence." In other words, "[ e ]vidence presented in support of or in opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment must be admissible." Nield, 156 Idaho at 814, 332 P.3d at 726 (citation 
omitted). All the exhibits appended to the Penning Affidavit have evidentiary issues which render 
them inadmissible. 
Turning first to Exhibit A and Exhibit B of the Penning Affidavit, the Court should strike 
these docwnents fo r lacking proper foundation and authenticity. Exhibit A is described as a "tract 
description between the plaintiffs and the defendants," whi le Exhibit B is described as a "sketch 
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of the original survey between the parties." Penning Affidavit, p. 2. However, nowhere within the 
Pem1ing Affidavit does Ms. Penning describe where she obtained these exhibits or where she 
derived the information for her hand-written notations. 5 Although these exhibits appear to be 
pmtions of a record of survey of the properties belonging to Plaintiffs and the Crostons there is 
no way to be sure. Specifically, they are neither self-authenticating pursuant to I.R.E. 902 nor are 
they properly identified pursuant to I.R.E. 901. Thus M . Penning failed to establish the requisite 
foundation to sponsor Exhibit A and Exhibit B. Moreover, these docwnents lack the requi.site 
authentication required the LR.Es 901 and 902. Accordingly, Plaintiffs request that Exhibit A and 
Exhibit B of the Penning Affidavit be stricken. 
Next, Exhibit C of the Penning Affidavit is equally inadmissible as evidence because it 
contains hearsay and hearsay within hearsay. Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted." I.RE. 80l(c). In general, hearsay is not admissible as evidence w1less specifically 
provided for within the rules of evidence. I.RE. 802. Here, Exhibit C to the Penning Affidavit is 
identified as a statement dated September 27 2015, made by Linda Penning "when putting up a 
temporary fence. " Penning Affidavit, at ~ 5. This document constitutes inadmissible hearsay. 
Furthermore, the statement contains hearsay within hearsay pursuant to I.R.E. 805 insofar as it 
purports to record statements made by Plaintiff and other third parties. Because Exhibit C is clearly 
hearsay, the Court should strike it as inadmissible. 
In addition to constituting hearsay the inclusion of Exhibit C in the Penning Affidavit is 
5 Indeed, their inclu ion into the Penning Affidavit is ambiguous at best, given that they are never citied to with in the Cro tons' 
Opposition. 
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inadmissible pursuant to I.R.C.P. 37(c)(l ). This rule states as fo llows: 
If a pai1y fails to supplement discovery responses wh n 
required . . . the party is not allowed to use that information .. . on a 
motion, at a hearing, or at a trial , unless the failure was substantially 
justified or is harmless. 
Here the Crostons never identified nor produced Exhibit C to Plaintiffs despite numerous 
applicable discovery requests. Declaration qf W Forrest Fischer in Support of Plaintiff's Motion 
to Strike, p. 2. Moreover, given that Exhibit C was allegedly created by Ms. Penning on September 
27, 2015, the Crostons cannot argue that this document was newly discovered evidence. Even it 
if were, the Crostons have failed to seasonably supplement their discovery responses in violation 
of I.R.C.P. 26(e). Accordingly, Exhibit C to the Penning Affidavit should be stricken. 
Finally Exhibit D to the Penning Affidavit should be stricken as it also constitutes 
inadmissible hearsay and hearsay within hearsay. Per Ms. Penning, Exhibit D "is the police repo11 
of 9/21/15 containing the statements of the plaintiffs." Penning Affidavit at p. 1. However 
Exhibit Dis both hearsay and contains hearsay within hearsay. In addition to these rnles, I.R.E. 
803(8)(A) fm1her states that " investigative rep011s by police and other law enforcement personnel, 
except when offered by an accused in a criminal case" are not within the public records and reports 
exception to the hearsay rule. As such, even police reports are inadmissible hearsay and therefore 
ai·e precluded from being appended to affidavits. See Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266 274, 
281 P.3d 103 , 11 1 (201 2) (affirming district court's grant of motion to strike police report from 
evidence). For these reasons the Court should also strike Exhibit D to the Penning Affidavit. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Penning Affidavit is fundamentally flawed for numerous reasons. Foremost of these 
reasons is that it does not meet the express requirements of affidavits under the comt rnles and 
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state law. Furthermore, the Penning Affidavit was not signed by Ms. Penning, but Counsel for the 
Crostons. These facts alone render the Penning Affidavit inadmissible in its entirety and the Court 
should strike it on these grounds. Nevertheless, if the Court allows the Penning Affidavit to be 
admitted, it should at the very minimum, strike Exhibits A, B, C, and D of the Penning Affidavit 
because they do not comply with the Idaho Rules of Evidence. 
Respectfully submitted this l \~ day of January, 2017. 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in 
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the \ \ ~ day of January, 2017, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct postage 
thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with IRCP 5(b ). 
Persons Served: 
Robin D. Dunn 
Dunn Law Offices, PLLC 
4 77 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby ID 83422 
Fax: (208) 745-8160 
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Supreme Court of Idaho. 
JOSE LUIS GARCIA and MARIA 
GARCIA, Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
V . 
ABSOLUTE BAIL BONDS, LLC., and 
WALTERALMARAZ, Defendants. 
Docket No. 43315-2015 
I 
Filed: December 21, 2016 
Appeal from the D istrict Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for Canyon County. 
Hon . George A . Southworth, District Judge. 
The j udgment of the di trict court is affirmed. 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
Richard L . H ammond Hammond Law Office, Caldwell, 
submitted a brief on behalf of the appellant. 
The respondent did not submit a brief on appeal. 
Opinion 
EISMANN, Justice. 
*l Thi is an appeal out of Canyon County from a 
judgment against a bail bondsman who revoked a bail 
bond for an illegal a lien at the request of an agent of 
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 
The district court awarded damages in the amoun t of the 
bail bond premiums and the appellants contend on appea l 
that they were entitled to additional damages. We affirm 
the judgmen t of the district court. 
I. 
Factual Background. 
On October 14 or 15, 2012, Jose Lui Garcia was arrested 
in Canyon County for d1iving under the influence of 
alcohol ("DUI"), and he was a lso a rrested under an 
outstanding warrant is ued in another case in which he 
was charged with petit theft and attempted petit theft. 
Mr. Garcia was thirty-one years of age and had entered 
the United States illegally when he was an ad ult . At 
about 8:30 a.m. on October 15 , 2012, Maria Garcia 
his mother paid Walter Almaraz, a bail bondsman, 
to obtain bail bonds for the two cases. Mr. Almaraz 
was an agent of Absolute Bail Bonds, LLC. Prior to 
making the payment, Ms. Garcia informed Mr. Almaraz 
that Jose Garcia was an illegal alien and that she 
wanted him bonded out q uickly before United States 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") placed 
a " hold" (immigration detainer) on him. Mr. Almaraz 
posted the bail bond in the petit theft case on October 
15, 2012, and he posted the bail bond in the DUI case on 
the next day . H e then received a telephone call from an 
ICE agent who told him to revoke the ba il bonds, and Mr. 
Almaraz did so before Jose Garcia was released from jail. 
On October 17, 2012, ICE placed an immigration hold on 
him. 
Jose Garcia pied guilty to the petit theft charge on Janua ry 
22, 2013. and he was sentenced the following week. The 
DUI charge \.Vas amended to driving under the influence 
of alcoho l with an excessive alcohol concentration of0.20 . 
H e pied guilty to that charge on December 21, 2012, and 
on March 18, 2013, he was sentenced . Upon completing 
the unsuspended portions of bis jail sentences for petit 
theft and DUI, he was released from jai l into the custody 
of ICE on May 3 2013 , and deported to Mexico. 
On May 2, 2013 , Jose Garcia and Ms. Garcia filed this 
action against M r. Almaraz and Absolute Bai l Bonds, 
LLC seeking to recover damages for breach of contract, 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
breach of fi duciary duty, failure to provide records and 
an accounting, and bad fai th breach of contract. The 
D efendants were served with the summons and complaint 
and a request for admissions, but they did not appear in 
this action . On July 19, 2013, the Plaintiffs filed a mot ion 
for entry of default against them, and on D ecember 13, 
2013, the court entered their default. On November 12, 
2013, the Defendants filed the affidav it of M . Garcia 
seeking a default judgment again t the Defendants. 
The district court set the case for a hearing for en try of 
a default judgment on April 23, 2015. On the morning of 
the hearing, the Plai ntiffs filed a motion seeking to amend 
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their complaint to add a claim for punitive damages and 
a supporting affidav it of counse1. At the hearing, the 
court questioned the Plaintiffs' counsel about the claimed 
damages and took under advisement the motion to amend 
the complaint. On April 27, 2015 the Plaintiffs filed 
two additional affidavits seeking punitive damages and a 
judgment. 
*2 On May 6, 2015, the district court issued its 
memorandum decision address ing the motion to amend 
and the amount of damages. The court denied the motion 
to amend the complaint to add a prayer for punitive 
damages and it awarded damages of $3 .300.00, which it 
stated was the total amount of the premiums on the bail 
bonds. 1 The court found that the consequential damages 
claimed were not caused by the conduct oft he Defendants. 
The court also awarded the Plaintiffs $2,500.00 in attorney 
fees, which is the ctmount requested in the complaint if 
judgment was entered by default. On May 6, 2015, the 
court entered a judgment awarding the Plaintiffs damages 
against the Defendants in the sum of $5 800, and the 
Plaintiffs timely appealed. 
ll. 
Did the District Court Err in 
Denying the Motion for Recusa l? 
"A motion to disqualify for cause must be accompanied 
by an affidavit of the party or the party's attorney 
stating the specific grounds upon which disqualification 
is based and the facts relied upon in support of the 
motion ." I.R.C.P 40(6)(2). ''An affidavit includes a 
written certification or declaration made as provided in 
Idaho Code section 9-1406." I. R .C.P. 2.7. Idaho Code 
section 9-1406 permit.s an affidavit to be a dated and 
signed "unsworn cert ification or declaration in writing, 
which is subscribed by such person and i in substantially 
the following form: 'I certify (or declare) under penalty 
of pe1jury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that 
the foregoing is true and correct. '' On December 5, 2013, 
the Plaintiffs filed a motion to recuse the district court for 
cause. The only part of the motion that would qualify as 
an affidavit under the sta tute was the initial paragraph, 
which began: 
The Plaintiff 111 the above entitled action , by and 
through hi a ttorney of record , Richard Hammond, 
hereby respectfully requc. t this Honorable Court to 
recuse himself, be removed under IRCP 40(d)(2) or 
reconsider its position stated in chambers to deny 
consequential damages to a person due to his or her 
immigration status. AFFIDAVIT 
Richard L. Hammond certifies and declares under 
penalty of pe1jury pursuant to the law of the state of 
Idaho that the foregoing is true and correct to the best 
or my personal knowledge: 
(Emphasis added.) 
The word foregoing means ' previously stated written 
or occurring; preceding." http://www.dictionary.com/ 
browse/foregoing (accessed : October 20, 2016). What was 
previously stated was simply the request that the court 
either recuse itself or "reconsider its position stated in 
chambers to deny consequential damages to a person due 
to his or her immigration status. ' There is no statement as 
to the words said or the context in which they were aid, 
nor was there a transcript of what was said. It is necessary 
that the affidavit . upporting the motion must state " the 
specific grounds upo n which di squa lification is based and 
the facts relied upon in support of the motion" rather 
than merely conclusory allegations. Without stating the 
facts rel ied upon, the motion could simply be based upon a 
misunderstanding or mischaracterization of what was said 
or done. For example the Plaintiffs' motion contained 
seven pages of argument, from which it appears that the 
objection was to the district court questioning whether 
the asserted consequential damages were caused by the 
Defendant or by the fact that Mr. Garcia wa subject to 
deportation because he had entered this country illegally. 
Becau e the Plaintiff ' motion was not supported by an 
affidavit that complied with Rule 40(6)(2) , we need not 
address on appeal whether the district court erred in 
denying the motion. 
III. 
Did the District Court Sua Sponte Rule That 
Consequential Damages Were Not All owed 
Due To The Immigration Status Of The Party'? 
*3 The Plaintiff assert that The District Court erred 
as a matter of law when the Court sua ponte ruled 
that consequential damages were not allowed due to the 
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immigration status of the party. " They also allege, "The 
District Court's sua sponte action to raise an affirmative 
defense on behalf of the R esponden ts and order that 
the Appell ants are not eligible for consequential damages 
due to the immigration status is improper, violates due 
process and Equal P rotections [sic] laws, is not supported 
by law and should be overturned ." They contend that 
"[t]he District Court was not given adequate notice or 
opportunity to respond to prevent the orders herein" and 
"[~urther, the decision cannot be based on arguments or 
facts not before the court." 
The Plainti ffs ' argument ind icates a lack of understanding 
regarding the meaning of the words sua sponte . They mean 
"[w]ithout p rompting or suggestion; on its own motion. " 
Black's Law Dictionary 1437 (7th ed. 1999). Ruling that 
the Plaintiffs failed to prove that all of the damages they 
claimed were caused by the Defendants is not making a 
sua sponte ruling. 
When default has been entered against a defendant and the 
claim is for a sum certain or a sum that can be made certain 
by computation, the party seeking a default judgment 
must present an affi davit showing the amount due and the 
method of computation of tha t amount. I.R.C.P. 55(b) 
(1 ) . In this <.:ase, Lht: Plaintiffs' complaint did not a llege 
the amount of damages claimed for the various claims 
alleged. In their complaint , the Plaintiffs alleged that 
the Defendants "ca used Plaintiffs damages in an amount 
established in trial including but not limited to over six 
months of incarceration, loss of wages, loss of service, loss 
of companionship, etc. " They then alleged: 
18. There are certain elements of damages provided by 
law that P laintiffs are enti tled to have the jury consider 
in determining the sum of money that will fairly and 
reasonably compensate him for his damages caused 
by the acts of the Defendants and those elements of 
damage include, bu t are not linuted to, the following, 
both up to the time of trial and in the future : 
a. Expenses and damages stemming from Plaint iffs 
failure to be released from custody; 
b. Damages suffered by Plaintiff as a result of being 
incarcerated for an extended period of time including, 
lost earnings and lost earning capacity sustained and to 
be sustained by Plaintiff and loss of liberty . 
c. The reasonable amount necessary to reimburse 
Plaintiff for time spen t on additional tasks necessitated 
by tlus injury, such as seeking further legal help; 
d . Recovery for damages to property and/or lost 
property; 
e. Reasonable attorney fees; and 
f. The costs of prosecuting and presenting the evidence 
in this case . 
g. The other natural and foreseeable consequences 
caused by fail ure to ensure that the Plaintiff Jose 
Luis Garcia's bond was posted and not revoked and 
spending the subsequent time in custody. 
19. The above paragraphs are included in each cause of 
action below. 
The prayer did allege that the damages did not exceed 
$35,000 in order to comply with Idaho Code section 
12-120(1), wluch provides tlrnt " in any action where the 
amount pleaded is thirty-five thousand dollars ($35,000) 
or less, there shall be taxed and allowed to the prevai ling 
party, as part of the costs of the action, a reasonable 
amount to be fixed by the court as attorney's fees." 
Because the complaint did not allege a sum certain or 
a sum tha t could be made certain by calculation, the 
Plaintiffs were required to apply to the district court for 
a default judgment. I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2). They did so, and 
the district court could then "conduct hearings or make 
referra ls when, to enter or effectuate judgment, it needs 
to: (A) conduct an accounting; (B) determine the amount 
of damages; (C) establish the truth of any a llega tion by 
evidence; or (D) investigate any other matter. " I.R .C.P. 
55(b)(2). T he purpose of the hearing is not simply for 
the cour t to rubber stamp the damages asserted by the 
Plaintiffs . 
*4 On November 12, 2013, the Pla intiffs filed a 
document titled "Affidavit for Default Judgment. " It 
began, "MARIA GARCIA certifies and declare under 
penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the state ofidaho 
that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my 
personal knowledge ." The only writing tha t was foregoing 
was the caption of the document. There were assertions of 
fact following the declaration, but the declaration did not 
apply to them by its terms. 
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On April 27, 20 15, the Plaintiffs filed a document titled 
" Another Affidavit of Maria Garcia re Punitive Damages 
and Judgment. " The second paragraph of that document 
stated, "MARIA GARCIA certifies and declare under 
penalty of pe1jury pursuant to the law of the state of 
Idaho that the foregoing is true and correct to the best 
of my personal knowledge. ' The only writing that was 
foregoing was the caption and the statement, "Comes now 
the Plai ntiffs and submi t this Another Affidavit of Maria 
Garcia in Support of the Motions filed herein including 
the Motion to Amend the Complaint to include Punitive 
Damages and in support of the Damages sustained." 
There were assertions of fact following the declaration, 
but the declaration did not apply to them by its terms. 
On April 28, 2015, the Plaintiffs filed a document titled 
'Affidavit of Dulce I. Garcia re Punitive Damages and 
Judgment.' The second paragraph of the document 
began, "DULCE I. GARCIA certifies and declare under 
penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the state of 
Idaho that the foregoing is true and correct to the best 
of my personal knowledge.'' The on ly writing that was 
foregoing was the caption and the statement, "Comes 
now the Plaintiffs and submit this Affidavit of Dulce I. 
Gar1,;ia in Supporl or the Motions filed herein including 
the Motion to Amend the Complaint to include Punitive 
Damages and in support of the Damages sustained. 
There were assertions of fact following the declaration 
but the declaration did not apply lo them by its terms. 
Thus, the Plaintiffs did not submit any affidavits ett.ing 
forth the damages claimed. The Plaintiffs' assertions, 
unsupported by any affidavits, were that they were entit led 
to: $1 300.00 for the premiums for the two bail bonds; Jose 
Garcia's Jost wages in the amount of 9 .50 per hour for 45 
hours per week; Ms. Garcia's lost wages for approximately 
20 day of work at $9.00 per hour and nine hours per day; 
Jose Garcia's loss of his trailer because Ms. Garcia could 
not pay the fees due to the money paid to the Defendant ; 
Jose Garcia's Joss of h.is car because Ms. Garcia sold it 
to hire an attorney, her suffering deep depression due to 
the loss of her son while he was in jail and after he was 
deported; and an additional ten days of lost work ror Ms. 
Garcia because she had gone to the border twice seeking to 
have ICE permit Mr. Garcia to come back into the United 
States. 
In thi case, the district court had to determine the 
amount of damages that the Plaintiffs were entitled to 
recover. Walter Almaraz, the bail agent may have been 
liable for the return of the premium . I.C. § 41-1044(1). 
Consequential damages recoverable for breach of contract 
must be those which 'were reasonably foreseeable and 
within the contemplation of the parties at the time they 
made the contract. ' Suitts 11. Firs1 Sec. Bank of Idaho, 
N.A., 110 Idaho 15, 22, 713 P .2d 1374, 1381 {1985). 
The Plaintiffs did not present the bail contract to the 
district court. With respect to their consequential damages 
claimed, they had the burden of showing not only that they 
were within the contemplation of the parties at the time 
of contracting, but also that the claimed damages were 
caused by the breach of contract. O'Shea v. High Mark 
Dev., LLC, 153 Idaho 119, 129-30, 280 P.3d 146, 156-57 
(2012). 
*5 The Plaintiffs contend that the district court ruled 
that , as a matter of law, " that consequential damages 
were not allowed due to the immigration status of the 
party. That assertion mi characterizes the court's ruling. 
The district court found that they had failed to prove that 
the claimed consequential damages were caused by the 
Defendants. Rather, the court found that they were caused 
by the immigration hold by ICE due to Mr. Garcia's illegal 
entry into the United States. 
As a matter of public policy, a person is not liable for 
damages allegedly caused by failing to enable the illegal 
alien to evade deportation. Allowing the recovery of such 
damages would be analogous to permitting recovery for 
breaching an illegal contract. This Court "has the duty to 
rai e the issue of illegality sua sponte. Trees v. Kersey, 138 
Idaho 3 6, 56 P.3d 765 768 (2002) . ' Whether a contract 
is illegal is a question of law for the court to determine 
from all the facts and circumstances of each case. An 
illegal contract is one that rests on illegal consideration 
consisting of any act or forbearan e which is contrary to 
law or public policy.' Id. A contract to enable an illegal 
alien to evade deporta tion would be contrary to public 
policy. For the same reason that such a contract would 
be unenforceable, damages allegedly resulting from failing 
to enable an illegal alien to evade deportation are not 
recoverable. The Plai ntiffs have not shown that the di tr ict 
court erred in failing to award more damages. 
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IV. 
Did the District Court Err in Failing to Award 
Damage under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act? 
In their third cause of action, the Plaintiffs a lleged 
that the revocation of the bail bonds constitu ted an 
unconscionable method, ac t, or practice p ursuant to 
Idaho ode section 48-603C, which is part of the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act. They contend on appeal that 
the district court erred in fail ing to award damages under 
that Act. In their affidavits submitted in upport of a 
default judgment , they did not set forth any claimed 
damages under that Act, nor did they even mention the 
Act. ln order to obtain damages in a default judgment, 
the Plain tiff: had the burden of presenting their claimed 
damages to the district court. The court is not required to 
go through the compla in t and arbitrarily pick amounts to 
award under the various claims a lleged . 
V. 
Did the District Court Err in Denying the 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend their Complafot 
to Add a Claim for Punitive Damages'! 
On Apr il 23, 20 15, after default was entered. the Plaintiffs 
filed a motion to amend their complain t to add a cla im for 
punitive damages. Id aho Code section 6-1604(1) permi ts 
the awa rding of punitive damages if the party seeking 
such damages ' prove[s] by clear and convincing evidence 
oppres ive, fraudu lent, malicious or outrageous conduct 
by the party against whom the claim for punit ive damages 
is asserted.' When a party moves to amend a plead ing to 
include a prayer for punitive damages, "[t]he court shall 
allow the motion to amend the pleadings if, after we ighing 
the evidence presented , the court concludes that, the 
moving par ty has e ta blished at such hearing area onable 
likelihood of proving facts at trial sufficient to support an 
award of puni tive damage ." Id. 
"A trial court's ruling on a motion to amend a complaint 
to add a claim fo r puni tive damages is reviewed for an 
abu e of discretion ." Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. and 
Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299, 311, 233 P. 3d 1221, 1233 
(2010). 'To determine whether a trial court ha abu ed 
its discretion , this Court considers whether it correctly 
perceived the issue as discretionary, whether it acted 
within the boundaries o f its d iscretion and consistently 
with applicable lega l standards and whether it reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason ." Reed v. Reed, 137 Idaho 
53, 57, 44 P .3d ll08, 1112 (2ooi). 
*6 The Plaintiffs submitted three affidavits in support of 
their motion to amend their complai nt to include a prayer 
for punitive d amages. The Affidavit of Counsel to Include 
Punitive D amage began, "Richard L. H ammond certify 
and declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law 
of the state of Idaho that the foregoing i true and correct 
to the best ofmy personal knowledge." The only foregoing 
writing was the caption of the document. Likewise, the 
other affidavits, discussed above, did not include any facts 
within the scope of the declarations. 
The Plain tiff did serve requests for admissions on the 
Defendants, which went unanswered and were therefore 
deemed admitted . I.R .C.P . 36(a)(4). The relevant ma tters 
deemed admitted included that Mr. Almaraz revoked Mr. 
G arcia's bonds "because the ICE agent advised him to 
revoke the bond" and tha t Mr. Almaraz ''revoked the 
one or more bond(s) bond [sic] for Jose Luis Garcia 
1.kspi te previously knowing of our client's immigration 
problems." 
The Plaintiffs have not shown that the d istrict court 
abused its discretion in denying their motion to amend 
their complaint to include a prayer for punitive damages. 
Acceding to the command of an ICE agent so tha t Mr. 
Garcia could not evade depor ta tion did not constitute 
oppressive, fraudulent, malicious or outrageous conduct. 
Ill. 
Are the Plaintiffs Entitled to an 
Award of Attorney Fee on Appeal'! 
The Plaintiffs request an award of attorney fees on appea l 
pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-120(1). Attorney fees 
are only awardable under that tatute to the prevailing 
pa rty. Because the P laintiffs are not the prevai ling party 
on appea l, they are not entitled to an award of attorney 
fees under that statute. 
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JOSE LUIS GARCIA and MARIA l CIA, Plaintiffs-Appellants, ... , --- P.3d ---- (20h 
IV. affirm the district court based on the fact that the plaintiffs 
failed to adeq uately establish the terms of any contract 
between them and the defendants. The ba.i l contract i not 
Conclusion. 
We affirm the judgment of the district court. 
Justices W. JONES and HORTON CONCUR. 
Justice BURDICK CONCURS. 
Chief Justice J. JONES, concurring in the result. 
I concur in the result of the Court's opinion. My 
rese rvations abou t fully concurring are: ( I) my preference 
would be to refer to Mr. Garcia as an ' undocumented 
alien 'which migbl be an exercise in political correctness 
but not unwarranted given the charged atmosphere on 
immigran ts that currently exists in the country; (2) I would 
forego the discussion of the declaration/affidavi ts because, 
although they were arranged awkwardly, they are largely 
irrelevant to the determination of the contract claim at 
issue here; and (3) I see no need to base the opinion on 
the ground of illegality , which could cause some confusion 
amongst members of the Bar in future cases. I would 
Footnotes 
contained in the record. There is no indica tion as to how 
the oral contract alleged by the plaintiffs might have been 
affected by the bail contract. The terms of the ora.l contract 
are pre ented with less than clarity. Further, the district 
court observed: 
I can understand a cause of action to refund the 
bond premium and attorney's fees and costs for that 
bond premium. I don't know that this Court or any 
court in the United States could enter an order for 
consequential damages because an undocumented alien 
who an immigration hold was placed on by ICE lost his 
job. That's not the bondsman's fault for doing that.. 
Thus, the district court properly held that any claimed 
breach of the alleged oral contract was not the proximate 
cause of any consequential damages clain1ed by the 
plaintiff . 
All Citations 
--- P .3d----, 2016 WL 7385058 
1 According to the unsworn statements made by Ms. Garcia, she paid an $800.00 premium for the bail bond in the DUI 
case and a $500.00 prem ium for the bail bond in the petit theft case. In its decision determining the amount of damages, 
the district court wrote, "The evidence shows the cost of those bonds to Plaintiffs was $3,300.00." There were no sworn 
or unsworn statements supporting that find ing. 
End of Document © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to orig inal U.S. Government Works . 
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Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile (208) 523-9518 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH WDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. A 
FISCHER, Trustees of the William and Ann 
Fischer Revocable Trust, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. 
CROSTON, husband and wife; 
AND ALL UNKNOWN OWNERS AND/OR 
OTHER PERSONS OR ENTITIES 
CLAIMING ANY INTEREST IN THE 
FOLLOWING DESCRIBED REAL 
PROPERTY: 
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 4, 
Block 12, of the Original Ammon Townsite, 
Bom1eville County, Idaho; running thence N. 
88°33'58" W. 330.00 feet to the Northwest 
corner of said Lot 4; thence S. 00°00'21 "W. 
along the West line of said Lot 4 a distance of 
8.99 feet to an existing fence line; thence S. 
89°41 '36" E. along said existing fence line 
329.90 feet to a point on the East line of said 
Lot 4; thence N. 00°00'21" E. along said ast 
line 2.50 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING 
Defendants. 
DECLARATION OF W. FORREST FISCHER IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIK - l 
Case No. CV-2016-2894 
DECLARATION OF W. FORREST 
FISCHER IN SUPPORT OF 
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JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. 
CROSTON, husband and wife~ 
Counter Claimants, 
vs. 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FIS CHER, Trustees of the William and Ann 
Fischer Revocable Trust, 
Counter Defendants. 
I, W. Forrest Fischer pursuant to Idaho Code § 9-1406 and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
2.7 declare under the penalty of pe1jmy as follows: 
1. I am an attorney with Holden, Kidwell Hahn & Crapo P.L.L.C., the firm 
representing Plaintiffs in this matter. 
2. I am familiar with these proceedings, and with the discovery conducted between 
the parties pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, this declaration is made 
based on my personal knowledge. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of excerpts of Plaintiffs 
First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for Production, and Requests for Admission ("Plaintiffs' 
First Discovery Requests"), which was served on counsel for James F. Croston and Marjorie C. 
Croston (the "Crostons") on September 7 2016. 
4. Specifically, Plaintiffs ' Fi rst Discovery Requests include the following : 
a. Interrogatory No. 16 which asked the Crostons to "identify any and all 
documents or other tangible which has not already been identified within your 
answers to these Interrogatories which support or tend to support the denials, 
assertions and/or affirmative defenses set fo1th in Defendants ' Answer in this 
DEC LARATION OP W. FORREST Fl CHER IN 
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matter," ; along with Request for Production No. I 2, which asked the Crostons 
to "produce all documents identified in your answer to Interrogatory No. 16." 
b. Interrogatory No. 17, which asked the Crostons to " identify in full and complete 
detail any statements, affidavits, photographs, drawings, illustrations, written 
documents, electronic messages, diaries, calendars, notes, journals, tape 
recordings and/or video tapes of which you are aware that pe11ain to any issues 
in this litigation"; along with Request for Production No. 13, which asked the 
Crostons to "produce all documents identified in your answer to Interrogatory 
No. 17." 
c. Request for Production No. 17, which asked the Crostons to "produce any and 
all docwnents (as identified above) which suppo1t your allegation that Plaintiffs 
and Defendants entered into an agreement as to the construction, location, and 
cost of the New Fence." 
d. Request for Production No. 18, which asked the Crostons to "produce each and 
every document not already produced, which suppo11s or tends to support the 
denials, assertions and/or affirmative defenses set fo11h in Defendants' Answer 
in this matter." 
5. The document, attached as Exhibit C to the document ti tled "Affidavit of Lind D. 
Penning in Opposition of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment" (the "Penning Statement") 
is responsive to the above-cited and provided discovery requests, and should have been produced 
in response to P laintiffs' Discovery Requests. 
6. The Crostons have never produced the Penning Statement in discovery, nor have 
the Crostons supplemented their responses to Plaintiffs' First Discovery Requests. 
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I certify (or declare) under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State ofldaho that 
the foregoing is true and correct. 
Date 
\\Law\data\ WPDAT A\ WFF\186 I I (Fischer Property)\Pleadings\6 - Motion to Strike\Decl. of W. Forrest Fischer.docx 
DECLARATION OF W. FORREST FISCHER IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS ' MOTION TO STRIKE - 4 
225
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofidaho, with my office in 
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the \ \ ~ day of January, 2017, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct postage 
thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with IRCP 5(b). 
Persons Served: 
Robin D. Dunn 
Dunn Law Offices, PLLC 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby ID 83422 
Fax: (208) 745-8160 
DECLARATION OF W. FORREST FISCHER IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAlNTIFFS' MOTTON TO STRlKE - 5 
Method of Service: 
• Mail 
~ Fax 
• Hand Delivery 
• Other: 
- ------
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Charles A. Homer, Esq., ISB #1630 
W. Fon-est Fischer, ISB #10009 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Ddve, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Fa11s, ID 83405 
Telephone (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Plain tiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN FISCHER, 
Trustees of the William and Ann Fischer Revocable 
Trust, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORlE C. 
CROSTON, husband and wife; 
AND ALL UNKNOWN O\VNERS AND/OR 
OTHER PERSONS OR ENTITIES CLAIMING 
ANY INTEREST IN THE FOLLOWING 
DESCRIBED REAL PROPERTY: 
Beginning at the Northeast comer of Lot 4, Block 
12, of the Original Ammon Townsite, Bonneville 
County, Idaho; running thence N. 88°33'58" W. 
330.00 feet to the Northwest comer of said Lot 4; 
thence S. 00°00'21 "W. along the West line of said 
Lot 4 a distance of 8.99 feet to an existing fence 
line; thence S. 89°41 '36" E. along said existing 
fence line 329.90 feet to a point on the East line of 
said Lot 4; thence N. 00°00'21" E. along said East 
line 2.50 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION, AND REQUESTS 
FOR ADMISSION · 1 
Case No. CV-2016-2894 
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR 
PRODUCTION, AND REQUESTS FOR 
ADMISSION 
EXHIBIT A - P. 001 
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JA.t\1ES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. 
CROSTON, husband and wife; 
Counterclaimants, 
vs. 
WJLLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN FISCHER, 
Trustees of the William and Ann Fischer Revocable 
Trust, 
Counter Def end.ants. 
TO: DEFENDANTS JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. CROSTON, and 
their counsel of recorclt ROBIN D. DUNN ESQ. 
Plaintiffs, WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN FISCHER, Tnistees of the William and 
Ann Fischer Revocable Trust, ("Plaintiffs") submit the following written Interrogatories, Requests 
for Production, and Requests for Admission to Defendants JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE 
C. CROSTON, husband and wife (''Defendants"). Pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
(IR.C.P.) Rules 26, 33, and 34, Defendants are required to answer the following Interrogatories and 
Requests for Production of Documents separately and fully, under oath, in writing, within thirty (30) 
days from the date of service, except that a defendant may serve answers within forty ( 40) days of 
the service of the summons and complaint upon that defendant. 
Each Inte1Togatory and Request for Production of Documents is required to be answered on 
the basis of Defendants' entire knowledge. Defendants must furnish all requested inf01mation that 
is known by, possessed by, or available to them or any of their attorneys, consultants, 
representatives or other agents. 
If any of the following Interrogatories or Requests for Production of Documents cannot be 
answered fully, answer to the extent possible, justifying the reason for your inability to answer the 
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION, AND REQUESTS 
FOR ADtvIISSION - 2 
EXHIBIT A- P. 002 
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remainder, and stating whatever information or knowledge you have concerning the unanswered 
portions. If yam answer is qualified in any particular, set forth the details of such qualification. If 
you object to an Interrogatory, Request for Production of Documents, or any subpa11 thereof as 
calling for infonnation that is beyond the scope of discovery, you must, nevertheless, answer the 
Inten-ogatory, Request for Production of Documents, or subpart thereof to the extent that it is not 
objectionable. 
These Interrogatori.es, Requests for Production, and Requests for Admission are intended 
to be continuing in nature. Any information that may be discovered by you subsequent to the 
service of your answers shall be brought to the attention of the propounding party in 
supplemental answers pmsuant to the requirements ofl.R.C.P. 26(e). 
DEFINITIONS 
With respect to these interrogatories and requests for production of documents, the 
following definitions apply: 
1. "And" or "or" means "and/or," with any word presented in the singular form 
deemed to include the plural and vice versa, where appropriate. The disjunctive shall be read as 
propounded in the conjunctive and vice versa. 
2. "Person" and/or "persons" mean natural persons, proprietorships, sole 
proprietorships, corporations, nonprofit corporations, whether public or private, public 
corporations, municipal corporations, local, state, federal or foreign government, or 
governmental agencies, political subdivisions, general or limited partnerships, business trusts, 
trusts, estates, clubs, groups, unincorporated associations, associations, or other business or 
public organizations. 
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3. "Document" is used in the broadest possible sense and means the original (or a 
copy, if the original is not available) and any non-identical copy (whether different from the 
original because of notes made on such copies or otherwise) of any wTitten, printed, typed, 
photographed, recorded or otherwise produced or reproduced communication or representation 
of any kind and description, whether comprised of letters, words, numbers, pictures, sounds or 
symbols, or any combination thereof, or inscribed by hand or by mechanical, electronic, 
magnetic, microfilm, photographic or other means, as well as phonic (such as tape recordings) or 
visual reproductions of communications, oral statements, conversations or events, and including 
material in any form including, but not limited to, any book, pamphlet, periodical, letter, 
memorandum, file, note, calendar, newspaper, magazine, statement, bill, invoice order, policy, 
telegram, correspondence, summary, receipt, opinion, investigation statement or report, schedule, 
manual, financial statement, audit, tax return, articles of incorporation, by laws, stock book, 
minute book, agreement, contract, deed, security agreement, mortgage, deed of trust, title or 
other insurance policy, report, study, record, handwritten note, map, drawing, working paper, 
chart, paper, draft, index, tape, microfilm, data sheet, computer-stored or computer-readable 
data, data processing card, computer printout, computer program, check bank statement, 
passbook, or any other written, typed, printed, photocopied, dittoed, mimeographed, recorded, 
transcribed, taped, filmed, photographic or graphic matter, all other data compilations from 
which information or communications can be obtained, however produced or reproduced, and 
any drafis or revisions of any of the foregoing. The term "document" also .includes the file and 
folder tabs associated with each such aforesaid original and/or copy, all correspondence 
transmitting such document or explanation or commenting on the contents thereof, and all 
working or supporting papers. 
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4. "Identify" or " identity," with regard to a natural person, means disclosure of his 
or her full name, present residence address, and telephone number, present or last .knov,'11 
business address and telephone number, and employment position. 
5. "Identify" or " identity," with regard to persons who are not natural persons, 
means clisclosure of '.its present or last known complete address and telephone number, including 
the area code, of its headquarters and its nearest or local office or agent. 
6. "Identify" or " identity," with regard to a document, means disclosure of the name 
of the person who prepared it, the name of the person who signed it or over whose signature it 
was issued, the name of each person to whom it was addressed or distributed, the nature and 
substance of the ·writing with sufficient particularity to enable it to be identified, the date when it 
was prepared, the date when it was signed, the physical location of it and name and address of its 
custodians, whether it will be voluntarily made available to defendants for inspection and 
copying, and whether copies are attached to your answers to these interrogatories. If any such 
document was but is no longer in yom possession or subject to your control, disclose what 
disposition was made of it and the reason for its disposition. When the identification of a 
document is requested, you may alternatively attach a copy of that document as an exhibit to 
your answers to these interrogatories. 
7. "Custodian" refers to any person having possession, custody, or control of the 
subject referred to. 
8. "Regarding" and "with regard to" mean pertinent, relevant or material to, 
evidencing, having a bearing on, or concenling, affecting, discussing, dealing with, considering 
or other¥.~se relating in any manner whatsoever to the subject of the inquiry. 
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9. "Defendants" refers to Defendants James F. Croston, Marjorie C. Croston, and 
their respective agents. 
10. "You" or "your" refers to Defendants James F. Croston, Marjorie C. Croston, and 
their respective agents. 
11. "Croston Property" refers to real property owned by Defendants which is located 
to the south of the Old Fence, commonly known as 3020 S. Western Avenue, Ammon, Idaho. 
12. "Fischer Property" refers to real property owned by Plaintiffs which is located 
north of the Old Fence, commonly known as 3000 S. Western Avenue, Ammon, Idaho. 
13. "Old Fence" refers to a post-and-wire fence which ran along the Fischer 
Property's southern boundary, dividing the Fischer Prope1ty and the Croston Property which 
existed for more than twenty years Wltil it was recently removed. 
14. "Access Road" refers to a di.rt road located immediately north of the Old Fence, 
running parallel to the Old Fence for approxin1ately 230 feet. 
15. "New Fence" refers to a new wired fence constrncted by Defendants which they 
claim follows the platted boundary line of the Croston Property. 
16. "Tract 1" refers to that certain area of real prope1ty legally described in the 
Complaint as the area located in between the Old Fence and the New Fence. 
I. 
INTERROGATORIES 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Please identify all persons who provided info1mation for 
the preparation of answers and responses to these 111terrogatories and Requests for Production of 
Documents and state the specific answer(s) and/or response(s) to which they contributed. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Please state all facts upon which you base your answer 
to parngraph 13 of the complaint. Specifically, please identify the date upon which you allege 
Plaintiffs "turned his large truck on the defendant property," and identify who witnessed this 
alleged event. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Please state all facts upon which you base your allegation 
that "a survey was completed" in respect to your answer to paragraph 20 of the Complaint. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: Please state all facts upon which you base your allegation 
that "plaintiffs had previously desired that the new fence be placed on the survey markings" as 
stated within your answer to paragraph 25 of the Complaint. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Please state all facts upon which you base your denial of 
paragraph 31 of the Complaint. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 14: Please state all facts upon which you base your denial of 
paragraph 33 of the Complaint. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 15: Please state all facts upon which you base yam allegation 
that Plaintiffs "indicated to the defendants that the survey would control" and that Plaintiffs 
"would pay one-half of the [fence] cost," as stated within your second affirmative defense. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 16: Please identify any and all documents or other tangible 
evidence which has not already been identified within your answers to these Interrogatories, 
which support or tend to suppo1t the denials, assertions and/or affirmative defenses set forth in 
Defendants' Answer in this matter. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 17: Please identify in full and complete detail any statements, 
affidavits, photographs, drawings, illustrations, written documents, electronic messages, diaries, 
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calendars, notes, journals, tape recordings and/or video tapes of which you are aware that pertain 
to any issues in this litigation. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 18: Please identify and describe in detail the factual basis for 
each affirmative defense Defendants assert in their Answer, and identify each document 
Defendants contend constitutes evidence of or provides support for each affirmative defense 
Defendants assert in this action. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 19: -Identify any infonnation that Defendants, or anyone 
acting on Defendants' behalf, have that Plaintiff, or anyone acting on Plaintiff's behalf, made 
any admission or declaration against interest in any way that would tend to support Defendants' 
version of the facts of this case. If you contend such infonnation or statements exist, please 
state: the time and place where such admission or declaration was made, the substance of the 
admission or declaration and the names, addresses, and phone numbers of all persons present 
when such admission or declaration was made. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 20: If your answers to the Requests for Admission (below) 
are anything other than unqualified admissions, please state each and every qualification and 
objections, and each and every fact and reason supporting your response, and describe each and 
every document upon which you rely or intent to rely in support of, or which forms in whole or 
in part the basis for your response. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 21: If you have withheld any document from production on 
the basis of a claim of privilege, please state the following: 
(l) identify the document, including the author, date, number of pages, 
recipient and topic; and 
(2) identify the privilege claimed. 
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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7: Please produce al l documents identified to 
support your answer to Interrogatory No. 11 . 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8: Please produce all documents identified to 
support your answer to Interrogatory No. 12. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9: Please produce all documents identified to 
support your answer to Interrogatory No. 13. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTIO NO. 10: Please produce all documents identified to 
support yom answer to Interrogatory No. 14. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11: Please produce all documents identified to 
support your answer to Interrogatory No. 15. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 12: Please produce all documents identified in 
your answer to Interrogatory No. 16. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13: Please produce all documents identified in 
your answer to Interrogatory No. 17. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTIO NO. 14: Please produce all documents identified in 
your answer to Interrogatory No. 18. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15: Please produce all documents identified in 
your answer to Interrogatory No. 19. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 16: Please produce any and all photographs, 
surveys, maps, or other documents which depict the Old Fence. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 17: Please produce any and all documents (as 
identified above) which support your allegation that Plaintiffs and Defendants entered .into an 
agreement as to the construction, location, and cost of the ew Fence. 
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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 18: Please produce each and every document 
not already produced, which supports or tends to support tl1e denials, assertions and/or 
affirmative defenses set fo1th in Defendants' Answer in this matter. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 19: Please produce any and all expe1t reports 
prepared by any expert retained by you in this matter. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 20: If you deny any of the following Requests 
for Admissions, please produce any and all docwnents on which you base your denial. 
III. 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION: 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 1: Admit that Plaintiffs and Defendants treated 
and recognized the Old Fence as the legal boundary between the Fischer Property and Croston 
Property since at least 1991 until August of 2015. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 2: Admit that no one has legally resided and 
physically occupied the structure on the Croston Property since at least 1991. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 3: Admit that the Old Fence existed at the time 
Defendants purchased tl1e Croston Prope1ty in 19 5 9. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 4: Admit that no written contract exists between 
Plaintiffs and Defendants evidencing that they were in agreement as to ownership of Tract 1, the 
location of the New Fence, and that Plaintiffs would pay Defendants one-half of the cost of 
constructing the New Fence. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 5: Admit that you received a letter in September 
2015 from Plaintiffs attorney wherein Plaintiffs assert their ownership of Tract 1. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 6: Admit iliat Plaintiffs objected to Defendants 
constructing the New Fence prior to its constrnction on September 27, 2015. 
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 7: Admit that you paid no po1tion of the survey 
conducted by Ellsworth & Associates, PLLC as identified within paragraph 20 of the Complaint. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 8: Admit that, since completing the New Fence, 
no livestock have been placed on the Croston Property. 
REQUEST F-OR ADMISSION NO. 9: Admit that you have never claimed ownership 
of or maintained Tract 1 prior to the construction of the New Fence. 
-7+ 
Dated this _l_ day of September, 2016. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in Idaho 
Falls, Idaho, and that on the~ day of September, 2016, I served an original of the foregoing 
document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct postage thereon, or by 
causing the dame to be delivered in accordance \Vi.th Rule 5(b), I.R.C.P. 
Document Served: Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for 
Production, and Requests for Admission 
Persons Served: 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
Dunn Law Offices, PLLC 
4 77 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box277 
Rigby, Idaho 83442 
Fax No. (208) 745-8160 
Method of Service: 
[ ] mail [ ] hand N fax 
G:\WPDATA\WFF\186 1 I (Fischer Property)\Discovery\Hrst interrogatories an<! KW S,docx 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO , I N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
WILLIAM R. FI SCHER and M. ANN FISCHER , 
Trustees of the William and Ann Fischer 
Revocable Trust , 
Plaint iffs , 
vs . 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C . CROSTON) 
Husband and wife , a nd all unknown ) 
Owners and/or other person or entities ) 
Claiming any interest i n the following ) 
Described property, ) 
De f endants . 
--- - --- ---- - ----- - - - - -
) 
) 
) 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No . CV- 2016- 2894 
On January 18 , 2017 , at 9 : 01 a . m. in Courtroom 5 , Plaintiffs ' 
motion for summary j udgment and mot i on to strike came before t he 
Honorable Joel E . Tingey , District Judge , appearing by telephonic 
connection in open court at Idaho Falls , Idaho . 
Mr . Jack Fuller , Court Reporter , and Ms . Mar l ene Southwick, 
Cour t Cl erk , we r e present . 
Mr . Forrest Fischer and Mr . Andrew Rawlings appeared o n 
behalf of the Plaintiffs . 
Mr . Robin Dunn appeared on behalf of the Defendants. 
Mr . Fischer presented Plaintiffs ' motion to strike . Mr . Dunn 
addressed the Court in opposition to the motion to strike . Mr . 
Fischer presented rebuttal argument . 
Mr . Fischer presented Plaintiffs ' motion for summary 
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judgment. Mr . Dunn presented argument in opposition to the 
motion. Mr. Fischer presented rebuttal argument . Further 
argument was heard . 
The Court will take the matter under advisement and issue a 
decision as soon as possible. 
Court was thus adjourned . 
District 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the _iK_ day of January , 2 017 , I 
caused a true and correct copy of the forego i ng document to 
be de l i vered to the following: 
Karl R . Dec ker 
W. Forrest Fischer 
PO Box 51030 
Idaho Falls , I D 83 4 05 
Plaintiffs 
Robin D. Dunn 
PO Box 277 
Rigby , ID 83422 
Defendants 
MINUTE ENTRY 
PENNY MANNING 
Deputy Court Clerk 
FAX : 523 - 95 1 8 
FAX : 745-8160 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEY TH nJDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
W1LLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FISCHER, Trustees of the William and Ann 
Fisher Re ocable Trust, 
Plaintiffs, 
Case No. CV-201 6-2894 
~T C~' . T 
Y. I • .) 
vs. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORl C. 
CROSTON husband and wife et al. 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Following the hearing and oral argument, the Court took the motion under advisement. 
I. FACTS 
This case revolves around a fence line eparating Plaintiffs and Defendants' 
properties. Th Fischers acquired the subject property in 1992 and transferr ditto a trust 
on November 2 2001. The Fishers are the trustees of the trust. They originally purchased 
the property from Douglas M. Ackerman and Cheryl A Ackennan. Th ckermans 
acquired the property from the Kennedys, and the Kennedys acquired the prope1ty from 
the Barzee's. The Barzee lived on th property beginning in 1943. 
Jame F Croston and Mmjorie C. Croston own the adjacent prope1ty to the south 
of the Fischer property. The north boundary of The Crostons' property is the south 
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boundary of the Fischers' property. The Croston's acquired their property in March 1959. 
At the time the Crostons purchased their property, there was an existing post-and-wire 
fence running along the Fischer property's southern boundary, dividing the Fischer 
property from the Croston property. Evidence indicates that the fence had been in place at 
least since 19 51. 
In 2015, the Fischers noticed the old fence was in decay with portions of it falling 
on the Fischer property. The Fischers decided to replace it with the new more 
aesthetically pleasing fence in August 2015. However, in the midst of replacing the old 
fence the Crostons sent the Fischers a letter, dated September 4, 2015, threatening to sue 
the Fischers for trespass and malicious injury to their property. The Fischers then 
commissioned Ellsworth and associates to conduct a survey. Fischers claim that the 
purpose of the survey was to locate the line of the old fence so a new fence could be 
placed accurately on the old fence line. The Fischers further believed that the survey 
woul.d reflect that the old fence line would be the same as the platted boundary between 
the properties. 
Before the survey was conducted, Mrs. Fisher had a conversation with Jim 
Croston (the Croston's son) discussing her intention to have the land surveyed so that 
there could be no dispute about where the fence should be placed. The survey was done 
and revealed that the old fence line was south of the platted property line. As compared to 
the platted prope1ty line, the old fence line extended approximately 9 feet in to the 
Fischers property on the west side, and approximately 3 feet in onto the Fischers property 
on the east side. The tract of land between the old fence line and the platted boundary 
line. according to the survey. has been identified by the parties as "Tract l ". 
MEMORANDUM DECISION - 2 
245
After the survey, the Crostons bui lt a new fence along the platted boundary. The 
Fischers then fi led a Complaint against the Crostons seeking: 1) a declaration that the old 
fence is the h·ue boundary line between the Fischer property and the Croston property 
under the doctrine of boundary line by agreement or acquiescence; 2) treble damages and 
attorney's fees for the Crostons' "wi llful and intentional trespass" and for committing 
waste under§ 6-202 (or in the alternative, costs and attorney's fees under§ 12- 121). The 
Fischers now move for summary judgment on their claims as well as summary judgment 
di smissing Crostons' counter-claims. 
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Summary judgment is only appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). When 
considering a motion for summary judgment, any disputed facts are construed in favor of 
the nonmoving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are 
drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 896, 155 P .3d 
695, 697 (2007). If reasonable minds might come to different conclusions, summary 
judgment is inappropriate. McPheters v. Maile. 138 Idaho 391, 394, 64 P.3d 317, 320 
(2003). 
The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of proving that no 
genuine issue of material fact exists. Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 873, 204 P.3d 
508, 513 (2009). Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact, the burden then shifts to the nonrnoving paity. Kiebert v. Goss, 144 Idaho 
225,228, 159 P.3d 862, 865 (2007). In order to survive a motion for summary judgment, 
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the nonmoving party must show that there is a triable issue. G & M Farms v. Funk 
Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 524, 808 P.2d 851 , 861 (1991). " [A] complete failure of 
proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders 
all other facts immaterial." McGilvray v. Farmers New World Lffe Ins. Co., 136 Idaho 
39, 42, 28 P.Jd 380,383 (2001), quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 
S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). The non-moving party's case must be anchored in something 
more than speculation; a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine 
issue. Corbridge v. Clark Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87, 730 P.2d 960, 963 (1994). 
In actions where the court is the trier of fact, the court may, in ruling on a motion 
for summary judgment, draw the most probable inferences arising from the undisputed 
evidentiary facts despite the possibility of conflicting inferences. Losee v. Idaho Co .. 148 
Idaho 219, 222, 220 P.3d 575, 578 (2009). 
Drawing probable inferences under such circumstances is permissible 
because the court, as trier of fact, would be responsible for resolving 
confl icting inferences at trial. Id. Thus, although confl icting and disputed 
evidence must be viewed in a light favorable to the nonmoving party, 
conflicting inferences need not be. Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Mark Wallace 
Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho 11 7, 124, 206 P.3d 481, 488 (2009). 
Johnson v. McPhee. No. 39669. 2013 WL 6008690, at *5 (Idaho Ct. App. July 19, 2013). 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Motion to Strike. 
Fischers have move to strike the Affidavit of Linda D. Penning. The Court finds 
that the portions of the Affidavit that refer to Exhibits A, B, and D should be stricken on 
the basis of hearsay and lack of fo undation. Penning has no personal knowledge as to the 
contents of those exhibi ts. 
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To the extent Fischers seek to strike other portions of the Affidavit, the motion is 
denied. 
B. Motion for Sununary Judgment. 
The Fischers seek swnmary judgment on their claim to establ ish a boundary by 
agreement. The Fischers also seek summary j udgment dismissing the Crostons 
counterclaim. The law regarding boundary by agreement is well settled. 
A boundary by agreement thus "has two elements: (1) there must be an 
unce1iain or disputed boundary and (2) a subsequent agreement fixing the 
boundary." Luce v. Marble, 142 Idaho 264,271 , 127 P.3d 167. 174 
(2005). "(I]f the location of the true boundary is unknown to either of the 
parties, and is uncertain or in dispute, such coterminous owners may agree 
upon a boundary line." Id. " (I]gnorance as to what is later deemed the true 
boundary" is sufficient to show uncertainty. Morrissey, 124 Idaho at 873, 
865 P .2d at 964. Regarding the element of agreement, " [ a ]n agreement can 
be implied from the sunounding circumstances and conduct of the 
landowners," or inferred from " [a] long period of acquiescence." Marble, 
142 ldaho at 27 l. I 27 P.3d at 174. "Once a boundary line has been fixed 
under the doctrine of agreed boundary, that boundary is binding upon 
successors in interest who purchase with notice of the agreement. The 
general rule is that one purchasing property is put on notice as to any 
claim of title or right of possession which a reasonable investigation 
would reveal." Id. 
With particular regard to fences, this Court has "repeatedly found a 
boundary by agreement where a fence is treated as the property line for a 
number of years, there is no information about why the fence was built, 
and no evidence to disprove that the fence was intended to be a 
boundary." Fly ing Elk Inv., LLC v. Cornwall, 149 Idaho 9, 14,232 P.3d 
330, 335 (2010). 
Sims v. Daker, 154 ldal10 975,978,303 P.3d 1231, 1234 (2013). 
A presumption in favor of boundary by agreement exists ''where such 
right has been definjtely defined by erection of a fence ... on the line 
fo llowed by such adjoining landowners treating it as fixing the boundary 
for such length of time that neither ought to be a llowed to deny the 
correctness of its location." Edgell er, 74 Idaho at 365, 262 P .2d at 101 O; 
see also Wakamatsu, 75 Idaho at 241,270 P.2d at 835 (noting that the Jaw 
preswnes boundary by agreement from the long existence and recognjtion 
of a fence as a boundary). In addition, in Paurley v. Harris, 75 Idaho 112. 
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l 17,268 P.2d 351,353 (1954), this Court noted that the period of 
acquiescence is regarded as competent evidence of the agreement. In the 
present case, the existence of the fence and maintenance of it for sixty 
years as well as the exclusive use and possession of the property by the 
Newports and the Johnsons and their predecessors on their respective sides 
of the old fence is sufficient to find an implied agreement that the old 
fence was to act as a boundary. 
Johnson v. Newport, 131 Idaho 52 1,523, 960 P.2d 742, 744 (1998). 
"Thus, the statute does not require Cornwall to move the fence because 
there is no evidence the fence was erected in its current location by 
accident. Although the fence encroaches on Flying Elk's deeded property, 
it now marks the legal boundary between the parties. 
In this case, there is no genuine dispute that the "old fence" that divided the 
properties for over 60 years constituted a boundary by an agreement. As such, the fence 
line set the boundary between the properties. While the fence line, or portions thereof, 
may have fallen over or been removed, the boundary between the properties would still 
be the old fence line. Flying Elk Inv., LLC v. Cornwall, 149 Idaho 9, 15-16, 232 P.3d 
330, 336-37 (2010): "Once there is an agreed upon boundary, the parties to the 
agreement are no longer entitled to the amount of property provided for in their deeds and 
must absorb the effect of any increase or decrease in the amount of their prope1ty as a 
result of the new boundary" (citing Stafford v. Weaver, 136 Idaho 223,225, 31 P.3d 245, 
247 (2001)). While there does not appear to be a disagreement as to the location of the 
old fence line, if there was, the Court would determine the location of the old fence line 
based upon evidence presented. 
Once the fence line had fallen down or was removed, it would be possible for the 
Parties to make an oral agreement fixing a new fence line as the properties' boundary. 
Morrissey v. Haley, 124 ldaho 870, 872-73, 865 P.2d 961 , 963- 64 (1993) (quoting Wells 
v. Williamson. 118 Idaho 37, 41 ,794 P.2d 626,630 (1990)): "The doctrine of boundary 
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by agreement is well established in this state: "[ w ]here the location of a uue boundary 
line on the ground is unknown to either of the parties and is unce11ain or in dispute [the] 
cotenninous owners [of the parcels involved] may orally agree upon a boundary line." 
ro ton argu that there was a new boundary agreement based upon statements 
made by the Fischers and the Ellsworth survey of the platted property line. This Court 
disagr e for a umber of reasons. 
First, such an agreement must be between the actual owners of the adjacent 
properties. There is no evidence to supp01t a claim that the Defendant Crostons, as 
owners of their prope1ty reached an acn1al agreement with the Fischers regarding a new 
fence line and boundary. 
Second, the evidence as to Ann Fischers' alleged agreement is ambiguous at best. 
Considering the evidence in the best light to the Crostons, the Fischers intended to 
conduct a survey and put a new fence upon on the survey line. However, the reference to 
a "l ine ' or "survey line" could only refer to the old fence line. It is undisputed that Ann 
Fischer had no knowledge that the survey would reflect that the old fence line differed 
from th platted boundary. Indeed no party in interest had knowledge that the platted 
boundary line differed from the old fence line until after the survey. Where she believed 
that the old fenc line was the same as the platted boundary line she could not have been 
referring to som line other than the old fence line. 1 ln any e nt, the comments made by 
Fischer are not sufficiently clear and precise to give rise to an enforceable agreement to 
change the property line. 
1 Boundaries by agreement are not subject to the statute of frauds . lt is worth not ing that once the urvey 
was performed identifying the true boundary, there could be no boundary by agreement since a lack of 
knowledge as to the true boundary line is a prerequis ite to an enforceable boundary by agreement. After 
the surv y, any change to the property line would have to comp I with the statute of frauds. 
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This Court has stated that for a contract to be specifically enforceable, it 
"must be complete, definite and certain in all of its material terms, or 
contain provisions which are capable in themselves of being reduced to 
certainty." Giacobb; Square v. PEK Corporation, 105 Idaho 346. 348, 670 
P.2d 51 , 53 (1983). 
P.O. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233. 238, 159 
P.3d 870, 875 (2007). There was not a clear or definite statement that the new fence (and 
alleged new boundary) would be on a line different from the old fence line. 
Finally. to the extent the Fischers made comments to the effect that they had 
un ilaterally intended to move the fence line further onto their property, there would be no 
enforceable agreement to that effect since there was no consideration given by the 
Crostons. Idaho Jury Instruction No. 6.04.1 provides as fo llows: 
A promise is not enforceable as a contract unless something of value was 
given or was agreed to be given in exchange fo r it. In law, the giving of 
value or agreement to give value is called "consideration." Consideration 
is the benefi t given or agreed to be given by one party in exchange for the 
other party's performance or promise to perform. 
There is nothing in the record to suggest the Crostons gave up anyth ing of value 
in exchange for the alleged decision of the Fischers to move the fence line northward 
thereby giving the Crostons more property. 
It is true that a boundary by agreement can be abandoned by the adjacent 
landowners through a new agreement. See e.g. Woodland v. Hodson, 35 Idal10 514,207 
P. 715, 716 (1922). However, in thi s case, the Court fi nds that there was no 
abandonment fo r the same reasons that the Court finds that no contract was formed to 
adopt a new boundary line. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that the old fence line constituted a boundary by 
agreement between the Fischer and Croston properties. The Court further finds that there 
was no agreement or contract to adopt a new boundary line. There does not appear to be a 
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genuine dispute as to the location of the old fence line such the area between the old 
fence line and the lot line (Tract l ) should be quieted in the Fischers. The Fischers would 
also be entitled to remove any encroachments. 
Crostons' counterclaim generally alleges that the Fischers breached an agreement 
as to a new boundary line, and breached an agreement to pay one-half of the cost of the 
fe nce Crostons installed on the lot line. As indicated above, the Court found that there 
was no agreement as to a new bow1dary line and correspondingly, there could be no 
agreement to share in the cost of a fence in a location different than the old fence line. 
Again, the evidence does not support the claims made in the counterclaim and Fischers 
are entitled to summary j udgment on the counterclaim. 
C. Trespass. 
Fischers allege in their complaint a right to recover for trespass and damages to 
their property under l.C. § 6-202. The evidence establishes that while this dispute was 
ongoing, the Fischers posted "No Trespassing" signs along the old fence line. The 
evidence a lso establishes that the Crostons, through their agents, crossed the old fence 
line into the Fischers' property and installed a fence. Such action constitutes a trespass 
pursuant to J.C. § 6-202. Weitz v. Green, 148 Idaho 851 , 863,230 P.3d 743, 755 (20 10). 
Pursuant to § 6-202, damages for such a trespass are $50 or treble the amount of 
the damages for injury to "any tree or timber" on the property. Exhibit M to the 
Declaration of Forest Fischer constitutes a bid to remove the Crostons' fence in the 
amount of $1278 and the cost of a new survey in the amount of $600. Fischers cla ims 
that those costs are trebled under the statute. However, § 6-202 only allows for treble 
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damages arising from injuries to trees. Absent an injury to trees or timber, the statutory 
remedy is $50. 
C. Attorney Fees. 
Section 6-202 also allows for a reasonable attorney fee for a party who prevails on 
a trespass claim. Such attorney fees are to be taxed as costs in reference to Rule 54, 
IRCP, which calls consideration of costs and attorney fees after the entry of judgment. As 
such, it is the Court's opinion that Fischers claims for attorney fees in the motion for 
summary judgment was premature. However, following the entry of a judgment in this 
matter the Fisch rs are free to pursue costs and attorney fees pursuant to Rule 54. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Fischers' motion for summary judgment is granted. The old fence line 
constitutes the boundary between the Fischer and Croston properties and the Fischers are 
entitled to quiet title in Tract 1. The Fischers are entitled to recover $50 for the Crostons' 
trespass onto the Fischer property. The Crostons' counter-claim is dismissed. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this _l! day of January, 2017. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this J.:J_ day of January, 2017, I did send a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the 
correct postage thereon, or by placement in the courthouse mailbox. 
Karl R. Decker 
W. Forrest Fischer 
HOLDE , KIDWELL HAHN & CRAPO 
1000 Riverwalk Dr. , Suite 200 
P.O. Box 501 30 (J~'j - 'f5/~ 
Robin D. Dunn 
Dunn Law Offices 
4 77 Pleasant County Lane 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83422 145-81(.p D 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
~1 C' . ·· 1 
~ , 1J n . ... : 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY qr.BQ_ffl,r~I:ra1E:4t: 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FISCHER, Trustees of the William and Ann 
Fischer Revocable Trust Case No. CV-2016-2894 
Plaintiffs, 
JUDGMENT 
vs. 
JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. 
CROSTON, husband and wife, et al. , 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
Judgment is entered as follows : 
1. Title in the following property is quieted and vested in William R. Fischer and 
M. Ann Fischer, Trustees of the William and Ann Fischer Revocable Trust: 
Beginning at the Northeast comer of Lot 4 Block 12, of the Original 
Ammon Townsite, Bonneville County, Idaho; running thence N. 
88°33 '58" W. 330.00 feet to the Northwest comer of said Lot 4; thence S. 
00°00'21" W. along the West line of said Lot 4 a distance of 8.99 feet to 
an existing fence line; thence S. 89°41 '36" E. along said existing fence 
line 329.90 feet to a point on the East line of said Lot 4; thence 
N.00°00'21" E. along said East line 2.50 feet to the POINT OF 
BEG ING. 
2. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover $50 in trespass damages against Defendants, 
with interest accruing at the statutory rate; and 
3. Defendants ' counterclaim is dismissed with prejudice. 
Dated this 1-!L day of January, 2017. 
JUDGMENT - I 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this Jq day of January, 2017, I did send a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing docume~on the parties listed below by mai ling, with the 
correct postage thereon, or by placement in the courthouse mailbox. 
Karl R. Decker 
W. Forrest Fischer 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO 
1000 Riverwalk Dr., Suite 200 
P.O. Box 50130 
Robin D. Dunn 
Dunn Law Offices 
4 77 Pleasant County Lane 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby, 10 83422 
JUDGMENT-2 
Clerk of the District Court 
Bonneville County, Idaho 
By :):n~ 
Deputy Clerk 
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Karl R. Decker, ISB #3390 
W. Forrest Fischer, ISB #10009 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys/or Plaintiffs 
' 1 -• , ,• I T \ / -. 
, : 'I 1 .... L_::_ wl..i 1-' 1 I ,, J;-,l+ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FISCHER, Trustees of the William and Ann 
Fischer Revocable Trust, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. 
CROSTON, husband and wife; 
AND ALL UNKNOWN OWNERS AND/OR 
OTHER PERSONS OR ENTITIES 
CLAIM! G ANY INTEREST THE 
FOLLOWING DESCRIBED REAL 
PROPERTY: 
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 4, 
Block 12, of the Original Ammon Townsite, 
Bonneville CoW1ty, Idaho; running thence N. 
88°33'58" W. 330.00 feet to the Northwest 
corner of said Lot 4; thence S. 00°00'21"W. 
along the West line of said Lot 4 a distance of 
8.99 feet to an existing fence line; thence S. 
89°41 '36" E. along said existing fence line 
329.90 feet to a point on the East line of said 
Lot 4; thence N. 00°00'21" E. along said East 
line 2.50 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF W. FORREST FISCHER IN SUPPORT OF 
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS - 1 
Case No. CV-2016-2894 
AFFIDAVIT OF W. FORREST 
FISCHER IN SUPPORT OF 
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS' 
FEES AND COSTS 
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JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. 
CROSTON, husband and wife; 
Counter Claimants, 
VS. 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FISCHER, Trustees of the William and Ann 
Fischer Revocable Trust, 
Counter Defendants. 
ST A TE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
W. Forrest Fischer, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am an attorney with the law firm of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., 
which is the law firm which represents Plaintiffs in the above-captioned matter. 
2. This affidavit is made according to my personal knowledge, except to the extent 
that allegations are expressly made on information and belief., and in support of the Memorandum 
of Attorneys' Fees and Costs filed simultaneously herewith. 
3. I have reviewed the billing and costs records of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, 
P .L. L. C. maintained for the above captioned matter and represent that, to the best of my knowledge 
and belief, the following items of costs and expenses are claimed in compliance with the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure and were necessarily expenses and incurred in the above-entitled action 
on behalf of Plaintiffs: 
a. Costs as a Matter of Right (Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(l)(C)) 
DATE EXPENSE 
May 25, 2016 Filing Fee - Complaint 
AFFIDA VLT OF W. FORREST FISCHER I SUPPORT OF 
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS - 2 
AMOUNT 
$22 1.00 
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June 14, 2016 Service of Process Fee $45 .00 
July 13 2016 Publication of Summons $418.26 
TOTAL COSTS OF RJGHT $684.26 
b. Costs as a Matter of Discretion (Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(l)(D)) 
DATE EXPENSE AMOUNT 
January 25 2017 Recording Fee for Judgment $13.00 
TOT AL DISCRETIO ARY COSTS $13.00 
TOTAL COSTS: $697 .26 
4. The law firn1 of Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. expended 171.70 hours 
tl1rough January 29, 20 17, in prosecuting the issues involved in this action for Plaintiffs and 
defending them against Defendants' Counterclaim. An itemization of the legal services provided 
by Iolden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P .L.L.C. in connection with such matter is attached hereto 
as Exhibit A. The law firm of Holden Kidwell , Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. has invoiced Plaintiffs 
for the legal services itemized on Exhibit A attached hereto which were provided in prosecuting 
this action in the total amount of $31 131 .00 which is allocated among the following attorneys at 
the following billing rates : 
Ill 
Ill 
Ill 
Ill 
Ill 
Ill 
AFF IDAV IT OF W. FO RREST F[SCHER IN SUPPORT OF 
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NAME HOURS RATE TOTAL FEES 
Charles A. Homer 2.50 $250.00 $625.00 
Peter D. Christofferson 2.70 $200.00 $540.00 
Luke H. Marchant 0.40 $180.00 $72.00 
D. Andrew Rawlings 13.40 $150.00 $2,010.00 
Karl R. Decker 35.00 $225 .00 $7,875.00 
W. Fonest Fisch.er 117.70 $170.00 $20 009.00 
TOT AL ATTORNEYS ' FEES $31 ,131.00 
5. I believe that the hourly rates charged by each of the attorneys listed above are 
consistent with the hourly rates charged by attorneys of similar xperience, ability and 
specialization within Southeast Idaho. 
a. Charles A. Homer has been a licensed attorney in Idaho since 1974; 
b. Peter D. hristofferson has been a licensed attorney since 2003 and has 
been admitted to practice in Idaho since 2009; 
c. Luke H. Marchant has been a licensed attorney in Idaho since 2008 · 
d. D. Andrew Rawlings has been a licensed attorney in Idaho since 2014; 
e. Karl. R. Decker has been a licensed attorney in Idaho since 1985; and 
f. W. Fonest Fischer has been a licensed attorney since 20 11 , and bas been 
admitted to practice in Idaho since 2016. 
6. I believe that the total amount of attorneys' fees and costs incuned in this matter 
are reasonable, given the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the legal questions 
in the case the prevailing charges for Like work the experience, skill and ability of the attorneys 
performing the work and the results obtained. 
AFFIDAVI T OF W. FORREST FISCHER IN SUPPORT OF 
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS ' FEES AND COSTS - 4 
260
7. I have personal knowledge of the foregoing, am over eighteen (18) years of age, 
and would so testify if called upon in a court of law. 
sJr 
DATED this ~\ day of January, 2017. 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this ~ day of January, 2017. 
AFFIDAVIT OF W. FORREST FISCHER IN SUPPORT OF 
MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS ' FEES AND COSTS - 5 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in 
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the ~\~ day of January, 2017, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the COlTect postage 
thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with IRCP 5(b ). 
Persons Served: 
Robin D. Dunn 
Dunn Law Offices, PLLC 
4 77 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby ID 83422 
Fax: (208) 745-8160 
Method of Service: 
• Mail 
~ Fax 
• Hand Delivery 
• Other: 
--- ----
G:\ WP DAT A\ WFF\186 I I (Fischer Property)\Pleadings\9 - Memorandum ofFees and Costs\Aff of W. Forrest Fischer.docx 
AFFIDAVIT OF W. FORREST FISCHER IN SUPPORT OF 
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Date Explanation Fees Hours Atty. Rate 
Sep 22/2015 Review correspondence prepared by W. Fischer in regard $100.00 0.40 CAH $250.00 
to boundary line dispute; email correspondence to W. 
Fischer 
Sep 25/2015 Client te lephone conference to discuss property and fence- $260.00 1.30 PDC $200.00 
line history; review demand letter and settlement offer; 
discuss strategy with W. Fischer. 
Sep 28/2015 Review correspondence from W. Fischer; compile quiet $75.00 0.30 CAH $250.00 
title compla int form to provide to W. Fischer. 
Sep 28/2015 Compile complaint, summons, and prior case law to assist $180.00 0.90 PDC $200.00 
W. Fischer in instigating lawsuit with regard to fence-line 
dispute. 
Sep 30/2015 Telephone conference with W. Fischer to discuss fi ling of $80.00 0.40 PDC $200.00 
complaint and summons; reviewed-mail correspondence 
exchanged between W. Fischer and R. Dunn rega rd ing 
dispute. 
Oct 13/2015 Review settlement proposal letter. $20.00 0.10 PDC $200.00 
Jan 29/2016 Edit and revise complaint, phone call with title company $374.00 2.20 WFF $170.00 
regard ing litigation guarantee. 
Feb 4/2016 Conference with K. Decker regarding revisions and edits to $68.00 0.40 WFF $170.00 
verified complaint. 
Feb 4/2016 Review and edit draft complaint . Intraoffice conference W. $292.50 1.30 KRD $225.00 
Fischer regard ing case issues. 
Feb 5/2016 Edit and revise complaint to add quiet ti t le, declaratory $272.00 1.60 WFF $170.00 
judgment, and add itional statements of fact; conference 
with K. Decker regarding the same; review court rules 
rega rding service of process in another state. 
Feb 5/2016 Intraoffice conference w ith W. Fischer regarding case $112.50 a.so KRD $225.00 
issues. 
Apr 6/2016 Review draft verified complaint to quiet t itle. $180.00 0.80 KRD $225.00 
Apr 7/2016 Continue review and revision of draft complaint. $630.00 2.80 KRD $225.00 
Apr 8/2016 Ed it revise and continue drafting comp laint. $340.00 2.00 WFF $170.00 
Apr 14/2016 Adverse possession research; edit and revise complaint. $119.00 0.70 WFF $170.00 
May 2/2016 Edit and revise pleadings, summons, publication, and $221.00 1.30 WFF $170.00 
affidavit. 
May 9/2016 Legal research, conference with K. Decker, fina lize $272 .00 1.60 WFF $170.00 
complaint. 
May 9/2016 Intraoffice conference regarding draft Complaint. $22.50 0.10 KRD $225 .00 
May 17/2016 Review draft verified compla int to quiet title. $180.00 0.80 KRD $225 .00 
May 18/2016 Review and revise draft complaint . Int raoffice conference $180.00 0.80 KRD $225.00 
with W. Fischer regarding case issues. 
May 23/2016 Phone cal l wit h cl ient; conference with K. Decke r regarding $272.00 1.60 WFF $170.00 
compla int; edit and f inalize compla int. 
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Date Explanation Fees Hours Atty. Rate 
May 23/2016 Intraoffice conference with W. Fischer regarding draft $180.00 0.80 KRD $225.00 
Complaint . Review draft complaint and documents. 
May 31/2016 Intraoffice conference with W. Fischer. Final draft $22.50 0.10 KRD $225.00 
complaint. 
Jun 13/2016 Review copy of order for service by publicat ion and $45.00 0.20 KRD $225.00 
summons received from court today. Intraoffice 
conference regarding default deadline. 
Jun 13/2016 Fo llow up on affidavit of service; legal research regarding $85.00 0.50 WFF $170.00 
defa ult procedure; scheduling time for default; review 
order granting publication; review publication from post 
register. 
Jun 21/2016 Review notice of appearance; conference with K. Decker $51.00 0.30 WFF $170.00 
regard ing the same. 
Jun 21/2016 Review emai l of fax of notice of appearance. Intraoffice $67.50 0.30 KRD $225.00 
conference regarding case issues. 
Jun 27/2016 Legal research regarding changes in rules for notice of $51.00 0.30 WFF $170.00 
intent to take default . 
Jun 28/2016 Preparation of notice of intent to take default. $90.00 0.40 KRD $225.00 
Jun 28/2016 Draft, edit and revise notice of intent to take default; $187.00 1.10 WFF $170.00 
review repository regarding notice of intent to t ake 
default . 
Jul 1/2016 Review answer and counterclaims; conference w ith K. $170.00 1.00 WFF $170.00 
Decker; e-mail opposing counsel regarding deposition 
dates. 
Jul 1/2016 Review fax of answer to complaint. Intraoffice conference $180.00 0.80 KRD $225.00 
W. Fischer regarding case issues. Ca lendar answer to 
countercla im. 
Ju l 5/2016 Draft answer to counterclaim; legal research regarding $459.00 2.70 WFF $170.00 
statute of frauds on oral contracts for boundaries; draft 
notice of trial sett ing. 
Jul 6/2016 Intraoffice conference regard ing issues in drafting answer $90.00 0.40 KRD $225.00 
to counterclaim. 
Ju l 6/2016 Edit and rev ise answer; conference with K. Decker $102.00 0.60 WFF $170.00 
regarding the same. 
Jul 8/2016 Review emai l from W. Fischer regarding amended survey $180.00 0.80 KRD $225.00 
monument statute . Review draft letter to Robin Dunn. 
Revise draft answer to counterclaim. Revise draft request 
for tri al setting. 
Jul 11/2016 Conference with K. Decker regarding case. $119 .00 0.70 WFF $170.00 
Ju l 11/2016 Intraoffice conference regarding case issues. Review proof $67.50 0.30 KRD $225.00 
of publication from Post Register regarding service of 
summons. 
Jul 12/2016 Edit and revise pleadings. $153 .00 0.90 WFF $170.00 
Jul 12/2016 Intraoffice confere nce regarding case issues. Revise draft $112.50 0.50 KRD $225.00 
answer to counterclaim. 
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Date Explanation Fees Hours Atty. Rate 
Jul 13/2016 Emai l opposing counsel regard ing deposit ion t imes. $17.00 0.10 WFF $170.00 
Jul 13/2016 Conference with K. Decker rega rding survey; phone ca ll $272.00 1.60 WFF $170.00 
with surveyor; review Ammon survey 
Jul 13/2016 Intraoffice conference regard ing case issues. Review $112.50 0.50 KRD $225.00 
recorded record of survey. Review draft and fina l email to 
Robin Dunn regard ing depositions. 
Jul 14/2016 Review and respond to e-mail from opposing counse l $34.00 0.20 WFF $170.00 
regarding deposi t ions. 
Jul 14/2016 Review email regarding deposit ion location. Intraoffice $22.50 0.10 KRD $225.00 
conference with W. Fischer regarding deposition issues. 
Ju l 15/2016 Intraoffice conference regarding case issues. $67.50 0.30 KRD $225.00 
Ju l 15/2016 Ass ist with review of aerial imagery availab le to show fence $72.00 0.40 LHM $180.00 
line. 
Jul 18/2016 review emails from opposing counsel; conference wi t h K. $187.00 1.10 WFF $170.00 
Decker regard ing the same. 
Jul 18/2016 Intraoffice conferences regarding case issues. $225.00 1.00 KRD $225.00 
Jul 22/2016 rev iew order for te lephonic status conference $17.00 0.10 WFF $170.00 
Jul 22/2016 Review fax order for te lephon ic status conference. $90.00 0.40 KRD $225 .00 
Ca lenda r hea ri ng on August 23, 2016 at 8:30 a. m. Fi le 
order. 
Jul27/2016 Draft discovery. $646.00 3.80 WFF $170.00 
Aug 23/2016 Prepare for status conference rega rding trial schedule. $67.50 0.30 KRD $225.00 
Aug 23/2016 Te lephon ic status conference wit h Judge Tingy. $34.00 0.20 WFF $170.00 
Aug 24/2016 Review Order and Noti ce Setti ng Court Trial. Calcu late $90.00 0.40 KRD $225.00 
deadl ines. 
Sep 2/2016 Edit and revise discovery. $119.00 0.70 WFF $170.00 
Sep 6/2016 Conference with C. Homer rega rding discovery. $34.00 0.20 WFF $170.00 
Sep 6/2016 Conference with C. Homer regarding discovery; edit and $119.00 0.70 WFF $170.00 
revise fi rst interrogatories and requests for production. 
Sep 6/2016 Review and revise discovery pleadings. $150.00 0. 60 CAH $250.00 
Sep 7/2016 Review case law on implied boundary line; finalize $272.00 1.60 WFF $170.00 
discovery. 
Oct 10/2016 Review ru les regarding discovery and service in $272.00 1.60 WFF $170.00 
preparation for Defendant's fa ilure t o respond to 
discovery; conference with C. Homer regarding the same; 
review rules regarding fai lure to res pond to requests for 
admission. 
Oct 11/2016 Review incoming discovery responses; conference wi t h C. $323 .00 1.90 WFF $170.00 
Homer and K. Decker; phone call with client. 
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Date Explanation Fees Hours Atty. Rate 
Oct 11/2016 Intraoffice conference regard ing discovery responses. $112.50 0.50 KRD $225.00 
Oct 19/2016 Begin review of discovery pleading. $25.00 0.10 CAH $250.00 
Oct 21/2016 Review correspondence to attorney R. Dunn. $25.00 0.10 CAH $250.00 
Oct 24/2016 Email to R. Dunn requesting CD from discovery. $17.00 0.10 WFF $170.00 
Nov 2/2016 Email to R. Dunn requesting production of documents $17.00 0.10 WFF $170.00 
pursuant to Rule 37. 
Nov 7/2016 Review CD contents; draft emai l to opposing counse l $68.00 0.40 WFF $170.00 
request ing miss ing documentat ion. 
Nov 14/2016 Draft email to Opposing Counsel regarding missing $34.00 0.20 WFF $170.00 
documentation. 
Nov 14/2016 Review incoming discovery documents from opposing $51.00 0.30 WFF $170.00 
party. 
Nov 16/2016 Review transcript of voice mail; conference with client $51.00 0.30 WFF $170.00 
regarding the same. 
Nov 17/2016 Discuss potential summary judgment with C. Homer. $119.00 0.70 WFF $170.00 
Nov 17/2016 Intra-office conference to review discovery pleadings and $250.00 1.00 CAH $250.00 
discuss preparation of pleadings on Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
Nov 28/2016 Legal research in preparation for Motion for Summary $391.00 2.30 WFF $170.00 
Judgment. 
Nov 28/2016 Intraoffice conference with C. Homer regard ing case issues. $45.00 0.20 KRD $225.00 
Intraoffice conference with W. Fischer regarding case 
issues. 
Nov 28/2016 Intraoffice conference regarding hearing scheduling issues. $22.50 0.10 KRD $225.00 
Nov 30/2016 Assess claims, counterclaims, and facts in preparation for $105 .00 0.70 DAR $150.00 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Nov 30/2016 Conference with A. Rawlings regarding case; legal research; $680.00 4.00 WFF $170.00 
begin draft of mot ion for summary judgment. 
Dec 1/2016 Continue draft of motion for summary judgment; phone $459.00 2.70 WFF $170.00 
ca ll with City of Ammon; investigation of prior owners of 
respective properties . 
Dec 1/2016 Intraoffice conferences regarding case issues. $90.00 0.40 KRD $225.00 
Dec 2/2016 Phone cal l w ith L. Kennedy and Sharon Anderson; draft $714.00 4.20 WFF $170.00 
affidavits regard ing the same; cont inue drafting motion for 
summary judgment. 
Dec 2/2016 Intraoffice conference regarding case issues. $45.00 0.20 KRD $225 .00 
Dec 5/2016 Continue draft of motion for su mmary judgment. $510.00 3.00 WFF $170.00 
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Dec 6/2016 Lega l research regarding statute of frauds as applied to $561.00 3.30 WFF $170.00 
boundary line by agreement; phone call with local attorney 
regarding boundary line cases; edit and revise motion for 
summary judgment; conference with A. Rawlings regarding 
counterclaim section. 
Dec 6/2016 Email to S. Anderson regarding declaration concerning Old $68.00 0.40 WFF $170.00 
Fence. 
Dec 6/2016 Intraoffice conference regarding summary judgment $67.50 0.30 KRD $225.00 
I 
motion issues. 
Dec 6/2016 Discuss motion for summary judgment regarding Creston's $105 .00 0.70 DAR $150.00 
counterclaims; start editing draft memorandum. 
Dec 7/2016 Phone call with S. Anderson; ed it and revise motion for $425 .00 2.50 WFF $170.00 
summary judgment; countercla im 
Dec 7/2016 Finish editing draft of memorandum. $435.00 2.90 DAR $150.00 
Dec 8/2016 Edit and revise motion for summary judgment. $442.00 2.60 WFF $170.00 
Dec 9/2016 Edit and revise motion for summary judgment; legal $799.00 4.70 WFF $170.00 
research regarding authority to contract; draft section on 
agent authority; begin drafting declarations and 
assembl ing exh ibits . 
Dec 9/2016 Edits to motion fo r summary judgment. $375.00 2.50 DAR $150.00 
Dec 13/2016 Edit and revise motion and supporting declarations; begin $697.00 4.10 WFF $170.00 
assembling exhibits; conference with I<. Decker regarding 
the same. 
Dec 13/2016 Review draft memorandum in support of motion for $517.50 2.30 KRD $225.00 
summary judgment. 
Dec 14/2016 Intraoffice conference with W. Fischer. Continue revising $945.00 4.20 KRD $225.00 
draft memorandum in support of motion for summary 
judgment. 
Dec 14/2016 Add additional argument regarding statute of frauds into $986.00 5.80 WFF $170.00 
motion for summary judgment; legal research regarding 
the same; edit and revise motion. 
Dec 15/2016 Intraoffice conference regarding case issues. $45.00 0.20 KRD $225.00 
Dec 15/2016 Continue work on motion for summary judgment ; $731.00 4.30 WFF $170.00 
assemble exhibits for declarations; arrange decla rat ion for 
S. Anderson; conference with K. Decker regarding the 
same. 
Dec 19/2016 Intraoffice conference regarding case issues. Revise draft $112.50 0.50 KR D $225.00 
declarations of Johnson and Fischer. 
Dec 19/2016 Finalize motion for summary judgment with associated $544.00 3.20 WFF $170.00 
exhibits and declarations; prepare for filing and service on 
Tuesday. 
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Dec 19/2016 Review emai l from W. Fischer with draft memorandum. $337.50 1.50 KRD $225 .00 
Revise draft memorandum. Email revisions to Forrest 
Fischer. 
Dec 20/2016 Visit with L. Kennedy regarding declaration; prepare $578.00 3.40 WFF $170.00 
documents for filing; fax to R. Dunn; prepare for court 
filing; complete the same. 
Jan 3/2017 Review motion to continue trial; conference with K. Decker $68.00 0.40 WFF $170.00 
regarding the same. 
Jan 3/2017 Intraoffice conference regarding attorney Robin Dunn's $90.00 0.40 KRD $225.00 
motion to continue trial. 
Jan 4/2017 Review opposition to summary judgment. $136.00 0.80 WFF $170.00 
Jan 4/2017 Intraoffice conferences with W. Fischer regarding case $292.50 1.30 KRD $225.00 
issues to reply to Crostons' response to summary 
judgment. Share research regarding Garcia v. Absolute Bail 
Bonds, LLC. 
Jan 4/2017 Discuss motion to strike affidavit with K. Decker. $85.00 0.50 WFF $170.00 
Jan 5/2017 Legal research in preparation for motion to strike affidavit. $289.00 1.70 WFF $170.00 
Jan 9/2017 Draft Motion to Strike; Draft Deel of W. Fischer in support $765 .00 4.50 WFF $170.00 
of motion to strike; draft response to motion to continue; 
legal research for motion to strike; edit and revise motions. 
Jan 9/2017 Draft Motion to Shorten Time; discuss Reply Memorandum $450.00 3.00 DAR $150.00 
with Forrest Fischer; draft Rep ly Memorandum. 
Jan 9/2017 Intraoffice conference regarding Motion to Strike. Revise $180.00 0.80 KRD $225.00 
draft Motion to Strike. 
Jan 10/2017 Draft, edit, and revise Response in support of motion for $1,054.00 6.20 WFF $170.00 
summary judgment; additional edits to motion to strike 
and motion to shorten time; conference with A. Rawl ings 
and K. Decker regarding the same. 
Jan 10/2017 Research and draft portions of Reply Memorandum; edit $540.00 3.60 DAR $150.00 
first draft of Reply Memorandum. 
Jan 10/2017 Intraoffice conference regarding Motion to Strike issues. $562.50 2.50 KRD $225.00 
Revise draft Mot ion to Strike affidavi t of Linda Penn ing, 
revise draft declaration in support of Motion to Strike. 
Revise draft notice of hearing on Motion to Strike. Revise 
draft Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike. Revise 
draft Motion to Shorten Time. Revise Notice of Hearing. 
Revise draft Reply in support of Summmary Judgment 
Memorandum. 
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Jan 11/2017 Edit and finalize reply in support of motion for summary $765.00 4.50 WFF $170.00 
judgment; prep for file with the Court and service upon 
opposing counsel. 
Jan 11/2017 Continue revising draft reply memorandum in support of $112 .50 0.50 KRD $225.00 
motion for summary judgment. Intraoffice conference with 
W. Fischer regarding draft memorandum. 
Jan 17/2017 Prep for ora l argument. $714.00 4.20 WFF $170.00 
Jan 17/2017 Intraoffice conference with W. Fischer regarding summary $472.50 2.10 l<RD $225.00 
judgment oral argument issues. Review accord and 
satisfaction research, eva luate with W. Fischer. 
Jan 18/2017 Intraoffice conference with W. Fischer regard ing case $67.50 0.30 KRD $225.00 
issues. 
Jan 18/2017 Travel to and from courthouse; prepare for hearing; $442.00 2.60 WFF $170.00 
hearing on MSJ; phone ca ll with client regarding outcome. 
Jan 18/2017 Review minute entry from court. $34.00 0.20 WFF $170.00 
Jan 19/2017 Review Decision and Judgment from Court. $85.00 0.50 WFF $170.00 
Jan 29/2017 Prep attorney fees and costs affidavit and memorandum. $969.00 5.70 WFF $170.00 
Jan 29/2017 Prep attorney fees and costs affidavit and memorandum. $450.00 2.00 KRD $225.00 
TOTAL $31,131.00 171.70 
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Karl R. Decker, ISB #3390 
W. Forrest Fischer, ISB #10009 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Fa11s, ID 83405 
Telephone (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FISCHER, Tmstees of the William and Ann 
Fischer Revocable Trust, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. 
CROSTON, husband and wife; 
AND ALL UNKNOWN OWNERS AND/OR 
OTHER PERSONS OR ENTITIES 
CLAIMING ANY INTEREST IN THE 
FOLLOWING DESCRIBED REAL 
PROPERTY: 
Beginning at the Northeast comer of Lot 4, 
Block 12, of the Original Ammon Townsite, 
Bonneville County, Idaho; running thence N. 
88°33 '58" W. 330.00 feet to the Northwest 
corner of said Lot 4; thence S. 00°00'21"W. 
along the West line of said Lot 4 a distance of 
8.99 feet to an existing fence line; thence S. 
89°41 '36" E. along said existing fence line 
329.90 feet to a point on the East line of said 
Lot 4; thence N. 00°00'21" E. along said East 
line 2.50 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING 
Defendants. 
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JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. 
CROSTON, husband and wife· 
Counter Claimants, 
vs. 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FISCHER, Trustees of the William and Ann 
Fischer Revocable Trust, 
Counter Defendants. 
Plaintiffs/Counter Defendants, William R. Fischer And M. Ann Fischer, Trustees of the 
William and Ann Fischer Revocable Trust ("Plaintiffs"), by and through their counsel of record 
Holden, Kidwell Hahn & Crapo P.L.L.C., herby submit this Memorandum of Attorneys Fees 
and Costs ("Memorandum") pursuant to Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. By 
submitting this Memorandum, Plaintiffs claim the right, pursuant to Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Prncedure, Idaho Code§ 6-202 and Idaho Code§ 12-121 , to recover from Defendants the 
costs and attorneys' fees incurred in maintaining the above-captioned matter. The amount of 
attorneys' fees and costs is supported by the Affidavit of W. Forrest Fischer in Support of 
Memorandmn of Attorneys ' Fees and Costs ("Affidavit') which is filed concurrently herewith. 
As of the date of th.is Memorandum, Plaintiffs have incuned the following attorneys' fees 
and costs in the above-captioned matter: $31,131.0 in attorneys ' fees; $684.26 in costs as a matter 
of right; and 13.00 in discretionary costs which are specifically described and itemized in the 
Affidavit. To the best of the knowl dge and belief of the undersigned th se amounts are correct 
and such costs and fees are claimed by Plaintiffs in compliance with Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure. This Memorandum is supported by the Affidavit of the tmdersigned, which is 
incorporated herein by reference. 
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$\ 
DATED this~ day of January, 2017. 
orrest Fischer 
LDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in 
~Jc 
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the '6 \ day of January, 2017, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct postage 
thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with IRCP 5(b). 
Persons Served: 
RobinD. Dwm 
Dunn Law Offices, PLLC 
4 77 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby ID 83422 
Fax: (208) 745-8160 
Method of Service: 
~ Mail 
pg,_ Fax 
• Hand Delivery 
• Other: 
-------
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DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P. 0. Box277 
Rigby, ID 83442 
(208) 745-9202 (t) 
(208) 745-8160 (f) 
rdunn@dunnlawoffices.com 
Attorney fot Defendants 
FAX No. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
William R. Fischer, et. al. 
Plaintiffs, 
V'S. 
James F. Crosto:tt., et. al. 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-16-2894 
OBJECTION TO THE 
PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST 
FOR FEES AND COSTS 
COMES NOW, Defendant and OBJECTS to the Plaintiffs' request for fees and 
costs. The objection is based upon Rule 54 IRCP and specifically Rule 54(d)(6) and 
54(e){6). 
Idaho follows what has been named "the American Rule"1 when deciding the issue 
of attorney fees. The Supreme Coutt of the State of Idaho has in place, for numerous years, 
guidance on this issue. The first major treatise on the issue was written by Lon Davis, Esq 
in 1990. He was the personal attorney for the Idaho Supreme Court for numerous years. A 
treatise was updated by the Hon. Jesse Walters entitled, "A Primer for Awarding Attorney 
1 The American Rule only a l lot~s for fees if there i s an underlying statute or 
contract for ent i t lement . 
1 
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Fees i'n Idaho", Idaho Law Review, Volume 38, Number 1 (2001)2. The Walters publication 
explains the major statutes aod all cases through the date of the publication. His treatise 
walks the reader through every step in the fee award process. According to the Justice, fees 
cannot be awarded as an "equity" determination or by the court sua sponte if not claimed 
under a pertinent statute. There is no inherent power of the comt to award attorney fees. In 
swn, there must be a statute or rule to tely upon except in limited circumstances.3 
Therefore, in the instant case the plaintiff relies upon the statutory language of l .C. 
Section 12-121 which must be read in conjunction with IRCP, Rule 54 wherein the case must 
be[ defended] frivolously, without fo\.lndation and so forth. lRCP, Rule 54(e)(1). This is the 
"frivolous' section that applies to fees. 
The court is well aware that the fence in question was not maintained, was in 
disrepair and did not even e..-.,:ist in places throughout the fence line. Further, there vvas 
gravel stacked on the property of the defendantS encroaching on the line. An e..xamination 
of the affidavits granting summary judgment calls into question. the verbal agreement of the 
parties as to placing the new fence on the existing boundary. 
Remember that the plaintiffs sought a new survey which should persuade the court 
that thete was some reason for the parties to believe that the nev•,r su.nrey was important to 
settle the case. The comr did not even need the survey; yet, the plaintiffs desired a survey. 
It does provide that the parties were of some belief that the swvey was important. 
Additionally, the court was awate that only a temporary fence was placed on the 
survey line by the defendants until the court could rule. Thus, the defendants were trying to 
wait until a solution could be resolved. 
Plaintiffs also rely on I.C. § 6-202 for fees under the trespass starute. The court 
2 Justice Walrer~ personiilly :iw·arded tlus primer ro the undersigned, :ifter irs public:irion, on i\.farch 29, 2002. 
3 011e nored exception is the Private _\ttorney General provision which is not relevant in the case at bar. 
2 
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should examine the affidavit for fees and determine that little, if any relevant time, was spent 
on the trespass issue. Moreover, the court only awarded nominal damages of $50 for 
trespass . This is hardly a reason to awatd fees for the pyric victory of the plaintiffs on 
trespass. 
Costs of a matter of right cannot be arg\les and the discretionary cost is minor. 
The defendants object to ao.y award of fees since a contractual or statutory basis does 
not exist. Costs are set by statute. 
The factors of 54(e) are as follows: 
Rule 54(e)(3). Amount of attorney fees. In the event the court grants 
attorney fees to a party o.t parties in a civil action it shall consider the 
following factors in determining the amount of such fees: 
(A) The time and labor required. 
(B) The novelty and difficulty of the questions. 
(C) The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the 
experience and ability of the attorney in the particular field of law. 
(D) The prevailing charges for like work. 
(E) Whether the fee is fixed o.c contingent. 
(F) The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of 
the case. 
(G) The amount involved and the results obtained. 
(H) The undesirability of the case. 
I) The nature and length of the professional relationship ....,rith the 
client. 
0) Awards in similar cases. 
K) The reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer 
Assisted Legal Research), if the court finds it was reasonably necessary in 
preparing a party's case. 
(L) Any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the 
particular case. 
In sum, a statutory basis must exist for the award of fees; and, the rule [54] 
provides fees for the prevailing patty. Costs are determined as of right and by discretion 
pursuant to IRCP, Rule 54(d)(1). Therefore, the court fixes the appropriate award. As 
discussed above, §12-121 cannot apply because the case was defended properly and in good 
faith. Without belaboring the point, it is alleged that the defendant did not plll'sue or 
3 
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defend this cause without basis. The testimony of both parties was heavily contested. The 
court believed the plaintiffs' version of the facts. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant objection is well founded because a contract or statutory basis does 
not exist to support fees. 
Dated this 2M day of February, 20112~ 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
NOTICE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2nd day of February, 2017, I delivered a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to: 
Forrest Fischer, Esq. 
523-9518 
Hand Delivery 
Postage-prepaid Mail 
X Facsimile Transmission 
Courthouse Box 
~
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
Dunn Law Offices, PLLC 
4 
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HOLDEN, KJDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FISCHER, Trustees of the William and Ann 
Fischer Revocable Trust, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. 
CROSTON, husband and wife; 
AND ALL UNKNOWN OWNERS AND/OR 
OTHER PERSONS OR ENTITIES 
CLAIMING ANY INTEREST IN THE 
FOLLOWING DESCRIBED REAL 
PROPERTY: 
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 4, 
Block 12, of the Original Ammon Townsite, 
Bonneville County, Idaho; running thence N. 
88°33'58" W. 330.00 feet to the Northwest 
corner of said Lot 4; thence S. 00°00'2l"W. 
along the West line of said Lot 4 a distance of 
8.99 feet to an existing fence line; thence S. 
89°41 '36" E. along said existing fence line 
329.90 feet to a point on the East line of said 
Lot 4; thence N. 00°00'21" E. along said East 
line 2.50 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING 
Defendants. 
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JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. 
CROSTON, husband and wife; 
Counter Claimants, 
vs . 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FISCHER, 1 rustees of the William and Ann 
Fischer Revocable Trust, 
Counter Defendants. 
Plaintiffs/Counter Defendants, William R. Fischer And M. Ann Fischer, Trustees of the 
William and Ann Fischer Revocable Trust ("Plaintiffs") by and through their counsel of record, 
Holden Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo P.L.L.C., herby submit this Reply in Support of Plaintiffs 
Memorandum of Attorneys ' Fees and Costs ("Reply") pursuant to Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Defendants do not object the amount of attorneys' fees and costs requested by 
Plaintiffs. 
As a preliminary matter, the Comt should take notice that within their "Objection to the 
Plaintiffs Request for Fees and Costs" ( 'Objection") Defendants James F. Croston and Mrujorie 
C. Croston ("Defendants") do not challenge, or otherwise object to: (1) the reasonableness of the 
attorneys' fees and costs requested by Plaintiffs; (2) the ru11om1t of time expended; (3) the hourly 
rates charged by Plaintiffs attorneys; or (4) the total amount of fees requested, as detailed in the 
Affidavit of W. Forrest Fischer in Support of Memorandum of Attorneys' Fees and Costs. By 
failing to object on these grounds Defendants waived their ability and right to contest the arnoLmt 
of attorneys ' fees. Farris Wh le. , Inc. v. Howell, 105 Idaho 699 704, 672 P.2d 577,582 (Ct. App. 
1983). Therefore if the Court de ms that Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and 
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costs, it should consider the amounts claimed as unchallenged and subject only to the Court's 
discretion. 
2. An award of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees is mandatory under Idaho Code§ 6-202. 
Defendants' sole argument alleges that Plaintiffs lack a statutory basis to support an award 
of attorneys' fees and costs in their favor. Objection, p. 4. Defendants are incorrect. The Comt 
fo und that Defendants trespassed upon Plaintiffs' prope1ty pmsuant to Idaho Code § 6-202. 
Violation of this statute carries with it a mandatory award of attorneys' fees for the prevailing 
party. 
Idaho Code § 6-202 states that any person who commits trespass "is liable to the owner of 
such land .. . for treble the amount of damages which may be assessed therefor or fifty dollars 
($50.00), plus a reasonable attorney's fee which shall be taxed as costs, in any civil action brought 
to enforce the terms of this act if the plaintiff prevails." In applying this statute, Idaho case law 
clearly holds that " in a trespass action . . . J.C. § 6-202 mandates that a reasonable attorney fee be 
awarded to the prevailing ' plaintiff. "' Bubak v. Evans, 11 7 Idaho 510, 512, 788 P.2d 1333, 1335 
(Ct. App. 1989) (emphasis added); see also Akers v. Mortensen, 156 Idaho 27, 36, 320 P.3d 418, 
427 (20 14). 
In this case, an award of Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and costs is mandatory. Specifica lly, 
the Court found that Defendants, "through their agents, crossed the old fence line into [Plaintiffs'] 
property and installed a fence" and therefore held that Defendants committed trespass under Idaho 
Code § 6-202. Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 9 ("Decision"). Thus, the Comt awarded 
Plaintiffs' the statutory fine of $50.00 in damages, while reserving the award of attorneys' fees fo r 
subsequent briefing: 
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Section 6-202 also allows for a reasonable attorney fee for a party 
who prevails on a trespass claim .... such attorney fees are to be taxes 
as costs in reference to Rule 54. 
Decision, at I 0. Because Defendants violated Idaho Code § 6-202 and because Plaintiffs are the 
prevailing party, the Cow1 is required to award Plaintiffs their attorneys' fees as a matter of law. 
Buback, 117 Idaho at 512, 788 P.2d at 1335. Defendants' counter argument that Plaintiffs are not 
entitled to an award of fees is incorrect and should be di sregarded. 
3. Defendants' apportionment argument is inapplicable because Plaintiffs' claims 
for relief are inextricably intertwined. 
Defendants also argue that the "[t]he court should examine the affidavit for fees and 
determine that little, if any relevant time, was spend on the trespass issue." Objection, at pp. 2-3. 
While not specifically stated, it appears that Defendants are making a one-lined argument for an 
appo11iomnent of attorneys' fees . However, Defendants provide no statutory basis or case law to 
support such an apportionment argument. Furthermore, Defendants place the onus of determining 
the amount of apportionment on the Court - i.e. they want the Cowt make their arguments for 
them. This is improper. As stated by the Idaho Supreme Court, any motion objecting to fees must 
comply with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b)(l) which requires that it "state with particularity 
the grounds therefor." Fagen, Inc. v. Rogerson Flats Wind Park, LLC, 159 Idaho 624, 628, 364 
P.3d 1189, 1193 (2016). In Fagen, the Idaho Supreme Court affi rmed the lower court's ruling that 
failing to provide specific objections functionally results in a failure to object altogether: 
Defendants fail to raise any specific objection, or to point out any specific 
time/work entry or other billing entry of Fagen's materials submitted in 
suppo11 of its attorney fees claim as objectionable. Absent such specific 
objection, the Court concludes that Defendants have fai led to identify or 
demonstrate with any degree of particularity any manner in which Fagen's 
claimed attorney fees are unreasonable, disproportionate, excessive, or 
otherwise inappropriate. 
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Id. In this case, Defendants similarly fa iled to " identify or demonstrate with any degree of 
particularity" that Plaintiffs' claim of attorneys' fees are "umeasonable, dispropo11ionate, 
excessive, or otherwise inappropriate." Accordingly, the Court should disregard Defendants' 
objections and consider Plaintiffs' request fo r fees and costs as w1opposed. 
Even if Defendants brought a proper objection, Plaintiffs are still entitled to the full an1ount 
of their attorneys' fees and costs because issues in this case are inextricably intertwined. Plaintiffs' 
trespass claim against Defendants is inseparable from their other claims within the Complaint. In 
cases where a claim for trespass is intertwined or overlaps with other causes of action, Idaho courts 
have awarded attorneys' fees under Idaho Code §6-202 to cover those associated claims. See 
Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629,644, 862 P.2d 321,336 (Ct. App. 1993) ("some of the 
legal work performed on those claims overlapped with Kent's successful claim for trespass to the 
west end of his lot, and that Kent was entitled to recover those fees."); Bubak v. Evans, 117 Idaho 
510, 513, 788 P.2d 1333, 1336 (Ct. App. 1989) (finding that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion when it awarded all of plaintiffs attorney's fees under I.C. § 6-202 even though the 
lawsuit included a quiet title action). Moreover, Plaintiffs' trespass claim goes to the heart of 
Defendants' Counterclaim. Plaintiffs ' claim fo r trespass entirely depended upon establishing that 
the Old Fence marked the true boundary line between the parties' respective properties and that 
Tract I legally belonged to them by operation of boundary line by agreement or acquiescence. See 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs ' 1\llotion for Summary Judgment, p. 27, Dec. 20, 2016 
("Memorandum"). One of the required elements ofldaho Code § 6-202 to establish a trespass is 
entry "upon the real property of another. " In order to establish this element, Plaintiffs had to 
demonstrate that Tract 1 legally belonged to them, while at the same time refuting Defendants' 
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counterclaim claiming title to Tract l. Thus, Plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim for trespass 
without establishing and prevailing on their other claims and rebutting Defendants' Counterclaim. 
For these reasons, apportionment of the fees claimed by Plaintiff are unwarranted because 
all the time expended in this case culminated in the Court holding Defendants guilty of trespass 
tmder Idaho Code § 6-202. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover all their attorneys ' fees 
and costs tmder the provisions ofldaho Code §6-202. 
4. If the Court apportions Plaintiffs' award of attorney' fees based on trespass, the 
remainder of their attorneys' fees should be awarded pursuant to Idaho Code § 
12-121. 
Plaintiffs also requested attorneys' fees under Idaho Code§ 12-12 1. This statute provides 
that the "judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party or pa11ies." If the 
Court app011ions Plaintiffs' award of attorneys' fees based on trespass, then the remainder of their 
attorneys' fees should be awarded to Plaintiffs as the prevailing party pursuant to Idaho Code § 
12-121. 
Currently, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(2) - which is set to be struck on March 1, 
2017 - limits the courts ' discretion to award attorney fees to those instances where the case was 
"brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." A claim is 
frivolous if it is " [l]acking a legal basis or legal merit." Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
Idaho courts have found that a pai1y's failure to provide argument or authority to support his or 
her claim is sufficient for an award of attorneys' fees to the prevailing opposing patty, under Idaho 
Code§ 12-12 1. See Anson v. Les Bois Race Track, Inc., 130 Idaho 303,305,939 P.2d 1382, 1384 
(1997); see also Peasley Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smith, 132 Idaho 732, 744, 979 P.2d 605, 617 
(1999) (failure to provide proper authority in briefing and failing to provide evidence showing a 
cause of action are grounds fo r an award of attorneys' fees tmder LC. §12-121). 
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Here, Defendants' Counterclaim and overall opposition in this matter was frivolous and 
pursued without foundation. Defendants conclusively demonstrated this fact by failing to provide 
even a scintilla of legal authority or evidence to suppo1t their claims during the summary judgment 
proceedings. Defendants' Objection is also fri volous for the same reasons. Defendants make 
allegations and claims of fact within their Objection that are not supported by the record or the 
Court's Decision. They argue that an oral agreement existed between the parties, and that this 
agreement justified their Counterclaim. However, this Court clearly held that there was no 
evidence that such an agreement between the parties existed . Decision, at 7. Furthermore, 
Defendants seek to introduce a new argument that the new fence they erected was only 
" temporary," as though (1 ) there was evidence of this temporary nature; and (2) that the nature of 
the fence somehow renders their Counterclaim and defenses reasonable. Obj ection, at 2. There 
are simply no facts within the record that support this claim. 
In the end, Defendants' Objection serves as yet another illustration that their Counterclaim 
and opposition in this matter was frivolous and without basis or foundation. Defendants cannot 
simply throw out haphazard arguments, lacking any support whatsoever, only to then claim that 
these arguments were based on law and fact without consequence. 
If the Court does not find that Defendants defended frivolously, umeasonably, or without 
foundation, Plaintiffs are neve1theless entitled to their fees and costs under Idaho Code § 12-1 21 
due to the reasoning in the Idaho Supreme Court's recent decision Hoffer v. Shappard, 160 Idaho 
870,380 P.3d 681 , 696 (201 6). In Hoffer, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that "prevailing parties 
in civil litigation have the right to be made whole for attorney fees they have incurred 'when justice 
so requires."' Id. ( citation omitted) . Though the court made this ruling prospective, taking effect 
on March 1, 2017, the court's reasoning for the change arguably warrants that it take effect 
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immediately. Specifically, the Idaho Supreme Comi fom1d that the court lacked authority to 
change a clear legislative pronouncement when it adopted Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(2), 
which limits recovery under Idaho Code § 12-121 to cases where claims were brought or defended 
"frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." If the court had no authority to restrict the 
effect ofldaho Code§ 12-121, then the restrictions ofldaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(2) are 
void ab initio, and not merely after March 1, 2017 if the legislature chooses not to act. 
Accoridngly, the Court should award Plaintiffs their reasonable attorneys' fees under Idaho Code 
§ 12-121. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs request that they be awarded all their attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Idaho 
Codes §§ 6-202 and 12-121. As set forth by the Affidavit of W Forrest Fischer in Support of 
Memorandum of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, the total amount of attorneys ' fees and costs requested 
are reasonable, given the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the legal questions 
in the case, the prevailing charges for like work, the experience, skill and ability of the attorneys 
performing the work and the results obtained. Importantly Defendants do not challenge Plaintiffs 
on these issues. Instead, Defendants sole contention is that no fees should be awarded at all. This 
argument is flawed because Idaho courts have expressly held that attorneys' fees are mandatory to 
the prevailing party in a trespass action. Accordingly, Plaintiffs request that they be awarded all 
their attorneys' fees and costs in this action. 
-t~ 
DATED this (c; day of February, 2017. 
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WorrestFiser 
HOLDEN, KLDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in 
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the ~ .\'½ day of February, 2017, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with th correct postage 
thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with IRCP 5(b ). 
Persons Served: 
Robin D . Dunn 
Dunn Law Offices, PLLC 
4 77 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box277 
Rigby ID 83422 
Fax: (208) 745-8160 
Method of Service: 
• Mail 
)r Fax 
• Hand Delivery 
• Other: 
--- - - --
G:\WPDATA\WFF\1861] (Fischer Properly)\Pleadings\10 - Reply in Support of Memo of Fees and Costs\Reply in Support of Atty Fees and 
Costs.docx 
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DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC. 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq., ISB #2903 
477 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby ID 83442 
Telephone: (208) 745-9202 
Facsimile: (208) 745-8160 
.rdmm@durmlawoffices.com 
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Attorney for Defendants/ Appellants James F. and Marjorie C. Croston 
IN TH DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FISCHER, 
Trustees of the William and Ann Fischer 
Revocable Trust, 
Plaintiffs/ Respondents, 
vs. 
JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. 
CROSTON, husband and wife; 
AND ALL UNKNOWN OWNERS AND/OR 
OTHER PERSONS OR ENTITIES 
CLAIMING ANY INTEREST IN THE 
FOLLOWING DESCRIBED REAL 
PROPERTY: 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Beginning at the Northeast comer of Lot 4, Block ) 
12, of the Original Ammon Town site, Bonneville ) 
County, Idaho; running thence N. 88°33'58" W. ) 
330.00 feet to the Northwest corner of said Lot 4; ) 
thence S 00°00'21"W. along the West line of said ) 
Lot 4 a distance of 8.99 feet to an existing fence ) 
line; thence S. 89°41'36" E. along said existing ) 
fence line 329.90 feet to a point on the East line of ) 
said Lot 4; thence N. 00°00'21" E. along said East ) 
line 2.50 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING. ) 
) 
Defendants/ Appellants. 
Case No. CV-16-2894 
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TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS; AND THE CLERK OF THE 
ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellants appeal against the above named Respondents 
to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final Order Re: Memorandum Decision and Order 
(Summary Judgment) and Judgment entered in the above entitled action with the judgment 
being entered on the 19th day of January, 2017 the Honorable Joel E. Tingey, presiding. 
2. The Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgment/ order described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant 
to Rule 11(a) I.A.R., as follows: (1) Final judgments, as defined in Rule 54(a) of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure including judgments of the district court granting or denying 
peremptory writs of mandate and prohibition 
3. The issue(s) on appeal include, but are not limited, to the following: 
a. The findings of fact are inconsistent with the conclusions of law as to 
the issue of preexisting boundary line. 
b. Material issues of fact precluded summary judgment. 
c. The defendants counterclaim was improperly dismissed. 
d. Attorney fees are pending and may be included in the appeal. 
e. Attorney fees and costs should be awarded to the Appellants at trial 
and on appeal. 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. A reporter's transcript IS NOT requested as oral argument was all that 
occurred before the court reporter and is not testimony. 
6. The Appellants request that the following documents be included in the 
NOTICE OF APPEAL -2-
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clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, l.A.R.: 
-The repository of the case. 
-The minute entry. 
-All affidavits and declarations. 
-The court's memorandum decision and Judgment as dated above. 
-The court's post-trial rulings. 
7. The undersigned certifies: 
a. That a copy of the notice of appeal has NOT been served on the 
certified short hand reporter because there is not a request for a record; and, all that exists is 
oral argument on the summary judgment motion. 
b. That the Appellants have made contact with the clerk of the district 
court and are in the process of obtaining the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's 
record; 
c. That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been 
paid or will be paid; 
d. That appellate filing fee has been paid; and 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20, I.A.R. 
DATED this 7'5 day of February, 2017. 
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
NOTICE OF APPEAL -3-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ..2..,3_ day of February, 2017, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing was delivered to the following persons(s) by: 
DOCUMENT SERVED: Notice of Appeal 
ATTORNEYS AND/OR INDIVIDUALS SERVED: 
Forrest Fischer, Esq. 
Andrew Rawlings, Esq. 
Facsimile 523-9518 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN AND CRAPO, PLLC 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
NOTICE OF APPEAL -4-
Robin D. Dunn, Esq. 
DUNN LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH WDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. A 
FISCHER, Trustees of the William and Ann 
Fischer Revocable Trust, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. 
CROSTON, husband and wife, et al. 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
Judgment is entered as follows: 
Case No. CV-2016-2894 
JUDGMENT OF COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Plaintiffs are awarded costs in the amount of $266 and attorney fees in the amount 
of $2,670.50 for a total award of $2,936.50, with interest accruing thereon at the statutory 
rate. 
Dated this E.,_ day of February, 2017. 
JUDGMENT- I 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ;J_ J day of February, 2017, I did send a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing docume~on the parties listed below by mailing, with the 
correct postage thereon, or by placement in the courthouse mailbox. 
Karl R. Decker 
W. Forrest Fischer 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO 
1000 Riverwalk Dr., Suite 200 
P.O. Box 50 130 5l3-15/~ 
Robin D. Dunn 
Dunn Law Offices 
4 77 Pleasant County Lane 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83422 ( 4-5- cg I & 0 
JUDGMENT-2 
Clerk of the District Court 
Bonneville County, Idaho 
By ~ 
Deputy Clerk 
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17 FEB 24 A9 :S3 
IN THE DISTRICT CO RT O • THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF JIE ST ATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF 80 VILLE 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
I CHER, Tru tees of the William and Ann 
Fi cher R vocable Trust, 
Plaintiffs, 
V . 
JAMES F. CROSTO and MARJORIE C. 
CROST , husband and wife, et al. , 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
Case No. CV-2016-2894 
ORDE 
This matter has come before th Court upon Plaintiffs ' motion for an award of 
costs and attorney fees as against Defendants. Defendants have objected to the request. 
either Party has requested a hearing on this issue. 
Inasmuch as Plaintiffs prevailed on their motion for summary judgment, the Court 
finds that Plaintiffs are the prevailing party in this matter. Based upon Plaintiffs 
memorandum of costs, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitl d to an award of costs in 
the amount of $266. The Court declines to award discretionary costs. 
Attorney Fees 
Plaintiff seeks attorney fees pur uant to I.C. §12-121 and§ 6-202. Section 12-121, 
read in c njunction with Rule 54(e)(2), lRCP allows for an a ard of attorney fees when 
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the court "finds that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably 
or without foundation ... " 
While the Court granted Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, the Court 
cannot conclude that Defendants' claim was unreasonable, frivolous or without 
foundation. Once the subject fence was no longer standing, reasonable minds could 
question the location of the boundary between the properties. Accordingly, the Court 
finds that attorney fees are not awardable under§ 12-121. 
Section 6-202 provides that when a party recovers for trespass under that section, 
that party is also entitled to a "reasonable attorney's fee ... " In considering this action, it 
is the Court's opinion that the primary claim in this matter was to quiet title based upon a 
boundary by agreement. The trespass claim was incidental to that primary claim. 
Accordingly, when considering the factors of Rule 54( e )(3 ), IRCP and the 
"reasonableness" requirement of§ 6-202, the Court finds that the award of attorney fees 
should be tempered and limited to the trespass issue. In consideration of the foregoing, 
the Court awards $2,670.50 in attorney fees. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs are awarded costs in the amount of $266 and attorney fees in 
the amount of $2,670.50 for a total award of $2,936.50. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this '2?/ day of February, 2017. 
ORDER-2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this -& day of 1~ 017, I did send a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document upon the p~ies lisj d below by mailing, with the 
correct postage thereon, or by placement in the courthouse mailbox. 
Karl R. Decker 
W. Forrest Fischer 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO 
I 000 Riverwalk Dr. , Suite 200 
P.O. Box 50 130 
Robin D. Dunn 
Dunn Law Offices 
477 Pleasant County Lane 
P.O. Box 277 
Rigby, ID 83422 
ORDER-3 
Clerk of the District Court 
Bonnevi11e County Idaho 
By ~;1,./ 
Deputy Clerk 
295
Send Result -.eport 
MFP 
(8 K!:j•[ERa 
Fi rmware Vers ion 2NM 2000 .002.304 2015.03.05 
02/24/20 17 09:59 
[2NM_l000.006 002] [2NM_ll00.00 1.004] [2NM_7000 .002 .302] 
Job No .: 00 1411 Total Time: 0°03' 14" Page: 005 
Complete 
Document: doc00141120170224095134 
No . 
001 
002 
N THE DISTIUCT COURT OF THE SEVENrn Jl'DICIAL DfSTRJCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, N AND FOR THE COU"I\ OF BO>INE VILLE 
WILLIAM R FlSCHE'.R and M. .'\;'-11,· 
F!SCHER, Tru5lcei, of the William ond Ann 
fi!cher Revocable- Trust, 
Plll!nfifis, 
vs. 
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. 
Karl R. Decker, ISB #3390 
W. F01Test Fischer, ISB #10009 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Telephone (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile (208) 523-95 18 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
BO NEVILLE COUN TY 
IOAHO 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER and M. ANN 
FISCHER, Trustees of the William and Ann 
Fischer Revocable Trust, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
vs. 
JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE C. 
CROSTON, husband and wife; 
AND ALL UNKNOWN OWNERS AND/OR 
OTHER PERSONS OR ENTITIES 
CLAIMING ANY INTEREST IN THE 
FOLLOWING DESCRIBED REAL 
PROPERTY: 
Beginning at the Northeast comer of Lot 4, 
Block 12, of the Original Ammon Townsite, 
Bonneville County, Idaho; running thence N . 
88°33 '58" W. 330.00 feet to the Northwest 
comer of said Lot 4; thence S. 00°00'21"W. 
along the West line of said Lot 4 a distance of 
8.99 feet to an existing fence line; thence S. 
89°41 '36" E. along said existing fence line 
329.90 feet to a point on the East line of said 
Lot 4; thence N. 00°00'21" E. along said East 
line 2.50 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING 
Defendants/ Appellants 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD - l 
Case No. CV-2016-2894 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL 
RECORD 
ORI AL 
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TO: THE ABOVE NAMED APPELL NTS AND THEIR ATTORNEY, AND THE 
CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVE that Respondents in the above entitled proceeding hereby 
request pursuant to Rule 19 of the Idaho Appellate Rules ("l.A.R."), the inclusion of the fo llowing 
material in the clerk's record in addition to that required to be included by the I.AR. and the notice 
of appeal: 
• Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgement, filed 12/20/201 6; 
• Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment filed 
12/20/2016; 
• Declaration of W. Forrest Fischer in Supp011 of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, filed 12/20/2016; 
• Declaration of M. Ann Fischer, filed 12/20/2016; 
• Declaration of Sharon Anderson filed 12/20/2016; 
• Declaration of Larry Kennedy fil d 12/20/2016; 
• Memorandum of the Defendants in Opposition to Plaintiffs ' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, filed 01/04/201 7· 
• Affidavit of Linda D. Penning in Opposition of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment, fi led 01/04/2017; 
• Verification, filed 0 1/04/2017; 
• Plaintiffs ' Reply Memorandum m Supp01t of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment, filed 01/11 /2017 · 
• Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Affidavit of Linda D. Penning filed 01/11/2017; 
• Declaration of W. Fonest Fi cher in upp011 of Plaintiffs ' Motion to Strik fi led 
01 /11/2017; 
R.EQUE T FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD - 2 
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• Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Affidavit of Linda 
D. Penning, filed 01/11 /2017; 
• Minute Entry, dated 1 /18/207; 
• Memorandum Decision and ORDER, filed 01/19/2017; 
• Judgement, entered 01/19/2017; 
• Memorandum of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, filed 01/31/2017; 
• Affidavit of W. Forrest Fischer in Support of Memorandum of Attorneys' Fees and 
Costs, filed 01/31 /2017; 
• Objection to the Plaintiff s Requests for Fees and Costs, filed 02/02/2017; 
• Reply in Support of Memorandum of Attorneys' Fees and Costs, filed 02/06/2017; and 
• Order, filed 02/24/2017. 
I certify that this request for additional record has been served upon the clerk of the district 
court and upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20. 
DA TED this 8th day of March, 2017. 
~ 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Respondents 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORD - 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, with my office in 
<f:f'r"" 
Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that on the_~ __ day of March, 2017, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing document on the persons listed below by first class mail, with the correct postage 
thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered in accordance with IRCP S(b). 
Persons Served: 
Robin D . Dunn 
Dunn Law Offices, PLLC 
4 77 Pleasant Country Lane 
P.O. Box277 
Rigby ID 83422 
Fax: (208) 745-8160 
Method of Service: 
• Mail 
~ Fax 
• Hand Delivery 
• Other: 
-------
~ 
G:\ WPDAT A\ WFF\ 18611-00 l Fischer Property Appeal\Requesl for Additional Record.docx 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER AND M. ANN ) 
FISCHER ) 
Trustees of the William and Ann Fischer ) 
Revocable Trust, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, ) 
) 
V. ) 
) 
JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE ) 
C. CROSTON, husband and wife; ) 
) 
AND ALL UNKNOWN OWNERS ) 
AND/OR OTHER PERSONS OR ) 
ENTITIES CLAIMING ANY ) 
INTEREST IN THE FOLLOWING ) 
DESCRIBED REAL PROPERTY: ) 
) 
Beginning at the Northeast comer of Lot ) 
4, Block 12, of the Original Ammon ) 
Town site, Bonneville County, Idaho; ) 
running thence N. 88 33'58" W. 330.00 ) 
feet to the Northwest corner of said Lot ) 
4; thence S 00 00'21 "W. along the West ) 
line of said Lot 4 a distance of 8.99 feet ) 
to an existing fence line; 329.90 feet to a ) 
point on the East line of said Lot 4; ) 
thence N. 00 00'21" E. along said East ) 
line 2.50 feet to the POINT OF ) 
BEGINNING., ) 
) 
Defendants/ Appellants. ) 
______________ ) 
ST A TE OF IDAHO ) 
) 
County of Bonneville ) 
Case No. CV-2016-2894 
Docket No. 44887 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATION 
OF EXHIBITS 
I, Penny Manning, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State 
of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville, do hereby certify that the foregoing Exhibits were 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATION OF EXHIBITS- I 
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marked for identification and offered in evidence, admitted, and used and considered by the 
Court in its determination: 
No Exhibits were admitted. 
And I further certify that all of said Exhibits are on file in my office and are part ofthis 
record on Appeal in this cause, and are hereby transmitted to the Supreme Court. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the 
District Court this -J.i2-- day of May, 2017. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATION OF EXHIBITS- 2 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER AND M. ANN ) 
FISCHER ) 
Trustees of the William and Ann Fischer ) 
Revocable Trust, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, ) 
) 
V. ) 
) 
JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE ) 
C. CROSTON, husband and wife; ) 
) 
AND ALL UNKNOWN OWNERS ) 
AND/OR OTHER PERSONS OR ) 
ENTITIES CLAIMING ANY ) 
INTEREST IN THE FOLLOWING ) 
DESCRIBED REAL PROPERTY: ) 
) 
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot ) 
4, Block 12, of the Original Ammon ) 
Town site, Bonneville County, Idaho; ) 
running thence N. 88 33'58" W. 330.00 ) 
feet to the Northwest corner of said Lot ) 
4; thence S 00 00'21 "W. along the West ) 
line of said Lot 4 a distance of 8.99 feet ) 
to an existing fence line; 329.90 feet to a ) 
point on the East line of said Lot 4; ) 
thence N. 00 00'21" E. along said East ) 
line 2.50 feet to the POINT OF ) 
BEGINNING., ) 
) 
Defendants/ Appellants. ) 
______________ ) 
STATE OF IDAHO 
County of Bonneville 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-2016-2894 
Docket No. 44887 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I, Penny Manning, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State 
ofldaho, in and for the County of Bonneville, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE- I 
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Record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, 
correct and complete Record of the pleadings and documents as are automatically required under 
Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
I do further certify that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the above-entitled cause, will 
be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the Court Reporter's Transcript 
(if requested) and the Clerk's Record as required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand affixed the seal of the District 
Court this J1)__ day of May, 2017. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE - 2 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
WILLIAM R. FISCHER AND M. ANN ) 
FISCHER ) 
Trustees of the William and Ann Fischer ) 
Revocable Trust, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, ) 
) 
V. ) 
) 
JAMES F. CROSTON and MARJORIE ) 
C. CROSTON, husband and wife; ) 
) 
AND ALL UNKNOWN OWNERS ) 
AND/OR OTHER PERSONS OR ) 
ENTITIES CLAIMING ANY ) 
INTEREST IN THE FOLLOWING ) 
DESCRIBED REAL PROPERTY: ) 
) 
Beginning at the Northeast comer of Lot ) 
4, Block 12, of the Original Ammon ) 
Town site, Bonneville County, Idaho; ) 
running thence N . 88 33'58" W. 330.00 ) 
feet to the Northwest comer of said Lot ) 
4; thence S 00 00'21 "W. along the West ) 
line of said Lot 4 a distance of 8.99 feet ) 
to an existing fence line; 329.90 feet to a ) 
point on the East line of said Lot 4; ) 
thence N. 00 00'21" E. along said East ) 
line 2.50 feet to the POINT OF ) 
BEGINNING., ) 
) 
Defendants/ Appellants. ) 
__________ ) 
Case No. CV-201 6-2894 
Docket No. 44887 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the f.D_ day of May, 2017, I served a copy of the 
Reporter's Transcript (if requested) and the Clerk's Record in the Appeal to the Supreme Court in 
the above entitled cause upon the following attorneys: 
Robin D. Dunn 
4 77 Pleasant County Ln. 
Rigby, ID 83442 
CLERK'S CERTIF'ICA TE OF SERVICE- I 
Karl R. Decker 
1000 River Walk Dr. # 200 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
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by depositing a copy of each thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, in an envelope 
addressed to said attorneys at the foregoing address, which is the last address of said attorneys 
known to me. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE- 2 
